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SaaSセキュリティリスク:マルチアカウントハイジャックをAIにより検知

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09
Jun 2021
09
Jun 2021
このブログでは、複数のMicrosoft 365アカウントを悪用して攻撃を仕掛け、持続性を維持した、SaaSベースの巧妙な攻撃について分析しています。

SaaS(Software-as-a-Service)の広範かつ迅速な採用により、ITチームにとって幅広いセキュリティリスクの可能性が新たに生じました。すぐに使える商用のソフトウェア(COTS: commercial off-the-shelf)と異なり、SaaSのセキュリティは最終顧客ではなくサードパーティベンダーが管理することが多くなっています。したがってセキュリティチームは、これらの環境に対して、状況が見えづらく管理しづらい中で苦労しなければならず、サイバー犯罪者はすばやく状況を利用して、ベンダーのEメールの侵害から内部アカウントの乗っ取りまで、クラウドベースの攻撃を次々と展開しています。

攻撃者はしばしば、同じドメイン上の複数のアカウントに対するアクセス権を得て、複数の角度から攻撃できるようにします。たとえば、数百通のメールを1つのアカウントから送信しつつ、別のアカウントで永続性を維持します。これによりハッカーは、SaaS環境のネイティブツールとともに外部ペイロードも利用して、複数の攻撃経路を試みることができます。

多要素認証(MFA)のような予防的な管理を行うことで、保護のレイヤーを1つ増やすことはできますが、ゼロトラストアプローチを迂回する多くのテクニックが存在します。リモートワークやフレキシブルな働き方は、今後もさまざまな地域と業界で多かれ少なかれ継続するため、企業は今すぐクラウドアーキテクチャのセキュリティ確保と、積極的なサイバーセキュリティ手法の開発に注力する必要があります。

このブログでは、ヨーロッパのある不動産会社を標的とした、複数の侵害されたMicrosoft 365アカウントを使用した持続的なサイバー攻撃を分析します。こうしたSaaSアカウント乗っ取りは急激に新たな標準となりつつありますが、業界全体ではいまだに誤解されているうえに、文書化も貧弱です。サイバーAIは、この侵入のすべての段階を、シグネチャや静的なルールを使用せずにリアルタイムで検知しました。

アカウントA、B: Microsoft 365アカウントの乗っ取り

この企業の環境には約5000台のデバイスと、1000のアクティブなSaaSアカウントがありました。次のタイムラインは、脅威アクターが5つの異なるユーザーのSaaSアカウントを利用して作戦を実行し、さらに最終日には他の複数のアカウントも不正使用した様子を示しています。

図1:3日間にわたって発生した感染の連鎖4日目にも攻撃者による試行がありましたが、失敗しました。

この行為者は、最初に少なくとも2つのSaaS認証情報(ここでは単にアカウントAアカウントBと呼ぶことにします)を侵害し、おそらくVPNを使用して、いくつかの通常とは異なる地理的位置からログインしました。Darktraceはこれを、SaaSアカウントに対する不審なログインイベントとして検知しました。

アカウントAは、攻撃者は顧客の情報が含まれると思われるファイルをプレビューしている様子がみられましたが、その他のフォローアップアクティビティは行っていませんでした。アカウントBでは、当初の侵害から3時間後に受信トレイルールが新たに設定され、重大度の高い警告が発生しました。

この頃、脅威アクターはいくつかのフィッシングメールをアカウントBから送信しました。無害で本物らしいOneDriveフォルダを共有すると見せかけたメールです。このリンクは、おそらく次のような偽のMicrosoftログインページに通じていて、被害者のアカウントを記録して攻撃者に直接送信する機能を備えていたものと考えられています。

図2:一見正しいMicrosoftログインページ

フィッシングの試みは、DarktraceのEメールセキュリティテクノロジーであるDarktrace Emailによって検知されました。Darktrace Emailは当時パッシブモードだったため、こうした脅威のあるメールに対処するようには設定されていませんでした。しかし、きわめて異常な送信数増加と、不審なログイン場所の組み合わせを考えれば、おそらくすべてのメールを自動的に差し止め、攻撃の影響を緩和することができていたでしょう。

攻撃者はやがてアカウントBからロックアウトされました。その後攻撃者はレガシーユーザーエージェントを使用して、アカウントに対して強制されているMFAを回避しようとしましたが、失敗しました。Darktraceはこれを疑わしいログインとして検知し、この試みをブロックしました。

アカウントC、D、E: 脅威の進展

翌日、攻撃者は、同一のASN(自律システム番号)から新しいアカウント(アカウントC)にログインしました。これは、このアカウントがOneDriveフィッシングEメールに感染したことを示しています。言い換えると、攻撃者はアカウントBを利用して、社内の新しいユーザーを侵害し、複数の侵入ポイントを確保したことになります。

Darktrace detected each stage of this, piecing together the different events into one meaningful security narrative.

