Blog

Thought Leadership

Piloting Airline Cyber Security With Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Default blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog image
09
Oct 2022
09
Oct 2022
The airline industry is constantly exposed to cyber threats. Darktrace has some tips to help airline professionals bolster their cyber-security efforts.

わずかな誤差の範囲

航空業界は昔から薄利多売で知られ、予期せぬダウンタイムが発生すると高いコストがかかると言われています。2010年にアイスランドで起きたエイヤフィヤトラヨークトルの噴火と、それに伴うヨーロッパ全域での6日間の飛行禁止は航空会社に17億ドルの損害害を与えたが、これはその10年後のパンデミックの結果としてもたらされる影響のほんの一例である。2020年には業界全体で1,800億ドル以上の負債を抱え、2024年には業界の負債が収入を上回るという予測もある。

ダウンタイムがさらに続くと、ただでさえ低迷している航空業界に影響が及ぶ可能性があるため、航空会社はサイバーセキュリティに真剣に取り組まなければならなくなってきています。昨年、米国で発生したコロニアルパイプラインのランサムウェア攻撃により、パイプラインの操業が6日間停止しましたが、これはエイヤフィヤトラヨークトル
の噴火による航空機の着陸と同じ期間でした。しかし、航空業界ではこの12年間、これほどの規模の火山噴火は発生していないものの、ランサムウェア攻撃は毎週のように航空会社を襲っています。今年もSpiceJet社にランサムウェアの攻撃があり、比較的早く沈静化したものの、インド各地の空港で数百人の乗客が足止めを食らったばかりです。  

不正、罰金、安全リスク

航空業界の多くが懸念しているのは、ランサムウェアだけではありません。データ漏えいは、常に数百万人の顧客の個人情報および財務情報に責任を持つ組織である航空会社にとって、依然として最大の脅威の1つです。2019年、ブリティッシュ・エアウェイズは、住所、生年月日、クレジットカード情報など38万人の顧客データを盗まれ、英国の情報コミッショナー事務所(ICO)から2,000万ポンド(パンデミックの影響もあり1億8,300万ポンドから減額)の罰金を科され、ICO史上、最大の罰金発行額となりました。欧州の航空会社イージージェットは、2020年に2,208人の顧客のクレジットカード情報を紛失したことを適切に開示せず、現在、180億ポンドの損害賠償を求める集団訴訟に直面しています。 

航空会社もまた、カード詐欺やエアマイル詐欺の被害に遭っており、何千もの不正なロイヤリティプログラムアカウントがダークウェブで販売されています。航空会社自身も手をこまねいているわけではありません。SITAが2021年に発表したレポートでは調査対象となった航空会社の100%が、今後3年間の重要な投資としてサイバーセキュリティを挙げています。これらの投資を確実に実行することが、次の課題です。

安全性とセキュリティ対策がこれほど重要な業界は他にありません。サイバー攻撃によるフライトの安全性への影響はまだ報告されていませんが、Eurocontrolなどの機関はすでに注意を促しています。航空会社や空港は、デジタル環境を積極的に保護する、よりスマートな方法を検討する必要があります。 

攻撃がますます高速化し、予測が困難になっているため、組織は予防的なAIセキュリティ対策にますます注目するようになっています。広範な攻撃対象領域と多くの貴重なデータで運用されている航空会社にとって、組織内のあらゆる資産と潜在的な攻撃経路を特定・監視し、それらを保護するために必要な措置を講じることができるツールを使用することは、攻撃者の先を行くための最善の方法と言えます。

空域の保護、サイバースペースの保護

私自身、レジャー用のパイロットとして、フライトプラン、飛行前のチェック、そして長年にわたって培われた深い知識など、すべてのフライトで行われる安全対策がどのようなものであるかを理解しています。このような包括的で綿密なアプローチは、航空会社、空港、その他の業種を問わず、組織のサイバーセキュリティの取り組みに反映されるべきものです。飛行機を利用するプロセスとデジタル組織を安全に運営するプロセスの類似性は、航空会社を含むあらゆる組織にとって、適切なAI主導のサイバーセキュリティが何をもたらすかを理解するのに役立つ方法を与えてくれます。

離陸許可 

パイロットにとって、安全対策はコックピットに座るずっと前から始まっています。高度や地形、天候などを考慮した方位や方角などの飛行計画に加え、飛行前の十分な点検を行う必要があります。パイロットが行う飛行前点検のチェックリストは、多くの場合、飛行機全体の外周をぐるりと一周するように指示されます。燃料に水が混じっていないか、エンジンカウルの中に鳥が巣を作っていないかなど、脅威となるものを未然に防ぐためのチェックです。

