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ソーシャルエンジニアリング:既知の送信者と未知の送信者の両方から悪意あるEメール活動を検知






近年、ソーシャルエンジニアリングはサイバー脅威の中で広く普及しており、今日のソーシャルメディアのほぼ普遍的な使用により、攻撃者はより効果的に被害者を調査し、ターゲットにすることができます。ソーシャルエンジニアリングは、ユーザーを操作して、ログイン情報やクレジットカード情報などの機密情報を開示させるなどの行為を行うものです。また、ユーザーアカウントの漏えいにつながることもあり、組織のデジタル資産に大きな混乱をもたらすこともあります。
人々が個人的な理由だけでなく、ビジネス目的でもソーシャルメディアプラットフォームを利用するようになると、攻撃者はソーシャルエンジニアリング攻撃で悪用できる情報を得るようになります。例えば、脅威アクターは、既知の個人または正規のサービスになりすまし、ユーザーの確立した信頼を利用しようとすることがあります。既知の連絡先を模倣することで、拒否リストに依存する従来のセキュリティツールでは攻撃を検知することが困難になるため、ソーシャルエンジニアリングの手法としては非常に有効です。
2022年10月、Darktrace は脅威アクターが既知の連絡先になりすまして顧客のデバイスを侵害しようとした2つの別々の悪質なEメールキャンペーンを特定し対応しました。Eメールシステムのすべてのユーザーの通常の行動を学習するため、Darktrace はこれらの脅威を即座に検知し、自律的に軽減することができ、顧客ネットワークへの重大な混乱を防ぐことができました。
元従業員になりすました給与流用詐欺未遂
カナダのエネルギーセクターのお客様が2022年10月にDarktrace をトライアル利用していた際、Darktrace/Email™は、組織内の従業員から送信されたと思われる疑わしいEメールを特定しました。Eメールは人事部(HR)のシニアディレクター宛に送信され、件名は "Change in payroll Direct Deposit" でした。このEメールは、従業員の銀行口座情報の変更を要求していました。しかし、Darktrace は送信者がランダムな文字を含むフリーメールのアドレスを使用しており、アルゴリズムで生成された可能性があることを認識しました。この事件は導入トライアル中に発生したため、Darktrace/Emailは対策を講じるように設定されていませんでした。そうでなければ、受信トレイにメールが届くのを防げたはずです。しかし、このケースでは、他のすべてのセキュリティツールを回避して、当該Eメールが送信されてしまったのです。
送信者不明のEメールでしたが、送信者と思われる社員は7日前に退職しており、会社のEメールアカウントにアクセスできなくなっていたため、人事部長はこのEメールが正当なものである可能性があると考えていました。しかし、Darktrace/Emailダッシュボードで確認した後、お客様は不審に思い、そのリクエストが正当なものかどうかを確認するために元社員に直接連絡しました。その結果、そのようなEメールは送っていないことが確認され、疑惑は晴れました。
顧客がさらに調査を進めたところ、その元従業員は、さまざまなソーシャルメディア上で退社について発言していたことが判明しました。このため、脅威アクターは元従業員になりすまし、組織を欺くための貴重な情報を得ることができたのです。
組織の人事部門を狙い、給与を流用しようとするこのような試みは、サイバー犯罪者の一般的な手口であり、Darktrace/Emailによって顧客全体で特定されることが多いのです。Darktrace/Email は、こうしたなりすましの試みに関連する指標を即座に特定し、顧客のセキュリティチームの注意を喚起することができるのです。
フィッシングリンクを共有するために正規のファイル共有サービスを使用
2022年10月7日、シンガポールの建設業界の顧客が、この組織にとって既知の法律事務所になりすまそうとするフィッシングキャンペーンの標的にされました。約200名の従業員が、件名が "Accepted:評価契約書" というEメールを受信したのです。

その4日前、Darktraceは法律事務所に関連する別のEメールアドレスと顧客の従業員との間の通信を観察しました。Darktrace/Emailは、この通信相手が顧客にEメールを送信したのは初めてだと指摘しました。

このEメールには、ファイル共有サービスへの非常に珍しいリンク(hxxps://ssvilvensstokes[.]app[.]box[.]com/notes)が、「PREVIEW OR PRINT COPY OF DOCUMENT HERE」というテキストの後ろに隠れていました。Darktrace がこのイベントをさらに調べたところ、2022年の10月にOSINTセキュリティツールを使って約30個の同様のURLが疑わしいものとして特定されていたため、このフィッシングキャンペーンの標的が当該顧客だけでないことが判明しました。


