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Darktrace ActiveAI Secirity Platformで、XDRを超えて真のサイバーレジリエンスを実現

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09
Apr 2024
09
Apr 2024
セキュリティ運用を変革するために設計された新しいDarktrace ActiveAI Security Platformを発表しました。このアプローチにより、セキュリティチームは、クラウド、Eメール、ネットワーク、エンドポイント、運用技術(OT)など、Darktrace が導入されているあらゆる領域において、これまでにない可視性を実現します。

進化する脅威には包括的なセキュリティが必要

攻撃者の技術革新により、サイバーセキュリティ攻撃の速度、洗練度、成功率は飛躍的に向上しており、現在では敵対者の手法として広く用いられているマルチドメイン攻撃やマルチステージ攻撃に見られるようになりました。

防御に関しては、従来のサイバーセキュリティのポイントソリューションではもはや追いつけません。特定の領域におけるインテリジェンスの深さはあるものの、脅威の検知は既存の攻撃データに依存しているのです。これにより、既知の脅威は阻止できるが、未知の脅威の特定が不確実なため、アラートの洪水が発生します。セキュリティチームは、アラートをトリアージするプロセスをs手動で構築し、API、統合、ルールを通じてデータを手作業で組み合わせる必要があります。

従来のeXtended Detection and Response(XDR)は、セキュリティチームを支援するために立ち上がり、ネットワーク、エンドポイント、クラウドから不審なイベントをつなぎ合わせることはできるものの、初期感染の大半が発生するEメールなどの分野ではまだ十分な領域をカバーできておらず、人による検証、優先順位付け、トリアージが必要で、最終的にはリアクティブな性質に留まっています。

セキュリティチームは、多すぎるアラート、少なすぎる時間、肥大化したベンダースタックからの断片的なサポートによって、限界点に達しています。簡単に言えば、ほとんどの組織では、サイバーレジリエンスを維持するために必要な人的リソースが不足しているのです。

Introducing the Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform

Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platformは、セキュリティオペレーションをプロアクティブな状態に変えるために設計されました。そのAIは、組織固有のビジネスとIT情報に基づいて学習し、昨日の脅威インテリジェンスではなく、日々の通常業務を学習します。

このアプローチにより、セキュリティチームは、クラウドEメールネットワークエンドポイントアイデンティティ運用技術 (OT)など、Darktrace が導入されているあらゆる領域にわたって、これまでにない可視性を得ることができます。このようにビジネスを理解することで、AIは既知および未知の脅威を正確に検知し、対応することができるのです。

Darktraceのプロアクティブツールおよびインシデント対応ツールは、内部および外部の脅威サーフェスを理解し、どこで準備体制を改善できるかを特定することで、チームがセキュリティギャップや潜在的なプロセスリスクに先手を打つことを支援します。

Cyber AI Analystと呼ばれるユニークで特許取得済みの調査AIは、自動化と効率化によって人的チームを補強し、SecOpsワークフローを再定義するために一般的なアラートの継続的な調査を実行し、セキュリティアナリストが迅速に意思決定に到達できるよう、プラットフォーム全体で稼働します。 広範なサービスは、Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platformを最大限に活用するために顧客のリソースを支援します。

図1:独自のビジネスを理解する自己学習型AIを搭載したDarktrace ActiveAI Security Platformは、企業全体をカバーします。当社の調査AIであるCyber AI Analystは、関連するアラートを調査し、人間のセキュリティチームがサードパーティのセキュリティツールからのものであっても、関連するすべてのアラートをトリアージし、優先順位を付けるのを支援し、セキュリティ運用を変革します

セキュリティオペレーションとインシデントライフサイクル

SOCチームには3つの一般的な重点分野があり、それぞれDarktrace ActiveAI Securityでサポートすることができます。

1. プロアクティブであることの利点

Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform は、攻撃される前にギャップを特定し、解決することで、チームのプロアクティブ化を支援します。これにより、攻撃の影響とコストを削減できます。  

このプラットフォームは、攻撃者の潜在的な人的および機械的な侵入ポイントを理解するために各組織を調査することでこれを実現します。今後のアップデートでは、当社のテクノロジーにファイアウォールルールの分析も追加され、より正確な攻撃経路のモデリングが可能になる予定です。

AIは、その調査結果を現地のビジネスやITのコンテキストと照らし合わせて、最もリスクが高く、影響の大きいデバイス、ID、脆弱性を特定するため、チームは最初にパッチを当てるべきものに優先順位をつけることができます。