2022年7月にリリースされたDarktrace PREVENTは、上記と同様の目的を果たす製品です。このAIは、潜在的な脆弱性を発見し、必要に応じて防御を強化するために、ビジネスを構成するすべてのユーザーと資産を自律的に識別し、テストします。PREVENT/Attack Surface Managementは、歩き回るように、外部資産の脅威を全面的に調査します。PREVENT/End-to-End は、潜在的な攻撃経路を特定およびテストし、弱点や最悪のシナリオを緩和することで、攻撃が開始される前に戦いに勝利するための手段を講じるものです。 

良好な視認性を維持する

飛行機を操縦するとき、何よりもまず必要なのは、重要な変数を検知する方法です。コックピット内の基本的な飛行計器は、シックスパックと呼ばれています。

1. Airspeed Indicator(対気速度計)
2. Attitude Indicator or Artificial Horizon(姿勢指示器)
3. Altimeter(高度計)
4. Turn Coordinator(旋回釣合計)
5. Heading Indicator(飛行方位計)
6. Vertical Speed Indicator(垂直速度計)

この6つの計器は、パイロットが飛行機を安全に飛ばすために必要な重要な情報を提供しています。視界が悪い時やIMC(Instrument Meteorological Conditions:計器気象条件)での飛行には、追加の計器が必要ですが、これらは不注意で雲に飛び込んでしまった時など、危険な状況から抜け出すために必要不可欠なものです。

環境を理解し、その変化に対応することは、脅威が出現した瞬間にそれを発見するために、組織の環境に関する包括的な知識を構築することに焦点を当てたAI駆動型製品(Darktrace DETECT)の基本でもあります。Darktrace DETECT は、組織の「普通」を理解することで、複数の微妙な異常を関連付け、これまでになかった新たな攻撃を発見することができます。飛行に不可欠な計器のように、DETECT は、環境の不明瞭な領域を可視化し、潜在的な問題を可能な限り早期に発見することを保証します。 

メーデー、誰か助けて

航空業界やセキュリティ業界では、脅威を察知したら迅速に行動することが重要です。地上3,000フィートでエンジンがストールしたとき、訓練書を取り出して対処法を考えている暇はありません。パイロットは「常にアウトを用意し、それを使えるようにしておく」ように教えられているのです。

航空業界では、効果的な対応はパイロットの知識と素早い反応にほぼ依存していますが、サイバーセキュリティでは、AIがこれまで以上に迅速かつ効果的な対応を可能にします。Darktrace RESPOND は、脅威を軽減するために最適な行動を取るために、DETECTの文脈の理解を利用しています。この対応の適応性は非常に重要です。1つのサイバー攻撃はいくつもの構成でやってきますが、Darktrace RESPOND はその行動を適切に調整することが可能です。今日の攻撃の動きは速すぎて、人間のチームはついていけませんが、AIがマシンスピードでアクションを起こすことで、組織は保護された状態を保つことができるのです。 

常に学習

パイロットにとって最高のアドバイスのひとつは、常に学び続けることです。すべてのフライトは、新しいことを学び、より良い、より安全なパイロットになるための機会なのです。

Darktrace DETECT、RESPONDおよびPREVENTはすべて、各ビジネスに対する理解を構築するだけでなく、継続的に進化させる技術である自己学習型 AI によって駆動されています。つまり、組織が成長し、ユーザー、資産、アプリケーションが増えるにつれて、 Darktrace のカバー範囲も拡大し、それぞれの新しいデータポイントを使用して理解を深め、アクションと検知の精度を向上させることができるのです。また、Darktrace各技術は、相互に学習し合います。3つの製品ファミリーは、それぞれ継続的に他の製品にデータを供給し、その機能を強化し、組織を脅威から保護する能力を向上させます。 

サイバー攻撃が急増し、高度化するにつれ、攻撃対象が大きく、膨大な量の顧客データを持ち、持続的なダウンタイムを乗り切る余裕のない航空会社のような組織は、今後も狙われ続けるでしょう。しかし、AIが効果的でプロアクティブな対策と晴れ切った空のような可視性を提供することで、セキュリティチームは自信を持って反撃に出ることができます。

INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
AUTHOR
ABOUT ThE AUTHOR
Tony Jarvis
Director of Enterprise Security, Asia Pacific and Japan

Tony Jarvis is Director of Enterprise Security, Asia Pacific and Japan, at Darktrace. Tony is a seasoned cyber security strategist who has advised Fortune 500 companies around the world on best practice for managing cyber risk. He has counselled governments, major banks and multinational companies, and his comments on cyber security and the rising threat to critical national infrastructure have been reported in local and international media including CNBC, Channel News Asia and The Straits Times. Before joining Darktrace, Tony previously served as CTO at Check Point and held senior advisory positions at FireEye, Standard Chartered Bank and Telstra. Tony holds a BA in Information Systems from the University of Melbourne.