追加のOSINT作業により、このリンクは、"Valuation Agreement "という名前のPDFファイルをホストしていると思われるウェブサイトへ誘導することが判明しました。その後、受信者は、ファイルを表示するために、「OPEN OR ACCESS DOCUMENT HERE」というテキストに隠された別のリンク(hulking-citrine-krypton [.]glitch[.]me)をたどるように促されます。その後、ユーザーはMicrosoft 365の認証情報を入力するよう促されます。


このページには、"This document has been scanned for viruses by Norton Antivirus Security." というテキストが含まれていました。これは、脅威アクターが、ユーザーの信頼を獲得し、成功の可能性を高めるために、確立されたセキュリティベンダーなどの有名ブランドになりすまし、ソーシャルエンジニアリングの技術を採用したもう1つの例です。
法律事務所の実在の職員がアカウントを乗っ取られ、それを悪用した悪意ある行為者がサプライチェーン攻撃の一環としてこのようなフィッシングメールを一斉送信していた可能性が高いです。このような場合、悪意のある行為者は、ターゲットが普段の会話から逸脱することを疑わないよう、既知の連絡先への信頼を頼りにします。
Darktrace は、一見すると既知の通信相手から送信されたEメールであるにもかかわらず、これらのEメールに複数の異常があることを即座に検知することができました。検知されたアクティビティは、予期せぬリンクや視覚的に目立つリンクに関連するモデルブリーチを自動的に誘発しました。その結果、Darktrace/Emailは、リンクをロックして、ユーザーがクリックできないように対応しました。
Darktrace はその後、この送信者から社内の他の受信者を狙ったメールが確認され、フィッシングキャンペーンを示唆するメール送信の急増に伴うモデルブレーキングが引き起こされました。これに対し、Darktrace/Emailは自律的に行動し、これらのEメールを迷惑メールとしてファイリングしました。お客様の環境でより多くのメールが検知されるにつれ、送信者の異常スコアは上昇し、最終的にDarktrace は160通以上の悪質なEメールを阻止し、受信者をアカウント侵害の可能性から保護することができました。
このフィッシングキャンペーンの期間中、以下のDarktrace/Email モデルが侵害されました:
- Unusual/Sender Surge
- Unusual/Undisclosed Recipients
- Antigena Anomaly
- Association/Unlikely Recipient Association
- Link/Low Link Association
- Link/Visually Prominent Link
- Link/Visually Prominent Link Unexpected For Sender
- Unusual/New Sender Wide Distribution
- Unusual/Undisclosed Recipients + New Address Known Domain
結論
攻撃者は、ソーシャルエンジニアリングを利用して、ユーザーを操作し、送金、認証情報の開示、悪意のあるリンクのクリックなどをさせることができるため、現在のEメールサイバーセキュリティを脅かす主要な脅威の多くに関与しているのです。
上記の脅威の実例は、2022年12月にChatGPTがリリースされ、言語生成AIが主流となる前に起こったものです。現在では、悪意のあるアクターが洗練されたソーシャルエンジニアリングメールを生成することがさらに容易になっています。ソーシャルメディアの投稿を入力として使用することで、生成AIによって書かれたソーシャルエンジニアリングメールは、高度にターゲット化され、大規模に生成することができます。また、文法やスペルの間違いなど、ユーザーが注意すべき点を回避し、ペイロードを隠したり、完全に見過ごしたりすることも可能です。
ソーシャルエンジニアリングのリスクを軽減するために、ソーシャルメディアポリシーを導入し、従業員がオンラインに投稿する内容に注意するよう促すとともに、資金移動の要求が正当なものかどうかを確認する手順を定めることが推奨されます。
しかし、これらのポリシーはそれだけでは十分ではありません。Darktrace/Emailは、既知の通信相手から送信されたEメールでも、未知の送信者から送信されたEメールでも、疑わしいEメールの特徴を識別することができます。自己学習型AIを搭載しているため、どんななりすましよりも組織のユーザーをよく理解しています。このように、Darktrace/Emailは、Eメール内の異常を検知し、悪意のあるコンポーネントを機械的な速度で無効化することで、従業員が被害に遭う前に、攻撃を初期段階で阻止することができます。
付録
侵害指標(IoC)一覧
ドメイン:
hxxps://ssvilvensstokes[.]app[.]box[.]com/notes/*?s=* - 1st external link (seen in email)
hxxps://hulking-citrine-krypton[.]glitch[.]me/flk.html - 2nd external link, masked behind “OPEN OR ACCESS DOCUMENT HERE”
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PurpleFox in a Henhouse: How Darktrace Hunted Down a Persistent and Dynamic Rootkit