さらに、Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platformは、トレーニングシミュレーション、ダイナミックプレイブック、レディネスレポートにより、各組織の人材、プロセス、テクノロジーをサポートし、インシデントへの準備に際してプロアクティブ性を高めます。

2. 既知および新規の脅威の完全な可視化

Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platformは、アクティブなインシデントフェーズにおける効率化を促進し、時間と労力を節約すると同時に、包括的でカスタマイズされた保護を提供します。ネイティブソース(Eメール、クラウド、運用技術、エンドポイント、アイデンティティ、アプリケーション、ネットワーク)と外部ソース(サードパーティのセキュリティツールやインテリジェンス)の双方から取り込まれた企業データからコンテキストを適用し、既知、新規、未知の脅威を検知します。

他のセキュリティベンダーは、顧客全体のデータを集約して一般化し、脅威検知をビッグデータアプローチで扱っています。インテリジェンスを抽出し、新たなルールとシグネチャを作成し、クラウド上で稼働する教師ありマシンを訓練しているのです。その後で初めて、脅威の状況の変化に基づいて新しい検知結果を配信します。そのため、攻撃者には好機が残されています。例えば、Log4攻撃が流行したとき、ほとんどのベンダーはそれに追いつき、防御するために貴重な時間を費やすことになりました。

Darktraceの検知アプローチとは対照的です。DarktraceのAIは、各組織固有のビジネスデータに基づいて継続的にトレーニングを行っているため、脅威ランドスケープにおける既知の攻撃を超えて機能することができます。したがって、当社のAIは、このビッグデータ問題に勝とうとするのではなく、各顧客のデータに焦点を当てるため、これまでになかった攻撃に対しても組織を防御することができます。

DarktraceのAIは、通信全体の特性における異常を浮き彫りにすることができるため、トラフィックを復号化する必要なく、常に脅威を浮き彫りにすることができましたが、今後のアップデートにより、より深いフォレンジック分析のための復号化が間もなく可能になります。

これはまた、大幅な効率化にもつながります。例えば、自主規制と検知精度です。AIがある環境で特定の種類の異常を検知し続け、それが正当なビジネスプロセスの一部であれば、AIは自律的にアラートの深刻度を下げ始め、検知とアラートを微調整するセキュリティチームの負担を軽減します。

3. AI主導の調査と対処

Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platformは、トリアージ、調査、対処を支援し、人間による対応時間を短縮し、混乱を軽減します。

従来のセキュリティスタックでは、ルールやシグネチャ、監視された検知などの脅威インテリジェンスと組み合わされた多くの生データが使用されます。そして、その結果をまとめ、人間のチームに提示します。そのため、人間のチームは、状況をトリアージし、理解し、調査する必要があります。

Darktrace は、生データをネイティブに取り込み、異常検知とビジネスラーニングを適用し、サードパーティアラートの脅威インテリジェンスを含む一般的な異常のチェーンを構築します。これらの異常は、Cyber AI Analystによって継続的に調査され、重要であると判断された場合には、人間による検証と次のステップへのアクションに移されます。これにより、トリアージプロセスが簡素化され、調査時間が短縮されます。

Cyber AI Analystの次期機能では、どのような仮説を実行するかを設定するなど、脅威の種類ごとに調査方法をカスタマイズできるため、チームはより自由にコントロールできるようになります。その結果、トリアージプロセスが完全に変換され、関連するすべてのアラートがセキュリティチームのために調査され、重要なものは優先的に対処され、その他のものは二次的な調査を待ち、あるいは同じ攻撃経路による将来の攻撃を阻止するために、アナリストがセキュリティギャップをプロアクティブにレビューできるようになります。

最後に、行動封じ込め機能による脅威対処の自動化により、さらに効率化を支援します。つまり、当社のAIは、脅威を示す異常な行動を特定し、停止させる一方で、通常の正常なビジネス活動を継続させることができます。

結論

Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platformは、10年以上にわたるAI研究に基づいて構築された、ネイティブでホリスティックなAI駆動型プラットフォームです。セキュリティチームがより生産的なモードに移行し、既知および未知の攻撃を発見し、SOCを変革して効率化を推進するのを支援します。インシデントのライフサイクル全体にわたってこれを行うことで、リスクを低減し、アクティブなインシデントに費やす時間を短縮し、投資収益率を向上させます。