Book a 1-1 meeting with one of our experts
この記事を共有
USE CASES
該当する項目はありません。
PRODUCT SPOTLIGHT
該当する項目はありません。
COre coverage
該当する項目はありません。

More in this series

該当する項目はありません。

Blog

Inside the SOC

Stemming the Citrix Bleed Vulnerability with Darktrace’s ActiveAI Platform

Default blog imageDefault blog image
28
May 2024

What is Citrix Bleed?

Since August 2023, cyber threat actors have been actively exploiting one of the most significant critical vulnerabilities disclosed in recent years: Citrix Bleed. Citrix Bleed, also known as CVE-2023-4966, remained undiscovered and even unpatched for several months, resulting in a wide range of security incidents across business and government sectors [1].

How does Citrix Bleed vulnerability work?

The vulnerability, which impacts the Citrix Netscaler Gateway and Netscaler ADC products, allows for outside parties to hijack legitimate user sessions, thereby bypassing password and multifactor authentication (MFA) requirements.

When used as a means of initial network access, the vulnerability has resulted in the exfiltration of sensitive data, as in the case of Xfinity, and even the deployment of ransomware variants including Lockbit [2]. Although Citrix has released a patch to address the vulnerability, slow patching procedures and the widespread use of these products has resulted in the continuing exploitation of Citrix Bleed into 2024 [3].

How Does Darktrace Handle Citrix Bleed?

Darktrace has demonstrated its proficiency in handling the exploitation of Citrix Bleed since it was disclosed back in 2023; its anomaly-based approach allows it to efficiently identify and inhibit post-exploitation activity as soon as it surfaces.  Rather than relying upon traditional rules and signatures, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI enables it to understand the subtle deviations in a device’s behavior that would indicate an emerging compromise, thus allowing it to detect anomalous activity related to the exploitation of Citrix Bleed.

In late 2023, Darktrace identified an instance of Citrix Bleed exploitation on a customer network. As this customer had subscribed to the Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service, the suspicious network activity surrounding the compromise was escalated to Darktrace’s Security Operation Center (SOC) for triage and investigation by Darktrace Analysts, who then alerted the customer’s security team to the incident.

Darktrace’s Coverage

Initial Access and Beaconing of Citrix Bleed

Darktrace’s initial detection of indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with the exploitation of Citrix Bleed actually came a few days prior to the SOC alert, with unusual external connectivity observed from a critical server. The suspicious connection in question, a SSH connection to the rare external IP 168.100.9[.]137, lasted several hours and utilized the Windows PuTTY client. Darktrace also identified an additional suspicious IP, namely 45.134.26[.]2, attempting to contact the server. Both rare endpoints had been linked with the exploitation of the Citrix Bleed vulnerability by multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) vendors [4] [5].

Darktrace model alert highlighting an affected device making an unusual SSH connection to 168.100.9[.]137 via port 22.
Figure 1: Darktrace model alert highlighting an affected device making an unusual SSH connection to 168.100.9[.]137 via port 22.

As Darktrace is designed to identify network-level anomalies, rather than monitor edge infrastructure, the initial exploitation via the typical HTTP buffer overflow associated with this vulnerability fell outside the scope of Darktrace’s visibility. However, the aforementioned suspicious connectivity likely constituted initial access and beaconing activity following the successful exploitation of Citrix Bleed.

Command and Control (C2) and Payload Download

Around the same time, Darktrace also detected other devices on the customer’s network conducting external connectivity to various endpoints associated with remote management and IT services, including Action1, ScreenConnect and Fixme IT. Additionally, Darktrace observed devices downloading suspicious executable files, including “tniwinagent.exe”, which is associated with the tool Total Network Inventory. While this tool is typically used for auditing and inventory management purposes, it could also be leveraged by attackers for the purpose of lateral movement.

