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シグネチャを使用せずにSolarWindsハックを解剖する

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06
2021年1月
06
2021年1月
このブログでは、SolarWinds社製品に対するハッキングに関連する活動をシグネチャに依存せずに検知した方法と、自己学習型アプローチがこの高度持続的脅威(APT)を捕捉するための最良のメカニズムである理由を説明します。

SolarWindsハックのハイレベルな説明については、最下部の動画(英語)をご覧ください。

SolarWindsに対するSUNBURSTマルウェア攻撃は、企業のデジタル環境に対する不安を高めることになりました。2020年3月のソフトウェアアップデート時にインストールされたマルウェアにより、高度な攻撃者が顧客のデータや知的財産を含むかもしれないファイルに対して不正にアクセスできるようになりました。

DarktraceはSolarWindsを使用しておらず、当社の業務はこの侵害の影響を受けていません。しかしながら、SolarWindsはかなりの数のDarktraceの顧客に使用されているIT監視ツールです。本稿では、この侵害に関連した各種の動作を指摘しセキュリティチームに警告するDarktraceの検知事例を紹介します。

これはSolarWinds侵害の事例ではなく、このタイプの侵害により発生する異常な挙動の例を説明したものです。これらの例は、過去のデータから今日の脅威を予測しようとするシグネチャベースのアプローチではなく、エンタープライズ内の正常な「生活パターン」を理解する能力を持つ、自己学習型Cyber AIの価値を強調するものです。

Darktraceは既知の悪意あるシグネチャではなくデバイスアクティビティのパターンを検知するため、本稿で紹介するテクニックの検知はさらなる設定を必要とすることなくDarktraceの能力の範囲内です。このテクノロジーはデバイスのクラスタを自動的に「仲間集団」に分け、個別のデバイスが特異な挙動を示したケースを検知することができます。シグネチャベースの検知をトリガーしないようにある程度のステルス性をもってシステムにアクセスする攻撃者を捕捉するには、自己学習型アプローチの使用が実現しうる最高のメカニズムであると言えます。

これらのモデルの多くが他のモデルとの組み合わせでトリガーされることにより時間の経過とともに検知強度が高まり、ここでDarktraceの自律的インシデントトリアージ機能であるCyber AI Analyst がセキュリティチームに代わってアラートの調査を行う重要な役割を果たします。Cyber AI Analystはセキュリティチームの貴重な時間を節約するものであり、ここから出力される結果は警戒活動中には高い優先度で扱うべきものです。

SolarWindsがAIで検知された経緯

多くのケースにおいて自動化された最初の攻撃に続いて実行される、ハンズオンでの侵入の最も巧妙な方法を詳しく見ていきましょう。攻撃においてポストエクスプロイト部分はきわめて多様でありステルス性の高いものです。また、これらの段階は予測がほぼ不可能です。この段階でのそれぞれのターゲットに対する攻撃者の意図と目標によって決まるためです。これによりシグネチャ、脅威インテリジェンスや静的なユースケースの使用は実質的に役に立たなくなってしまいます。

自動化された、最初のマルウェア実行は理解すべき重要な最初のステップではありますが、動作はマルウェアに事前に設定されており、これにはペイロードのダウンロードとドメイン生成アルゴリズム(DGA)ベースのavsvmcloud[.]comのサブドメインへの接続が含まれていました。これらの自動化された最初の攻撃ステージはコミュニティによって詳細が十分に研究されています。本稿ではこれらの研究結果に何かを加えるものではなく、感染後に起こる可能性のあるアクティビティについて検討していきます。

マルウェア/C2ドメイン

脅威アクターは後期ステージのC2(Command and Control)インフラに、標的の環境で見つかった本物のホスト名を設定しました。これにより攻撃者が環境に溶け込み、疑惑を回避し、検知をすり抜けることができます。彼らはさらに、標的に地理的に近いC2サーバを使用して、静的なジオロケーションベースの信頼リストを回避しようとしました。Darktraceはこの種のテクニックには影響されません。ジオロケーションに対する暗黙的な事前定義された信頼を持っていないためです。