Darktrace Platformの詳細については、こちらからソリューション概要をダウンロードしてください。

Eメールセキュリティ、ネットワーク検知と異常遮断、クラウドネイティブアプリケーション保護、およびOTセキュリティにおける当社の主要なサイバーセキュリティソリューションのいずれかを選択することにより、Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platformをすでに選択した9,000人以上のお客様に加わることができます。

Darktrace/EmailDarktrace/OTの今後のアップデートにより、ますます強化されるプラットフォームについて、さらに詳しくご覧ください。

サイバーとAIの交差点について学ぶには、「AIサイバーセキュリティの現状2024」レポートをダウンロードし、驚くような世界的な調査結果や、セキュリティリーダーからの洞察、今日の最重要課題に対処するための推奨事項をご覧ください。

INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Mitchell Bezzina
VP, Product and Solutions Marketing
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Inside the SOC

Stemming the Citrix Bleed Vulnerability with Darktrace’s ActiveAI Platform

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28
May 2024

What is Citrix Bleed?

Since August 2023, cyber threat actors have been actively exploiting one of the most significant critical vulnerabilities disclosed in recent years: Citrix Bleed. Citrix Bleed, also known as CVE-2023-4966, remained undiscovered and even unpatched for several months, resulting in a wide range of security incidents across business and government sectors [1].

How does Citrix Bleed vulnerability work?

The vulnerability, which impacts the Citrix Netscaler Gateway and Netscaler ADC products, allows for outside parties to hijack legitimate user sessions, thereby bypassing password and multifactor authentication (MFA) requirements.

When used as a means of initial network access, the vulnerability has resulted in the exfiltration of sensitive data, as in the case of Xfinity, and even the deployment of ransomware variants including Lockbit [2]. Although Citrix has released a patch to address the vulnerability, slow patching procedures and the widespread use of these products has resulted in the continuing exploitation of Citrix Bleed into 2024 [3].

How Does Darktrace Handle Citrix Bleed?

Darktrace has demonstrated its proficiency in handling the exploitation of Citrix Bleed since it was disclosed back in 2023; its anomaly-based approach allows it to efficiently identify and inhibit post-exploitation activity as soon as it surfaces.  Rather than relying upon traditional rules and signatures, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI enables it to understand the subtle deviations in a device’s behavior that would indicate an emerging compromise, thus allowing it to detect anomalous activity related to the exploitation of Citrix Bleed.

In late 2023, Darktrace identified an instance of Citrix Bleed exploitation on a customer network. As this customer had subscribed to the Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service, the suspicious network activity surrounding the compromise was escalated to Darktrace’s Security Operation Center (SOC) for triage and investigation by Darktrace Analysts, who then alerted the customer’s security team to the incident.

Darktrace’s Coverage

Initial Access and Beaconing of Citrix Bleed

Darktrace’s initial detection of indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with the exploitation of Citrix Bleed actually came a few days prior to the SOC alert, with unusual external connectivity observed from a critical server. The suspicious connection in question, a SSH connection to the rare external IP 168.100.9[.]137, lasted several hours and utilized the Windows PuTTY client. Darktrace also identified an additional suspicious IP, namely 45.134.26[.]2, attempting to contact the server. Both rare endpoints had been linked with the exploitation of the Citrix Bleed vulnerability by multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) vendors [4] [5].

Darktrace model alert highlighting an affected device making an unusual SSH connection to 168.100.9[.]137 via port 22.
Figure 1: Darktrace model alert highlighting an affected device making an unusual SSH connection to 168.100.9[.]137 via port 22.

As Darktrace is designed to identify network-level anomalies, rather than monitor edge infrastructure, the initial exploitation via the typical HTTP buffer overflow associated with this vulnerability fell outside the scope of Darktrace’s visibility. However, the aforementioned suspicious connectivity likely constituted initial access and beaconing activity following the successful exploitation of Citrix Bleed.

Command and Control (C2) and Payload Download

Around the same time, Darktrace also detected other devices on the customer’s network conducting external connectivity to various endpoints associated with remote management and IT services, including Action1, ScreenConnect and Fixme IT. Additionally, Darktrace observed devices downloading suspicious executable files, including “tniwinagent.exe”, which is associated with the tool Total Network Inventory. While this tool is typically used for auditing and inventory management purposes, it could also be leveraged by attackers for the purpose of lateral movement.