防衛回避

In the days surrounding this compromise, Darktrace observed multiple devices engaging in potential defense evasion tactics using the ScreenConnect and Fixme IT services. Although ScreenConnect is a legitimate remote management tool, it has also been used by threat actors to carry out C2 communication [6]. ScreenConnect itself was the subject of a separate critical vulnerability which Darktrace investigated in early 2024. Meanwhile, CISA observed that domains associated with Fixme It (“fixme[.]it”) have been used by threat actors attempting to exploit the Citrix Bleed vulnerability [7].

Reconnaissance and Lateral Movement

A few days after the detection of the initial beaconing communication, Darktrace identified several devices on the customer’s network carrying out reconnaissance and lateral movement activity. This included SMB writes of “PSEXESVC.exe”, network scanning, DCE-RPC binds of numerous internal devices to IPC$ shares and the transfer of compromise-related tools. It was at this point that Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI deemed the activity to be likely indicative of an ongoing compromise and several Enhanced Monitoring models alerted, triggering the aforementioned PTNs and investigation by Darktrace’s SOC.

Darktrace observed a server on the network initiating a wide range of connections to more than 600 internal IPs across several critical ports, suggesting port scanning, as well as conducting unexpected DCE-RPC service control (svcctl) activity on multiple internal devices, amongst them domain controllers. Additionally, several binds to server service (srvsvc) and security account manager (samr) endpoints via IPC$ shares on destination devices were detected, indicating further reconnaissance activity. The querying of these endpoints was also observed through RPC commands to enumerate services running on the device, as well as Security Account Manager (SAM) accounts.  

Darktrace also identified devices performing SMB writes of the WinRAR data compression tool, in what likely represented preparation for the compression of data prior to data exfiltration. Further SMB file writes were observed around this time including PSEXESVC.exe, which was ultimately used by attackers to conduct remote code execution, and one device was observed making widespread failed NTLM authentication attempts on the network, indicating NTLM brute-forcing. Darktrace observed several devices using administrative credentials to carry out the above activity.

In addition to the transfer of tools and executables via SMB, Darktrace also identified numerous devices deleting files through SMB around this time. In one example, an MSI file associated with the patch management and remediation service, Action1, was deleted by an attacker. This legitimate security tool, if leveraged by attackers, could be used to uncover additional vulnerabilities on target networks.

A server on the customer’s network was also observed writing the file “m.exe” to multiple internal devices. OSINT investigation into the executable indicated that it could be a malicious tool used to prevent antivirus programs from launching or running on a network [8].

Impact and Data Exfiltration

Following the initial steps of the breach chain, Darktrace observed numerous devices on the customer’s network engaging in data exfiltration and impact events, resulting in additional PTN alerts and a SOC investigation into data egress. Specifically, two servers on the network proceeded to read and download large volumes of data via SMB from multiple internal devices over the course of a few hours. These hosts sent large outbound volumes of data to MEGA file storage sites using TLS/SSL over port 443. Darktrace also identified the use of additional file storage services during this exfiltration event, including 4sync, file[.]io, and easyupload[.]io. In total the threat actor exfiltrated over 8.5 GB of data from the customer’s network.

Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting the details of a data exfiltration attempt.
Figure 2: Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting the details of a data exfiltration attempt.

Finally, Darktrace detected a user account within the customer’s Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) environment conducting several suspicious Office365 and AzureAD actions from a rare IP for the network, including uncommon file reads, creations and the deletion of a large number of files.

Unfortunately for the customer in this case, Darktrace RESPOND™ was not enabled on the network and the post-exploitation activity was able to progress until the customer was made aware of the attack by Darktrace’s SOC team. Had RESPOND been active and configured in autonomous response mode at the time of the attack, it would have been able to promptly contain the post-exploitation activity by blocking external connections, shutting down any C2 activity and preventing the download of suspicious files, blocking incoming traffic, and enforcing a learned ‘pattern of life’ on offending devices.

結論

Given the widespread use of Netscaler Gateway and Netscaler ADC, Citrix Bleed remains an impactful and potentially disruptive vulnerability that will likely continue to affect organizations who fail to address affected assets. In this instance, Darktrace demonstrated its ability to track and inhibit malicious activity stemming from Citrix Bleed exploitation, enabling the customer to identify affected devices and enact their own remediation.

Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection allows it to identify such post-exploitation activity resulting from the exploitation of a vulnerability, regardless of whether it is a known CVE or a zero-day threat. Unlike traditional security tools that rely on existing threat intelligence and rules and signatures, Darktrace’s ability to identify the subtle deviations in a compromised device’s behavior gives it a unique advantage when it comes to identifying emerging threats.