図3:アカウントC、D、Eの異常なアクティビティ

そして、アカウントCを使用して、連絡先情報が含まれていると思われるファイルのプレビューが行われました。

翌日ログインしようとしたときにアカウントCにから締め出されると、ハッカーはさらに、以前のフィッシングで乗っ取った2つのアカウント(アカウントDおよびE)に入り込みました。しかし、普段とは異なるログインを行い、それと同時に新たな受信トレイルールを作成するたびに、アラートが生成され、ハッカーは締め出されました。

AからZ: 悪事の終わり

選択肢がなくなったため、攻撃者はアカウントAに戻り、新しい受信トレイルールを作成して、Microsoft以外のクラウドストレージドメイン(Tresorit)へのリンクを記載した新たなフィッシングEメールを送信しました。Darktraceは再びこれを、普段とは大きく異なる動作として認識し、ハッカーは速やかにアカウントから締め出されました。

この一連のアクティビティの間に、Darktraceは疑わしいASNの1つによるMicrosoft Teamsセッションも観測しました。これはおそらくソーシャルエンジニアリングの試みで、別の攻撃経路の可能性があると考えられました。Microsoft Teamsは、インスタントメッセージ経由の悪意あるリンクの共有、機密情報の抽出、チャット機能を使用した社内外へのスパム送信などに利用されていたおそれがあります。

脅威アクターはさらにこれを使用してさまざまなアプリケーションやアカウントに展開していった可能性もあります。この企業がサイロ化したセキュリティアプローチを使用していて(クラウド、SaaS、メール、エンドポイントに異なるツールを採用していた)、悪意のあるクロスプラットフォームの動きについていけないと想定していればそうしたでしょう。

翌日、攻撃者は再び複数のアカウントにわたってログインを試みましたが失敗しました。Cyber AIがすべての異常な活動を、発生源にかかわらず発見し、即座にセキュリティチームに警告したのです。

SaaS攻撃を詳しく分析する

複数アカウントの侵害は非常に持続性が高く、従来のセキュリティツールでは識別が難しい場合があります。ハッカーは、顧客の既存のメールセキュリティ製品を回避するために複数の戦術を利用しました。

  1. アカウントAアカウントBの2つの認証情報を使用することで、ハッカーは目立たずに活動し、1つのアカウントであまりに大きな疑いを持たれずに済みました。アカウントAは、他の経路が枯渇するまで沈黙を保ちました。
  2. アクティビティは、少なくとも3つの異なる地理的ロケーションにある複数のASNから、おそらくVPNを使用して生成されました。1つはアフリカにあり、ほとんどのアクティビティの発生源となっていました。2つは北米にありましたが、その中には広く使われているASNもあり、これはこの顧客にとって非常に珍しいことでした。
  3. 攻撃者は最後のEメールまですべてMicrosoftサービスを使用しました。これは、ゲートウェイによって捕捉されてしまうリンクを使うのではなく、‘live off the land’(環境に寄生する)方法を選択したことになります。
  4. 攻撃者は、最後の行動としてMicrosoft Teamsにログインしました。これは一見無害に映るイベントですが、検知されないまま、アカウントをさらに侵害したり水平移動したりするために利用できる可能性があります。

Darktraceは攻撃のすべての段階を識別し(その中には異常なASNの特定も含まれています)、Cyber AI Analystによる自動的かつ詳細な調査を開始しました。そのため、この企業は損害を被る前に対処することができました。

図4:DarktraceのSaaS Consoleは、さまざまなアプリケーションの概要を明確に表示

SaaSセキュリティのABC

各種のアカウントを用いて攻撃を実行しつつ、1つのアカウントで存在を持続させるアプローチによって、この侵入は長引きました。近い将来、このような戦術が再び観測されるでしょう。