これらの動作は次のようなDarktrace Cyber AIモデルをトリガーする可能性が非常に高いと言えます。これらのモデルはSolarWindsの改変を検知するよう特に設計されたものではなく、すでに何年間も使われています。これらは組織のネットワーク内で発生する、わずかな予兆でありながら重大になり得る攻撃者のアクティビティを検知するよう設計されたものです。

  • Compromise / Agent Beacon to New Endpoint
  • Compromise / SSL Beaconing to New Endpoint
  • Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to New Endpoint*

*インプラントはSSLを使用しますが、プロキシを使用した場合HTTPと識別される場合があります。

異なる認証情報を使った水平移動

攻撃者は流出した認証情報でネットワークに対するアクセス権を獲得すると、複数の異なる認証情報を使って水平方向に移動しました。水平移動に使用された認証情報はリモートアクセスに使用されたものとは常に異なっていました。

これは次のCyber AIモデルをトリガーする可能性が非常に高いでしょう:

  • User / Multiple Uncommon New Credentials on Device
図1:単一のデバイスから複数のユーザー認証情報を使った異常な(新規)ログインに対する違反イベントログの例
  • User / New Admin Credentials on Client
図2:異常な管理者ログインに対する違反イベントログの例

一時的なファイルの置き換えと一時的なタスク変更

攻撃者はリモートでユーティリティを実行するため一時的ファイル置き換えテクニックを使いました。正しいユーティリティを彼らのファイルと置き換え、ペイロードを実行し、その後元の正しいファイルに戻したのです。同様に、スケジュールされたタスクを操作しました。既存の正しいタスクを更新して彼らのツールを実行させ、その後スケジュールされたタスクを元通りの構成に戻しました。彼らは決まってツールを削除しました。正式にアクセスできるようになると、バックドアも削除したのです。

この動作は次のようなCyber AIモデルをトリガーする可能性が非常に高いと言えます。

  • Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
図3:あまり使われないサービスコントロールを示す違反の例
  • Anomalous Connection / High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control
図4:10件のあまり使われないサービスコントロールを示す違反の例
  • Device / AT Service Scheduled Task
図5:新しいATサービスのスケジュールされたタスクを示す違反イベント
  • Device / Multiple RPC Requests for Unknown Services
図6:不明なRPCサービスへの複数のバインドを示す違反例
  • Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches
図7:異常なSMBアクティビティと遅いビーコニングを示す違反例
  • Device / Suspicious File Writes to Multiple Hidden SMB Shares
図8:デバイスが.batファイルを別のデバイスの一時フォルダに書き込んでいることを示す違反例
  • Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB to New or Unusual Locations
図9:SAMRへの新たなアクセスとともに、SMB ReadおよびKerberosログイン失敗が見られる
  • Unusual Activity / Sustained Anomalous SMB Activity
図10:このデバイスにおいてSMBアクティビティに著しい逸脱が見られる

SolarWindsの侵害にいつでも対処

認証情報がどこで使われているか、どのデバイスが相互に通信しているかを理解することにより、Cyber AIはビジネスシステムに対するかつてない、動的な理解を持っています。これにより、サイバーリスクを示すものかもしれないエンタープライズの変化をリアルタイムにセキュリティチームに対して警告することができます。

これらのアラートはAIがそれを取り巻く独自の環境についての「正常」をどのように学び、SUNBURSTに直接関係のあるものを含めた逸脱についてオペレータに警告するかを示すものです。さらに、適切な可視性と検知機能を持たなかったこれらのネットワークを攻撃者がどのように悪用したかについての情報も提供してくれます。

これらのアラートに加えて、Cyber AI Analystは、検知結果を時系列で自動的に相関づけ、包括的かつ分かりやすいインシデントサマリーを自動生成することによりトリアージの時間を大幅に短縮することができます。今後数週間はCyber AI Analystアラートの確認に高い優先度を設定しておくべきでしょう。


INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
AUTHOR
ABOUT ThE AUTHOR
Max Heinemeyer
Chief Product Officer

Max is a cyber security expert with over a decade of experience in the field, specializing in a wide range of areas such as Penetration Testing, Red-Teaming, SIEM and SOC consulting and hunting Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups. At Darktrace, Max is closely involved with Darktrace’s strategic customers & prospects. He works with the R&D team at Darktrace, shaping research into new AI innovations and their various defensive and offensive applications. Max’s insights are regularly featured in international media outlets such as the BBC, Forbes and WIRED. Max holds an MSc from the University of Duisburg-Essen and a BSc from the Cooperative State University Stuttgart in International Business Information Systems.