Credit to Vivek Rajan, Cyber Analyst, Adam Potter, Cyber Analyst

付録

Darktrace モデルカバレッジ

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Device / ICMP Address Scan

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

Device / Network Scan

Device / SMB Lateral Movement

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

Anomalous File / Internal::Unusual Internal EXE File Transfer

Compliance / SMB Drive Write

Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution

Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Incoming

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

Device / Unauthorised Device

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe

Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Admin)

Device / New User Agent

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Device / Increased External Connectivity

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoints

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

Compliance / Possible Unencrypted Password File On Server

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio and Rare External

Device / Reverse DNS Sweep]

Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity

Anomalous File / Internal::Executable Uploaded to DC

Compliance / SMB Version 1 Usage

Darktrace AI Analyst Incidents

Scanning of Multiple Devices

Suspicious Remote Service Control Activity

SMB Writes of Suspicious Files to Multiple Devices

Possible SSL Command and Control to Multiple Devices

Extensive Suspicious DCE-RPC Activity

Suspicious DCE-RPC Activity

Internal Downloads and External Uploads

Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual External Data Transfer to Multiple Related Endpoints

MITRE ATT&CK マッピング

Technique – Tactic – ID – Sub technique of

Network Scanning – Reconnaissance - T1595 - T1595.002

Valid Accounts – Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access – T1078 – N/A

Remote Access Software – Command and Control – T1219 – N/A

Lateral Tool Transfer – Lateral Movement – T1570 – N/A

Data Transfers – Exfiltration – T1567 – T1567.002

Compressed Data – Exfiltration – T1030 – N/A

NTLM Brute Force – Brute Force – T1110 - T1110.001

AntiVirus Deflection – T1553 - NA

Ingress Tool Transfer   - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1105 - NA

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

204.155.149[.]37 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

199.80.53[.]177 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

168.100.9[.]137 – IP – Malicious Endpoint

45.134.26[.]2 – IP – Malicious Endpoint

13.35.147[.]18 – IP – Likely Malicious Endpoint

13.248.193[.]251 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

76.223.1[.]166 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

179.60.147[.]10 – IP – Likely Malicious Endpoint

185.220.101[.]25 – IP – Likely Malicious Endpoint

141.255.167[.]250 – IP – Malicious Endpoint

106.71.177[.]68 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

cat2.hbwrapper[.]com – Hostname – Likely Malicious Endpoint

aj1090[.]online – Hostname – Likely Malicious Endpoint

dc535[.]4sync[.]com – Hostname – Likely Malicious Endpoint

204.155.149[.]140 – IP - Likely Malicious Endpoint

204.155.149[.]132 – IP - Likely Malicious Endpoint

204.155.145[.]52 – IP - Likely Malicious Endpoint

204.155.145[.]49 – IP - Likely Malicious Endpoint

参考文献

  1. https://www.axios.com/2024/01/02/citrix-bleed-security-hacks-impact
  2. https://www.csoonline.com/article/1267774/hackers-steal-data-from-millions-of-xfinity-customers-via-citrix-bleed-vulnerability.html
  3. https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/citrixbleed-security-critical-vulnerability/702505/
  4. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/168.100.9.137
  5. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.134.26.2
  6. https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/b/threat-actor-groups-including-black-basta-are-exploiting-recent-.html
  7. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-325a
  8. https://www.file.net/process/m.exe.html
続きを読む
著者について
Vivek Rajan
Cyber Analyst

Blog

Eメール

How to Protect your Organization Against Microsoft Teams Phishing Attacks

Default blog imageDefault blog image
21
May 2024

The problem: Microsoft Teams phishing attacks are on the rise

Around 83% of Fortune 500 companies rely on Microsoft Office products and services1, with Microsoft Teams and Microsoft SharePoint in particular emerging as critical platforms to the business operations of the everyday workplace. Researchers across the threat landscape have begun to observe these legitimate services being leveraged more and more by malicious actors as an initial access method.

As Teams becomes a more prominent feature of the workplace many employees rely on it for daily internal and external communication, even surpassing email usage in some organizations. As Microsoft2 states, "Teams changes your relationship with email. When your whole group is working in Teams, it means you'll all get fewer emails. And you'll spend less time in your inbox, because you'll use Teams for more of your conversations."