複数のアカウント、攻撃経路、攻撃者IPアドレスを用いる攻撃に関連した大量の要素を追跡するのは、深刻な課題です。このような状況においては、さまざまなアプリケーションにわたるアクティビティを検知し、デジタルエンタープライズ全体の、統一された包括的な理解を形成することのできるセキュリティソリューションを導入することがきわめて重要です。

このケースでは有効化されていませんでしたが、 Darktrace SaaSが導入されていれば、Darktrace SaaSの自動対処により通常の動作が強制されることで、ハッカーによる悪意のあるインフラからのログインや、新しい受信トレイルールの作成など異常なSaaSアクションの実行を防げたはずでした。

この侵入事例の後、この企業はDarktrace SaaSの導入を決定しました。これにより、クラウドセキュリティリスクが緩和され、機密データの損失と評判の毀損から保護されています。

この脅威事例についての考察はDarktraceアナリストDaniel Gentleが協力しました。

Darktraceによるモデル検知:

  • SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and New Email Rule
  • SaaS / Compliance / New Email Rule
  • SaaS / Unusual Activity / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use
  • SaaS / Access / Suspicious Login Attempt
  • Antigena Email: Unusual Login Location + Sender Surge
INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
AUTHOR
ABOUT ThE AUTHOR
Max Heinemeyer
Chief Product Officer

Max is a cyber security expert with over a decade of experience in the field, specializing in a wide range of areas such as Penetration Testing, Red-Teaming, SIEM and SOC consulting and hunting Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups. At Darktrace, Max is closely involved with Darktrace’s strategic customers & prospects. He works with the R&D team at Darktrace, shaping research into new AI innovations and their various defensive and offensive applications. Max’s insights are regularly featured in international media outlets such as the BBC, Forbes and WIRED. Max holds an MSc from the University of Duisburg-Essen and a BSc from the Cooperative State University Stuttgart in International Business Information Systems.

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A Thorn in Attackers’ Sides: How Darktrace Uncovered a CACTUS Ransomware Infection

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24
Apr 2024

What is CACTUS Ransomware?

In May 2023, Kroll Cyber Threat Intelligence Analysts identified CACTUS as a new ransomware strain that had been actively targeting large commercial organizations since March 2023 [1]. CACTUS ransomware gets its name from the filename of the ransom note, “cAcTuS.readme.txt”. Encrypted files are appended with the extension “.cts”, followed by a number which varies between attacks, e.g. “.cts1” and “.cts2”.

As the cyber threat landscape adapts to ever-present fast-paced technological change, ransomware affiliates are employing progressively sophisticated techniques to enter networks, evade detection and achieve their nefarious goals.

How does CACTUS Ransomware work?

In the case of CACTUS, threat actors have been seen gaining initial network access by exploiting Virtual Private Network (VPN) services. Once inside the network, they may conduct internal scanning using tools like SoftPerfect Network Scanner, and PowerShell commands to enumerate endpoints, identify user accounts, and ping remote endpoints. Persistence is maintained by the deployment of various remote access methods, including legitimate remote access tools like Splashtop, AnyDesk, and SuperOps RMM in order to evade detection, along with malicious tools like Cobalt Strike and Chisel. Such tools, as well as custom scripts like TotalExec, have been used to disable security software to distribute the ransomware binary. CACTUS ransomware is unique in that it adopts a double-extortion tactic, stealing data from target networks and then encrypting it on compromised systems [2].

At the end of November 2023, cybersecurity firm Arctic Wolf reported instances of CACTUS attacks exploiting vulnerabilities on the Windows version of the business analytics platform Qlik, specifically CVE-2023-41266, CVE-2023-41265, and CVE-2023-48365, to gain initial access to target networks [3]. The vulnerability tracked as CVE-2023-41266 can be exploited to generate anonymous sessions and perform HTTP requests to unauthorized endpoints, whilst CVE-2023-41265 does not require authentication and can be leveraged to elevate privileges and execute HTTP requests on the backend server that hosts the application [2].

Darktrace’s Coverage of CACTUS Ransomware

In November 2023, Darktrace observed malicious actors leveraging the aforementioned method of exploiting Qlik to gain access to the network of a customer in the US, more than a week before the vulnerability was reported by external researchers.

Here, Qlik vulnerabilities were successfully exploited, and a malicious executable (.exe) was detonated on the network, which was followed by network scanning and failed Kerberos login attempts. The attack culminated in the encryption of numerous files with extensions such as “.cts1”, and SMB writes of the ransom note “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to multiple internal devices, all of which was promptly identified by Darktrace DETECT™.