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A Thorn in Attackers’ Sides: How Darktrace Uncovered a CACTUS Ransomware Infection

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24
Apr 2024

What is CACTUS Ransomware?

In May 2023, Kroll Cyber Threat Intelligence Analysts identified CACTUS as a new ransomware strain that had been actively targeting large commercial organizations since March 2023 [1]. CACTUS ransomware gets its name from the filename of the ransom note, “cAcTuS.readme.txt”. Encrypted files are appended with the extension “.cts”, followed by a number which varies between attacks, e.g. “.cts1” and “.cts2”.

As the cyber threat landscape adapts to ever-present fast-paced technological change, ransomware affiliates are employing progressively sophisticated techniques to enter networks, evade detection and achieve their nefarious goals.

How does CACTUS Ransomware work?

In the case of CACTUS, threat actors have been seen gaining initial network access by exploiting Virtual Private Network (VPN) services. Once inside the network, they may conduct internal scanning using tools like SoftPerfect Network Scanner, and PowerShell commands to enumerate endpoints, identify user accounts, and ping remote endpoints. Persistence is maintained by the deployment of various remote access methods, including legitimate remote access tools like Splashtop, AnyDesk, and SuperOps RMM in order to evade detection, along with malicious tools like Cobalt Strike and Chisel. Such tools, as well as custom scripts like TotalExec, have been used to disable security software to distribute the ransomware binary. CACTUS ransomware is unique in that it adopts a double-extortion tactic, stealing data from target networks and then encrypting it on compromised systems [2].

At the end of November 2023, cybersecurity firm Arctic Wolf reported instances of CACTUS attacks exploiting vulnerabilities on the Windows version of the business analytics platform Qlik, specifically CVE-2023-41266, CVE-2023-41265, and CVE-2023-48365, to gain initial access to target networks [3]. The vulnerability tracked as CVE-2023-41266 can be exploited to generate anonymous sessions and perform HTTP requests to unauthorized endpoints, whilst CVE-2023-41265 does not require authentication and can be leveraged to elevate privileges and execute HTTP requests on the backend server that hosts the application [2].

Darktrace’s Coverage of CACTUS Ransomware

In November 2023, Darktrace observed malicious actors leveraging the aforementioned method of exploiting Qlik to gain access to the network of a customer in the US, more than a week before the vulnerability was reported by external researchers.

Here, Qlik vulnerabilities were successfully exploited, and a malicious executable (.exe) was detonated on the network, which was followed by network scanning and failed Kerberos login attempts. The attack culminated in the encryption of numerous files with extensions such as “.cts1”, and SMB writes of the ransom note “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to multiple internal devices, all of which was promptly identified by Darktrace DETECT™.

While traditional rules and signature-based detection tools may struggle to identify the malicious use of a legitimate business platform like Qlik, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was able to confidently identify anomalous use of the tool in a CACTUS ransomware attack by examining the rarity of the offending device’s surrounding activity and comparing it to the learned behavior of the device and its peers.

Unfortunately for the customer in this case, Darktrace RESPOND™ was not enabled in autonomous response mode during their encounter with CACTUS ransomware meaning that attackers were able to successfully escalate their attack to the point of ransomware detonation and file encryption. Had RESPOND been configured to autonomously act on any unusual activity, Darktrace could have prevented the attack from progressing, stopping the download of any harmful files, or the encryption of legitimate ones.

Cactus Ransomware Attack Overview

Holiday periods have increasingly become one of the favoured times for malicious actors to launch their attacks, as they can take advantage of the festive downtime of organizations and their security teams, and the typically more relaxed mindset of employees during this period [4].