However, Teams can be exploited to send targeted phishing messages to individuals either internally or externally, while appearing legitimate and safe. Users might receive an external message request from a Teams account claiming to be an IT support service or otherwise affiliated with the organization. Once a user has accepted, the threat actor can launch a social engineering campaign or deliver a malicious payload. As a primarily internal tool there is naturally less training and security awareness around Teams – due to the nature of the channel it is assumed to be a trusted source, meaning that social engineering is already one step ahead.

Screenshot of a Microsoft Teams message request from a Midnight Blizzard-controlled account (courtesy of Microsoft)
Figure 1: Screenshot of a Microsoft Teams message request from a Midnight Blizzard-controlled account (courtesy of Microsoft)

Microsoft Teams Phishing Examples

Microsoft has identified several major phishing attacks using Teams within the past year.

In July 2023, Microsoft announced that the threat actor known as Midnight Blizzard – identified by the United States as a Russian state-sponsored group – had launched a series of phishing campaigns via Teams with the aim of stealing user credentials. These attacks used previously compromised Microsoft 365 accounts and set up new domain names that impersonated legitimate IT support organizations. The threat actors then used social engineering tactics to trick targeted users into sharing their credentials via Teams, enabling them to access sensitive data.  

At a similar time, threat actor Storm-0324 was observed sending phishing lures via Teams containing links to malicious SharePoint-hosted files. The group targeted organizations that allow Teams users to interact and share files externally. Storm-0324’s goal is to gain initial access to hand over to other threat actors to pursue more dangerous follow-on attacks like ransomware.

Darktrace がMicrosoft Teamsのフィッシングを阻止する方法について、さらに詳しく知りたい方は、ブログをお読みください: 餌に喰いつくな:Darktrace Microsoft Teamsのフィッシング攻撃を阻止する方法

The market: Existing Microsoft Teams security solutions are insufficient

Microsoft’s native Teams security focuses on payloads, namely links and attachments, as the principal malicious component of any phishing. These payloads are relatively straightforward to detect with their experience in anti-virus, sandboxing, and IOCs. However, this approach is unable to intervene before the stage at which payloads are delivered, before the user even gets the chance to accept or deny an external message request. At the same time, it risks missing more subtle threats that don’t include attachments or links – like early stage phishing, which is pure social engineering – or completely new payloads.

Equally, the market offering for Teams security is limited. Security solutions available on the market are always payload-focused, rather than taking into account the content and context in which a link or attachment is sent. Answering questions like:

  • Does it make sense for these two accounts to speak to each other?
  • Are there any linguistic indicators of inducement?

Furthermore, they do not correlate with email to track threats across multiple communication environments which could signal a wider campaign. Effectively, other market solutions aren’t adding extra value – they are protecting against the same types of threats that Microsoft is already covering by default.

The other aspect of Teams security that native and market solutions fail to address is the account itself. As well as focusing on Teams threats, it’s important to analyze messages to understand the normal mode of communication for a user, and spot when a user’s Teams activity might signal account takeover.

The solution: How Darktrace protects Microsoft Teams against sophisticated threats

With its biggest update to Darktrace/Email ever, Darktrace now offers support for Microsoft Teams. With that, we are bringing the same AI philosophy that protects your email and accounts to your messaging environment.  

Our Self-Learning AI looks at content and context for every communication, whether that’s sent in an email or Teams message. It looks at actual user behavior, including language patterns, relationship history of sender and recipient, tone and payloads, to understand if a message poses a threat. This approach allows Darktrace to detect threats such as social engineering and payloadless attacks using visibility and forensic capabilities that Microsoft security doesn’t currently offer, as well as early symptoms of account compromise.  

Unlike market solutions, Darktrace doesn’t offer a siloed approach to Teams security. Data and signals from Teams are shared across email to inform detection, and also with the wider Darktrace ActiveAI security platform. By correlating information from email and Teams with network and apps security, Darktrace is able to better identify suspicious Teams activity and vice versa.  

Interested in the other ways Darktrace/Email augments threat detection? Read our latest blog on how improving the quality of end-user reporting can decrease the burden on the SOC. To find our more about Darktrace's enduring partnership with Microsoft, click here.

参考文献

[1] Essential Microsoft Office Statistics in 2024

[2] Microsoft blog, Microsoft Teams and email, living in harmony, 2024

続きを読む
著者について
Carlos Gray
Product Manager
Our ai. Your data.

Elevate your cyber defenses with Darktrace AI

無償トライアルを開始
Darktrace AI protecting a business from cyber threats.