防衛回避

In the days surrounding this compromise, Darktrace observed multiple devices engaging in potential defense evasion tactics using the ScreenConnect and Fixme IT services. Although ScreenConnect is a legitimate remote management tool, it has also been used by threat actors to carry out C2 communication [6]. ScreenConnect itself was the subject of a separate critical vulnerability which Darktrace investigated in early 2024. Meanwhile, CISA observed that domains associated with Fixme It (“fixme[.]it”) have been used by threat actors attempting to exploit the Citrix Bleed vulnerability [7].

Reconnaissance and Lateral Movement

A few days after the detection of the initial beaconing communication, Darktrace identified several devices on the customer’s network carrying out reconnaissance and lateral movement activity. This included SMB writes of “PSEXESVC.exe”, network scanning, DCE-RPC binds of numerous internal devices to IPC$ shares and the transfer of compromise-related tools. It was at this point that Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI deemed the activity to be likely indicative of an ongoing compromise and several Enhanced Monitoring models alerted, triggering the aforementioned PTNs and investigation by Darktrace’s SOC.

Darktrace observed a server on the network initiating a wide range of connections to more than 600 internal IPs across several critical ports, suggesting port scanning, as well as conducting unexpected DCE-RPC service control (svcctl) activity on multiple internal devices, amongst them domain controllers. Additionally, several binds to server service (srvsvc) and security account manager (samr) endpoints via IPC$ shares on destination devices were detected, indicating further reconnaissance activity. The querying of these endpoints was also observed through RPC commands to enumerate services running on the device, as well as Security Account Manager (SAM) accounts.  

Darktrace also identified devices performing SMB writes of the WinRAR data compression tool, in what likely represented preparation for the compression of data prior to data exfiltration. Further SMB file writes were observed around this time including PSEXESVC.exe, which was ultimately used by attackers to conduct remote code execution, and one device was observed making widespread failed NTLM authentication attempts on the network, indicating NTLM brute-forcing. Darktrace observed several devices using administrative credentials to carry out the above activity.

In addition to the transfer of tools and executables via SMB, Darktrace also identified numerous devices deleting files through SMB around this time. In one example, an MSI file associated with the patch management and remediation service, Action1, was deleted by an attacker. This legitimate security tool, if leveraged by attackers, could be used to uncover additional vulnerabilities on target networks.

A server on the customer’s network was also observed writing the file “m.exe” to multiple internal devices. OSINT investigation into the executable indicated that it could be a malicious tool used to prevent antivirus programs from launching or running on a network [8].

Impact and Data Exfiltration

Following the initial steps of the breach chain, Darktrace observed numerous devices on the customer’s network engaging in data exfiltration and impact events, resulting in additional PTN alerts and a SOC investigation into data egress. Specifically, two servers on the network proceeded to read and download large volumes of data via SMB from multiple internal devices over the course of a few hours. These hosts sent large outbound volumes of data to MEGA file storage sites using TLS/SSL over port 443. Darktrace also identified the use of additional file storage services during this exfiltration event, including 4sync, file[.]io, and easyupload[.]io. In total the threat actor exfiltrated over 8.5 GB of data from the customer’s network.

Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting the details of a data exfiltration attempt.
Figure 2: Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting the details of a data exfiltration attempt.

Finally, Darktrace detected a user account within the customer’s Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) environment conducting several suspicious Office365 and AzureAD actions from a rare IP for the network, including uncommon file reads, creations and the deletion of a large number of files.

Unfortunately for the customer in this case, Darktrace RESPOND™ was not enabled on the network and the post-exploitation activity was able to progress until the customer was made aware of the attack by Darktrace’s SOC team. Had RESPOND been active and configured in autonomous response mode at the time of the attack, it would have been able to promptly contain the post-exploitation activity by blocking external connections, shutting down any C2 activity and preventing the download of suspicious files, blocking incoming traffic, and enforcing a learned ‘pattern of life’ on offending devices.

結論

Given the widespread use of Netscaler Gateway and Netscaler ADC, Citrix Bleed remains an impactful and potentially disruptive vulnerability that will likely continue to affect organizations who fail to address affected assets. In this instance, Darktrace demonstrated its ability to track and inhibit malicious activity stemming from Citrix Bleed exploitation, enabling the customer to identify affected devices and enact their own remediation.

Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection allows it to identify such post-exploitation activity resulting from the exploitation of a vulnerability, regardless of whether it is a known CVE or a zero-day threat. Unlike traditional security tools that rely on existing threat intelligence and rules and signatures, Darktrace’s ability to identify the subtle deviations in a compromised device’s behavior gives it a unique advantage when it comes to identifying emerging threats.

Credit to Vivek Rajan, Cyber Analyst, Adam Potter, Cyber Analyst

付録

Darktrace モデルカバレッジ

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Device / ICMP Address Scan

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

Device / Network Scan

Device / SMB Lateral Movement

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

Anomalous File / Internal::Unusual Internal EXE File Transfer

Compliance / SMB Drive Write

Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution

Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Incoming

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

Device / Unauthorised Device

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe

Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Admin)

Device / New User Agent

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Device / Increased External Connectivity

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoints

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

Compliance / Possible Unencrypted Password File On Server

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio and Rare External

Device / Reverse DNS Sweep]

Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity

Anomalous File / Internal::Executable Uploaded to DC

Compliance / SMB Version 1 Usage

Darktrace AI Analyst Incidents

Scanning of Multiple Devices

Suspicious Remote Service Control Activity

SMB Writes of Suspicious Files to Multiple Devices

Possible SSL Command and Control to Multiple Devices

Extensive Suspicious DCE-RPC Activity

Suspicious DCE-RPC Activity

Internal Downloads and External Uploads

Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual External Data Transfer to Multiple Related Endpoints

MITRE ATT&CK マッピング

Technique – Tactic – ID – Sub technique of

Network Scanning – Reconnaissance - T1595 - T1595.002

Valid Accounts – Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access – T1078 – N/A

Remote Access Software – Command and Control – T1219 – N/A

Lateral Tool Transfer – Lateral Movement – T1570 – N/A

Data Transfers – Exfiltration – T1567 – T1567.002

Compressed Data – Exfiltration – T1030 – N/A

NTLM Brute Force – Brute Force – T1110 - T1110.001

AntiVirus Deflection – T1553 - NA

Ingress Tool Transfer   - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1105 - NA

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

204.155.149[.]37 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

199.80.53[.]177 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

168.100.9[.]137 – IP – Malicious Endpoint

45.134.26[.]2 – IP – Malicious Endpoint

13.35.147[.]18 – IP – Likely Malicious Endpoint

13.248.193[.]251 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

76.223.1[.]166 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

179.60.147[.]10 – IP – Likely Malicious Endpoint

185.220.101[.]25 – IP – Likely Malicious Endpoint

141.255.167[.]250 – IP – Malicious Endpoint

106.71.177[.]68 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

cat2.hbwrapper[.]com – Hostname – Likely Malicious Endpoint

aj1090[.]online – Hostname – Likely Malicious Endpoint

dc535[.]4sync[.]com – Hostname – Likely Malicious Endpoint

204.155.149[.]140 – IP - Likely Malicious Endpoint

204.155.149[.]132 – IP - Likely Malicious Endpoint

204.155.145[.]52 – IP - Likely Malicious Endpoint

204.155.145[.]49 – IP - Likely Malicious Endpoint

参考文献

  1. https://www.axios.com/2024/01/02/citrix-bleed-security-hacks-impact
  2. https://www.csoonline.com/article/1267774/hackers-steal-data-from-millions-of-xfinity-customers-via-citrix-bleed-vulnerability.html
  3. https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/citrixbleed-security-critical-vulnerability/702505/
  4. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/168.100.9.137
  5. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.134.26.2
  6. https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/b/threat-actor-groups-including-black-basta-are-exploiting-recent-.html
  7. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-325a
  8. https://www.file.net/process/m.exe.html
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Vivek Rajan
Cyber Analyst

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How to Protect your Organization Against Microsoft Teams Phishing Attacks

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21
May 2024

The problem: Microsoft Teams phishing attacks are on the rise

Around 83% of Fortune 500 companies rely on Microsoft Office products and services1, with Microsoft Teams and Microsoft SharePoint in particular emerging as critical platforms to the business operations of the everyday workplace. Researchers across the threat landscape have begun to observe these legitimate services being leveraged more and more by malicious actors as an initial access method.

As Teams becomes a more prominent feature of the workplace many employees rely on it for daily internal and external communication, even surpassing email usage in some organizations. As Microsoft2 states, "Teams changes your relationship with email. When your whole group is working in Teams, it means you'll all get fewer emails. And you'll spend less time in your inbox, because you'll use Teams for more of your conversations."