While traditional rules and signature-based detection tools may struggle to identify the malicious use of a legitimate business platform like Qlik, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was able to confidently identify anomalous use of the tool in a CACTUS ransomware attack by examining the rarity of the offending device’s surrounding activity and comparing it to the learned behavior of the device and its peers.

Unfortunately for the customer in this case, Darktrace RESPOND™ was not enabled in autonomous response mode during their encounter with CACTUS ransomware meaning that attackers were able to successfully escalate their attack to the point of ransomware detonation and file encryption. Had RESPOND been configured to autonomously act on any unusual activity, Darktrace could have prevented the attack from progressing, stopping the download of any harmful files, or the encryption of legitimate ones.

Cactus Ransomware Attack Overview

Holiday periods have increasingly become one of the favoured times for malicious actors to launch their attacks, as they can take advantage of the festive downtime of organizations and their security teams, and the typically more relaxed mindset of employees during this period [4].

Following this trend, in late November 2023, Darktrace began detecting anomalous connections on the network of a customer in the US, which presented multiple indicators of compromise (IoCs) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) associated with CACTUS ransomware. The threat actors in this case set their attack in motion by exploiting the Qlik vulnerabilities on one of the customer’s critical servers.

Darktrace observed the server device making beaconing connections to the endpoint “zohoservice[.]net” (IP address: 45.61.147.176) over the course of three days. This endpoint is known to host a malicious payload, namely a .zip file containing the command line connection tool PuttyLink [5].

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to autonomously identify over 1,000 beaconing connections taking place on the customer’s network and group them together, in this case joining the dots in an ongoing ransomware attack. AI Analyst recognized that these repeated connections to highly suspicious locations were indicative of malicious command-and-control (C2) activity.

Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.

The infected device was then observed downloading the file “putty.zip” over a HTTP connection using a PowerShell user agent. Despite being labelled as a .zip file, Darktrace’s detection capabilities were able to identify this as a masqueraded PuttyLink executable file. This activity resulted in multiple Darktrace DETECT models being triggered. These models are designed to look for suspicious file downloads from endpoints not usually visited by devices on the network, and files whose types are masqueraded, as well as the anomalous use of PowerShell. This behavior resembled previously observed activity with regards to the exploitation of Qlik Sense as an intrusion technique prior to the deployment of CACTUS ransomware [5].

The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.
Figure 2: The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.

Following the download of the masqueraded file, Darktrace observed the initial infected device engaging in unusual network scanning activity over the SMB, RDP and LDAP protocols. During this activity, the credential, “service_qlik” was observed, further indicating that Qlik was exploited by threat actors attempting to evade detection. Connections to other internal devices were made as part of this scanning activity as the attackers attempted to move laterally across the network.

Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.
Figure 3: Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.

The compromised server was then seen initiating multiple sessions over the RDP protocol to another device on the customer’s network, namely an internal DNS server. External researchers had previously observed this technique in CACTUS ransomware attacks where an RDP tunnel was established via Plink [5].

A few days later, on November 24, Darktrace identified over 20,000 failed Kerberos authentication attempts for the username “service_qlik” being made to the internal DNS server, clearly representing a brute-force login attack. There is currently a lack of open-source intelligence (OSINT) material definitively listing Kerberos login failures as part of a CACTUS ransomware attack that exploits the Qlik vulnerabilities. This highlights Darktrace’s ability to identify ongoing threats amongst unusual network activity without relying on existing threat intelligence, emphasizing its advantage over traditional security detection tools.

Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.
Figure 4: Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.

In the month following these failed Kerberos login attempts, between November 26 and December 22, Darktrace observed multiple internal devices encrypting files within the customer’s environment with the extensions “.cts1” and “.cts7”. Devices were also seen writing ransom notes with the file name “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to two additional internal devices, as well as files likely associated with Qlik, such as “QlikSense.pdf”. This activity detected by Darktrace confirmed the presence of a CACTUS ransomware infection that was spreading across the customer’s network.

The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.
Figure 5: The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.
CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.
Figure 6: CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.

Following this initial encryption activity, two affected devices were observed attempting to remove evidence of this activity by deleting the encrypted files.

Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.
Figure 7: Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.