Following this trend, in late November 2023, Darktrace began detecting anomalous connections on the network of a customer in the US, which presented multiple indicators of compromise (IoCs) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) associated with CACTUS ransomware. The threat actors in this case set their attack in motion by exploiting the Qlik vulnerabilities on one of the customer’s critical servers.

Darktrace observed the server device making beaconing connections to the endpoint “zohoservice[.]net” (IP address: 45.61.147.176) over the course of three days. This endpoint is known to host a malicious payload, namely a .zip file containing the command line connection tool PuttyLink [5].

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to autonomously identify over 1,000 beaconing connections taking place on the customer’s network and group them together, in this case joining the dots in an ongoing ransomware attack. AI Analyst recognized that these repeated connections to highly suspicious locations were indicative of malicious command-and-control (C2) activity.

Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.

The infected device was then observed downloading the file “putty.zip” over a HTTP connection using a PowerShell user agent. Despite being labelled as a .zip file, Darktrace’s detection capabilities were able to identify this as a masqueraded PuttyLink executable file. This activity resulted in multiple Darktrace DETECT models being triggered. These models are designed to look for suspicious file downloads from endpoints not usually visited by devices on the network, and files whose types are masqueraded, as well as the anomalous use of PowerShell. This behavior resembled previously observed activity with regards to the exploitation of Qlik Sense as an intrusion technique prior to the deployment of CACTUS ransomware [5].

The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.
Figure 2: The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.

Following the download of the masqueraded file, Darktrace observed the initial infected device engaging in unusual network scanning activity over the SMB, RDP and LDAP protocols. During this activity, the credential, “service_qlik” was observed, further indicating that Qlik was exploited by threat actors attempting to evade detection. Connections to other internal devices were made as part of this scanning activity as the attackers attempted to move laterally across the network.

Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.
Figure 3: Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.

The compromised server was then seen initiating multiple sessions over the RDP protocol to another device on the customer’s network, namely an internal DNS server. External researchers had previously observed this technique in CACTUS ransomware attacks where an RDP tunnel was established via Plink [5].

A few days later, on November 24, Darktrace identified over 20,000 failed Kerberos authentication attempts for the username “service_qlik” being made to the internal DNS server, clearly representing a brute-force login attack. There is currently a lack of open-source intelligence (OSINT) material definitively listing Kerberos login failures as part of a CACTUS ransomware attack that exploits the Qlik vulnerabilities. This highlights Darktrace’s ability to identify ongoing threats amongst unusual network activity without relying on existing threat intelligence, emphasizing its advantage over traditional security detection tools.

Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.
Figure 4: Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.

In the month following these failed Kerberos login attempts, between November 26 and December 22, Darktrace observed multiple internal devices encrypting files within the customer’s environment with the extensions “.cts1” and “.cts7”. Devices were also seen writing ransom notes with the file name “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to two additional internal devices, as well as files likely associated with Qlik, such as “QlikSense.pdf”. This activity detected by Darktrace confirmed the presence of a CACTUS ransomware infection that was spreading across the customer’s network.

The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.
Figure 5: The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.
CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.
Figure 6: CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.

Following this initial encryption activity, two affected devices were observed attempting to remove evidence of this activity by deleting the encrypted files.

Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.
Figure 7: Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.

結論

In the face of this CACTUS ransomware attack, Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection enabled it to quickly identify multiple stages of the cyber kill chain occurring in the customer’s environment. These stages ranged from ‘initial access’ by exploiting Qlik vulnerabilities, which Darktrace was able to detect before the method had been reported by external researchers, to ‘actions on objectives’ by encrypting files. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was also able to detect a previously unreported stage of the attack: multiple Kerberos brute force login attempts.

If Darktrace’s autonomous response capability, RESPOND, had been active and enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of this attack, it would have been able to take swift mitigative action to shut down such suspicious activity as soon as it was identified by DETECT, effectively containing the ransomware attack at the earliest possible stage.