However, Teams can be exploited to send targeted phishing messages to individuals either internally or externally, while appearing legitimate and safe. Users might receive an external message request from a Teams account claiming to be an IT support service or otherwise affiliated with the organization. Once a user has accepted, the threat actor can launch a social engineering campaign or deliver a malicious payload. As a primarily internal tool there is naturally less training and security awareness around Teams – due to the nature of the channel it is assumed to be a trusted source, meaning that social engineering is already one step ahead.

Screenshot of a Microsoft Teams message request from a Midnight Blizzard-controlled account (courtesy of Microsoft)
Figure 1: Screenshot of a Microsoft Teams message request from a Midnight Blizzard-controlled account (courtesy of Microsoft)

Microsoft Teams Phishing Examples

Microsoft has identified several major phishing attacks using Teams within the past year.

In July 2023, Microsoft announced that the threat actor known as Midnight Blizzard – identified by the United States as a Russian state-sponsored group – had launched a series of phishing campaigns via Teams with the aim of stealing user credentials. These attacks used previously compromised Microsoft 365 accounts and set up new domain names that impersonated legitimate IT support organizations. The threat actors then used social engineering tactics to trick targeted users into sharing their credentials via Teams, enabling them to access sensitive data.  

At a similar time, threat actor Storm-0324 was observed sending phishing lures via Teams containing links to malicious SharePoint-hosted files. The group targeted organizations that allow Teams users to interact and share files externally. Storm-0324’s goal is to gain initial access to hand over to other threat actors to pursue more dangerous follow-on attacks like ransomware.

Darktrace がMicrosoft Teamsのフィッシングを阻止する方法について、さらに詳しく知りたい方は、ブログをお読みください: 餌に喰いつくな:Darktrace Microsoft Teamsのフィッシング攻撃を阻止する方法

The market: Existing Microsoft Teams security solutions are insufficient

Microsoft’s native Teams security focuses on payloads, namely links and attachments, as the principal malicious component of any phishing. These payloads are relatively straightforward to detect with their experience in anti-virus, sandboxing, and IOCs. However, this approach is unable to intervene before the stage at which payloads are delivered, before the user even gets the chance to accept or deny an external message request. At the same time, it risks missing more subtle threats that don’t include attachments or links – like early stage phishing, which is pure social engineering – or completely new payloads.

Equally, the market offering for Teams security is limited. Security solutions available on the market are always payload-focused, rather than taking into account the content and context in which a link or attachment is sent. Answering questions like:

  • Does it make sense for these two accounts to speak to each other?
  • Are there any linguistic indicators of inducement?

Furthermore, they do not correlate with email to track threats across multiple communication environments which could signal a wider campaign. Effectively, other market solutions aren’t adding extra value – they are protecting against the same types of threats that Microsoft is already covering by default.

The other aspect of Teams security that native and market solutions fail to address is the account itself. As well as focusing on Teams threats, it’s important to analyze messages to understand the normal mode of communication for a user, and spot when a user’s Teams activity might signal account takeover.

The solution: How Darktrace protects Microsoft Teams against sophisticated threats

With its biggest update to Darktrace/Email ever, Darktrace now offers support for Microsoft Teams. With that, we are bringing the same AI philosophy that protects your email and accounts to your messaging environment.  

Our Self-Learning AI looks at content and context for every communication, whether that’s sent in an email or Teams message. It looks at actual user behavior, including language patterns, relationship history of sender and recipient, tone and payloads, to understand if a message poses a threat. This approach allows Darktrace to detect threats such as social engineering and payloadless attacks using visibility and forensic capabilities that Microsoft security doesn’t currently offer, as well as early symptoms of account compromise.  

Unlike market solutions, Darktrace doesn’t offer a siloed approach to Teams security. Data and signals from Teams are shared across email to inform detection, and also with the wider Darktrace ActiveAI security platform. By correlating information from email and Teams with network and apps security, Darktrace is able to better identify suspicious Teams activity and vice versa.  

Interested in the other ways Darktrace/Email augments threat detection? Read our latest blog on how improving the quality of end-user reporting can decrease the burden on the SOC. To find our more about Darktrace's enduring partnership with Microsoft, click here.

参考文献

[1] Essential Microsoft Office Statistics in 2024

[2] Microsoft blog, Microsoft Teams and email, living in harmony, 2024

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Carlos Gray
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