結論

In the face of this CACTUS ransomware attack, Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection enabled it to quickly identify multiple stages of the cyber kill chain occurring in the customer’s environment. These stages ranged from ‘initial access’ by exploiting Qlik vulnerabilities, which Darktrace was able to detect before the method had been reported by external researchers, to ‘actions on objectives’ by encrypting files. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was also able to detect a previously unreported stage of the attack: multiple Kerberos brute force login attempts.

If Darktrace’s autonomous response capability, RESPOND, had been active and enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of this attack, it would have been able to take swift mitigative action to shut down such suspicious activity as soon as it was identified by DETECT, effectively containing the ransomware attack at the earliest possible stage.

Learning a network’s ‘normal’ to identify deviations from established patterns of behaviour enables Darktrace’s identify a potential compromise, even one that uses common and often legitimately used administrative tools. This allows Darktrace to stay one step ahead of the increasingly sophisticated TTPs used by ransomware actors.

Credit to Tiana Kelly, Cyber Analyst & Analyst Team Lead, Anna Gilbertson, Cyber Analyst

付録

参考文献

[1] https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/cactus-ransomware-prickly-new-variant-evades-detection

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cactus-ransomware-exploiting-qlik-sense-flaws-to-breach-networks/

[3] https://explore.avertium.com/resource/new-ransomware-strains-cactus-and-3am

[4] https://www.soitron.com/cyber-attackers-abuse-holidays/

[5] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/qlik-sense-exploited-in-cactus-ransomware-campaign/

Darktrace DETECT Models

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

Anomalous Connection / PowerShell to Rare External

Device / New PowerShell User Agent

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

User / Kerberos Password Brute Force

Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB

Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Delete Volume

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare  

Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination  

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server  

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)  

Compromise / Suspicious File and C2  

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert  

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches  

Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer

Anomalous File / Internet facing System File Download  

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise  

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)  

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)  

IoC一覧

IoC - Type - Description

zohoservice[.]net: 45.61.147[.]176 - Domain name: IP Address - Hosting payload over HTTP

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT; Windows NT 10.0; en-US) WindowsPowerShell/5.1.17763.2183 - User agent -PowerShell user agent

.cts1 - File extension - Malicious appendage

.cts7- File extension - Malicious appendage

cAcTuS.readme.txt - Filename -Ransom note

putty.zip – Filename - Initial payload: ZIP containing PuTTY Link

MITRE ATT&CK マッピング

Tactic - Technique  - SubTechnique

Web Protocols: COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071 -T1071.001

Powershell: EXECUTION - T1059 - T1059.001

Exploitation of Remote Services: LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210 – N/A

Vulnerability Scanning: RECONAISSANCE     - T1595 - T1595.002

Network Service Scanning: DISCOVERY - T1046 - N/A

Malware: RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1588 - T1588.001

Drive-by Compromise: INITIAL ACCESS - T1189 - N/A

Remote Desktop Protocol: LATERAL MOVEMENT – 1021 -T1021.001

Brute Force: CREDENTIAL ACCESS        T – 1110 - N/A

Data Encrypted for Impact: IMPACT - T1486 - N/A

Data Destruction: IMPACT - T1485 - N/A

File Deletion: DEFENSE EVASION - T1070 - T1070.004

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著者について
Tiana Kelly
Deputy Team Lead, London & Cyber Analyst

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The State of AI in Cybersecurity: How AI will impact the cyber threat landscape in 2024

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22
Apr 2024

About the AI Cybersecurity Report

We surveyed 1,800 CISOs, security leaders, administrators, and practitioners from industries around the globe. Our research was conducted to understand how the adoption of new AI-powered offensive and defensive cybersecurity technologies are being managed by organizations.

This blog is continuing the conversation from our last blog post “The State of AI in Cybersecurity: Unveiling Global Insights from 1,800 Security Practitioners” which was an overview of the entire report. This blog will focus on one aspect of the overarching report, the impact of AI on the cyber threat landscape.

To access the full report click here.

Are organizations feeling the impact of AI-powered cyber threats?

Nearly three-quarters (74%) state AI-powered threats are now a significant issue. Almost nine in ten (89%) agree that AI-powered threats will remain a major challenge into the foreseeable future, not just for the next one to two years.

However, only a slight majority (56%) thought AI-powered threats were a separate issue from traditional/non AI-powered threats. This could be the case because there are few, if any, reliable methods to determine whether an attack is AI-powered.