Learning a network’s ‘normal’ to identify deviations from established patterns of behaviour enables Darktrace’s identify a potential compromise, even one that uses common and often legitimately used administrative tools. This allows Darktrace to stay one step ahead of the increasingly sophisticated TTPs used by ransomware actors.

Credit to Tiana Kelly, Cyber Analyst & Analyst Team Lead, Anna Gilbertson, Cyber Analyst

付録

参考文献

[1] https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/cactus-ransomware-prickly-new-variant-evades-detection

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cactus-ransomware-exploiting-qlik-sense-flaws-to-breach-networks/

[3] https://explore.avertium.com/resource/new-ransomware-strains-cactus-and-3am

[4] https://www.soitron.com/cyber-attackers-abuse-holidays/

[5] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/qlik-sense-exploited-in-cactus-ransomware-campaign/

Darktrace DETECT Models

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

Anomalous Connection / PowerShell to Rare External

Device / New PowerShell User Agent

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

User / Kerberos Password Brute Force

Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB

Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Delete Volume

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare  

Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination  

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server  

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)  

Compromise / Suspicious File and C2  

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert  

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches  

Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer

Anomalous File / Internet facing System File Download  

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise  

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)  

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)  

IoC一覧

IoC - Type - Description

zohoservice[.]net: 45.61.147[.]176 - Domain name: IP Address - Hosting payload over HTTP

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT; Windows NT 10.0; en-US) WindowsPowerShell/5.1.17763.2183 - User agent -PowerShell user agent

.cts1 - File extension - Malicious appendage

.cts7- File extension - Malicious appendage

cAcTuS.readme.txt - Filename -Ransom note

putty.zip – Filename - Initial payload: ZIP containing PuTTY Link

MITRE ATT&CK マッピング

Tactic - Technique  - SubTechnique

Web Protocols: COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071 -T1071.001

Powershell: EXECUTION - T1059 - T1059.001

Exploitation of Remote Services: LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210 – N/A

Vulnerability Scanning: RECONAISSANCE     - T1595 - T1595.002

Network Service Scanning: DISCOVERY - T1046 - N/A

Malware: RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1588 - T1588.001

Drive-by Compromise: INITIAL ACCESS - T1189 - N/A

Remote Desktop Protocol: LATERAL MOVEMENT – 1021 -T1021.001

Brute Force: CREDENTIAL ACCESS        T – 1110 - N/A

Data Encrypted for Impact: IMPACT - T1486 - N/A

Data Destruction: IMPACT - T1485 - N/A

File Deletion: DEFENSE EVASION - T1070 - T1070.004

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著者について
Tiana Kelly
Deputy Team Lead, London & Cyber Analyst

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The State of AI in Cybersecurity: How AI will impact the cyber threat landscape in 2024

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22
Apr 2024

About the AI Cybersecurity Report

We surveyed 1,800 CISOs, security leaders, administrators, and practitioners from industries around the globe. Our research was conducted to understand how the adoption of new AI-powered offensive and defensive cybersecurity technologies are being managed by organizations.

This blog is continuing the conversation from our last blog post “The State of AI in Cybersecurity: Unveiling Global Insights from 1,800 Security Practitioners” which was an overview of the entire report. This blog will focus on one aspect of the overarching report, the impact of AI on the cyber threat landscape.

To access the full report click here.

Are organizations feeling the impact of AI-powered cyber threats?

Nearly three-quarters (74%) state AI-powered threats are now a significant issue. Almost nine in ten (89%) agree that AI-powered threats will remain a major challenge into the foreseeable future, not just for the next one to two years.

However, only a slight majority (56%) thought AI-powered threats were a separate issue from traditional/non AI-powered threats. This could be the case because there are few, if any, reliable methods to determine whether an attack is AI-powered.

Identifying exactly when and where AI is being applied may not ever be possible. However, it is possible for AI to affect every stage of the attack lifecycle. As such, defenders will likely need to focus on preparing for a world where threats are unique and are coming faster than ever before.

a hypothetical cyber attack augmented by AI at every stage

Are security stakeholders concerned about AI’s impact on cyber threats and risks?