Identifying exactly when and where AI is being applied may not ever be possible. However, it is possible for AI to affect every stage of the attack lifecycle. As such, defenders will likely need to focus on preparing for a world where threats are unique and are coming faster than ever before.

a hypothetical cyber attack augmented by AI at every stage

Are security stakeholders concerned about AI’s impact on cyber threats and risks?

The results from our survey showed that security practitioners are concerned that AI will impact organizations in a variety of ways. There was equal concern associated across the board – from volume and sophistication of malware to internal risks like leakage of proprietary information from employees using generative AI tools.

What this tells us is that defenders need to prepare for a greater volume of sophisticated attacks and balance this with a focus on cyber hygiene to manage internal risks.

One example of a growing internal risks is shadow AI. It takes little effort for employees to adopt publicly-available text-based generative AI systems to increase their productivity. This opens the door to “shadow AI”, which is the use of popular AI tools without organizational approval or oversight. Resulting security risks such as inadvertent exposure of sensitive information or intellectual property are an ever-growing concern.

Are organizations taking strides to reduce risks associated with adoption of AI in their application and computing environment?

71.2% of survey participants say their organization has taken steps specifically to reduce the risk of using AI within its application and computing environment.

16.3% of survey participants claim their organization has not taken these steps.

These findings are good news. Even as enterprises compete to get as much value from AI as they can, as quickly as possible, they’re tempering their eager embrace of new tools with sensible caution.

Still, responses varied across roles. Security analysts, operators, administrators, and incident responders are less likely to have said their organizations had taken AI risk mitigation steps than respondents in other roles. In fact, 79% of executives said steps had been taken, and only 54% of respondents in hands-on roles agreed. It seems that leaders believe their organizations are taking the needed steps, but practitioners are seeing a gap.

Do security professionals feel confident in their preparedness for the next generation of threats?

A majority of respondents (six out of every ten) believe their organizations are inadequately prepared to face the next generation of AI-powered threats.

The survey findings reveal contrasting perceptions of organizational preparedness for cybersecurity threats across different regions and job roles. Security administrators, due to their hands-on experience, express the highest level of skepticism, with 72% feeling their organizations are inadequately prepared. Notably, respondents in mid-sized organizations feel the least prepared, while those in the largest companies feel the most prepared.

Regionally, participants in Asia-Pacific are most likely to believe their organizations are unprepared, while those in Latin America feel the most prepared. This aligns with the observation that Asia-Pacific has been the most impacted region by cybersecurity threats in recent years, according to the IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index.

The optimism among Latin American respondents could be attributed to lower threat volumes experienced in the region, but it's cautioned that this could change suddenly (1).

What are biggest barriers to defending against AI-powered threats?

The top-ranked inhibitors center on knowledge and personnel. However, issues are alluded to almost equally across the board including concerns around budget, tool integration, lack of attention to AI-powered threats, and poor cyber hygiene.

The cybersecurity industry is facing a significant shortage of skilled professionals, with a global deficit of approximately 4 million experts (2). As organizations struggle to manage their security tools and alerts, the challenge intensifies with the increasing adoption of AI by attackers. This shift has altered the demands on security teams, requiring practitioners to possess broad and deep knowledge across rapidly evolving solution stacks.

Educating end users about AI-driven defenses becomes paramount as organizations grapple with the shortage of professionals proficient in managing AI-powered security tools. Operationalizing machine learning models for effectiveness and accuracy emerges as a crucial skill set in high demand. However, our survey highlights a concerning lack of understanding among cybersecurity professionals regarding AI-driven threats and the use of AI-driven countermeasures indicating a gap in keeping pace with evolving attacker tactics.

The integration of security solutions remains a notable problem, hindering effective defense strategies. While budget constraints are not a primary inhibitor, organizations must prioritize addressing these challenges to bolster their cybersecurity posture. It's imperative for stakeholders to recognize the importance of investing in skilled professionals and integrated security solutions to mitigate emerging threats effectively.

To access the full report click here.

参考文献

1. IBM, X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2024, Available at: https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/L0GKXDWJ

2. ISC2, Cybersecurity Workforce Study 2023, Available at: https://media.isc2.org/-/media/Project/ISC2/Main/Media/ documents/research/ISC2_Cybersecurity_Workforce_Study_2023.pdf?rev=28b46de71ce24e6ab7705f6e3da8637e

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