The results from our survey showed that security practitioners are concerned that AI will impact organizations in a variety of ways. There was equal concern associated across the board – from volume and sophistication of malware to internal risks like leakage of proprietary information from employees using generative AI tools.

What this tells us is that defenders need to prepare for a greater volume of sophisticated attacks and balance this with a focus on cyber hygiene to manage internal risks.

One example of a growing internal risks is shadow AI. It takes little effort for employees to adopt publicly-available text-based generative AI systems to increase their productivity. This opens the door to “shadow AI”, which is the use of popular AI tools without organizational approval or oversight. Resulting security risks such as inadvertent exposure of sensitive information or intellectual property are an ever-growing concern.

Are organizations taking strides to reduce risks associated with adoption of AI in their application and computing environment?

71.2% of survey participants say their organization has taken steps specifically to reduce the risk of using AI within its application and computing environment.

16.3% of survey participants claim their organization has not taken these steps.

These findings are good news. Even as enterprises compete to get as much value from AI as they can, as quickly as possible, they’re tempering their eager embrace of new tools with sensible caution.

Still, responses varied across roles. Security analysts, operators, administrators, and incident responders are less likely to have said their organizations had taken AI risk mitigation steps than respondents in other roles. In fact, 79% of executives said steps had been taken, and only 54% of respondents in hands-on roles agreed. It seems that leaders believe their organizations are taking the needed steps, but practitioners are seeing a gap.

Do security professionals feel confident in their preparedness for the next generation of threats?

A majority of respondents (six out of every ten) believe their organizations are inadequately prepared to face the next generation of AI-powered threats.

The survey findings reveal contrasting perceptions of organizational preparedness for cybersecurity threats across different regions and job roles. Security administrators, due to their hands-on experience, express the highest level of skepticism, with 72% feeling their organizations are inadequately prepared. Notably, respondents in mid-sized organizations feel the least prepared, while those in the largest companies feel the most prepared.

Regionally, participants in Asia-Pacific are most likely to believe their organizations are unprepared, while those in Latin America feel the most prepared. This aligns with the observation that Asia-Pacific has been the most impacted region by cybersecurity threats in recent years, according to the IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index.

The optimism among Latin American respondents could be attributed to lower threat volumes experienced in the region, but it's cautioned that this could change suddenly (1).

What are biggest barriers to defending against AI-powered threats?

The top-ranked inhibitors center on knowledge and personnel. However, issues are alluded to almost equally across the board including concerns around budget, tool integration, lack of attention to AI-powered threats, and poor cyber hygiene.

The cybersecurity industry is facing a significant shortage of skilled professionals, with a global deficit of approximately 4 million experts (2). As organizations struggle to manage their security tools and alerts, the challenge intensifies with the increasing adoption of AI by attackers. This shift has altered the demands on security teams, requiring practitioners to possess broad and deep knowledge across rapidly evolving solution stacks.

Educating end users about AI-driven defenses becomes paramount as organizations grapple with the shortage of professionals proficient in managing AI-powered security tools. Operationalizing machine learning models for effectiveness and accuracy emerges as a crucial skill set in high demand. However, our survey highlights a concerning lack of understanding among cybersecurity professionals regarding AI-driven threats and the use of AI-driven countermeasures indicating a gap in keeping pace with evolving attacker tactics.

The integration of security solutions remains a notable problem, hindering effective defense strategies. While budget constraints are not a primary inhibitor, organizations must prioritize addressing these challenges to bolster their cybersecurity posture. It's imperative for stakeholders to recognize the importance of investing in skilled professionals and integrated security solutions to mitigate emerging threats effectively.

To access the full report click here.

参考文献

1. IBM, X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2024, Available at: https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/L0GKXDWJ

2. ISC2, Cybersecurity Workforce Study 2023, Available at: https://media.isc2.org/-/media/Project/ISC2/Main/Media/ documents/research/ISC2_Cybersecurity_Workforce_Study_2023.pdf?rev=28b46de71ce24e6ab7705f6e3da8637e

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