Versatile Malware: PurpleFox
As organizations and security teams across the world move to bolster their digital defenses against cyber threats, threats actors, in turn, are forced to adopt more sophisticated tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to circumvent them. Rather than being static and predictable, malware strains are becoming increasingly versatile and therefore elusive to traditional security tools.
One such example is PurpleFox. First observed in 2018, PurpleFox is a combined fileless rootkit and backdoor trojan known to target Windows machines. PurpleFox is known for consistently adapting its functionalities over time, utilizing different infection vectors including known vulnerabilities (CVEs), fake Telegram installers, and phishing. It is also leveraged by other campaigns to deliver ransomware tools, spyware, and cryptocurrency mining malware. It is also widely known for using Microsoft Software Installer (MSI) files masquerading as other file types.
The Evolution of PurpleFox
The Original Strain
First reported in March 2018, PurpleFox was identified to be a trojan that drops itself onto Windows machines using an MSI installation package that alters registry values to replace a legitimate Windows system file [1]. The initial stage of infection relied on the third-party toolkit RIG Exploit Kit (EK). RIG EK is hosted on compromised or malicious websites and is dropped onto the unsuspecting system when they visit browse that site. The built-in Windows installer (MSIEXEC) is leveraged to run the installation package retrieved from the website. This, in turn, drops two files into the Windows directory – namely a malicious dynamic-link library (DLL) that acts as a loader, and the payload of the malware. After infection, PurpleFox is often used to retrieve and deploy other types of malware.
Subsequent Variants
Since its initial discovery, PurpleFox has also been observed leveraging PowerShell to enable fileless infection and additional privilege escalation vulnerabilities to increase the likelihood of successful infection [2]. The PowerShell script had also been reported to be masquerading as a .jpg image file. PowerSploit modules are utilized to gain elevated privileges if the current user lacks administrator privileges. Once obtained, the script proceeds to retrieve and execute a malicious MSI package, also masquerading as an image file. As of 2020, PurpleFox no longer relied on the RIG EK for its delivery phase, instead spreading via the exploitation of the SMB protocol [3]. The malware would leverage the compromised systems as hosts for the PurpleFox payloads to facilitate its spread to other systems. This mode of infection can occur without any user action, akin to a worm.
The current iteration of PurpleFox reportedly uses brute-forcing of vulnerable services, such as SMB, to facilitate its spread over the network and escalate privileges. By scanning internet-facing Windows computers, PurpleFox exploits weak passwords for Windows user accounts through SMB, including administrative credentials to facilitate further privilege escalation.
Darktrace detection of PurpleFox
In July 2023, Darktrace observed an example of a PurpleFox infection on the network of a customer in the healthcare sector. This observation was a slightly different method of downloading the PurpleFox payload. An affected device was observed initiating a series of service control requests using DCE-RPC, instructing the device to make connections to a host of servers to download a malicious .PNG file, later confirmed to be the PurpleFox rootkit. The device was then observed carrying out worm-like activity to other external internet-facing servers, as well as scanning related subnets.
Darktrace DETECT™ was able to successfully identify and track this compromise across the cyber kill chain and ensure the customer was able to take swift remedial action to prevent the attack from escalating further.
While the customer in question did have Darktrace RESPOND™, it was configured in human confirmation mode, meaning any mitigative actions had to be manually applied by the customer’s security team. If RESPOND had been enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of the attack, it would have been able to take swift action against the compromise to contain it at the earliest instance.
攻撃の概要

Initial Scanning over SMB
On July 14, 2023, Darktrace detected the affected device scanning other internal devices on the customer’s network via port 445. The numerous connections were consistent with the aforementioned worm-like activity that has been reported from PurpleFox behavior as it appears to be targeting SMB services looking for open or vulnerable channels to exploit.
This initial scanning activity was detected by Darktrace DETECT, specifically through the model breach ‘Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity’. Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst™ then launched an autonomous investigation into these internal connections and tied them into one larger-scale network reconnaissance incident, rather than a series of isolated connections.

As Darktrace RESPOND was configured in human confirmation mode, it was unable to autonomously block these internal connections. However, it did suggest blocking connections on port 445, which could have been manually applied by the customer’s security team.

特権昇格
The device successfully logged in via NTLM with the credential, ‘administrator’. Darktrace recognized that the endpoint was external to the customer’s environment, indicating that the affected device was now being used to propagate the malware to other networks. Considering the lack of observed brute-force activity up to this point, the credentials for ‘administrator’ had likely been compromised prior to Darktrace’s deployment on the network, or outside of Darktrace’s purview via a phishing attack.
Exploitation
Darktrace then detected a series of service control requests over DCE-RPC using the credential ‘admin’ to make SVCCTL Create Service W Requests. A script was then observed where the controlled device is instructed to launch mshta.exe, a Windows-native binary designed to execute Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) files. This enables the execution of arbitrary script code, VBScript in this case.


There are a few MSIEXEC flags to note:
- /i : installs or configures a product
- /Q : sets the user interface level. In this case, it is set to ‘No UI’, which is used for “quiet” execution, so no user interaction is required
Evidently, this was an attempt to evade detection by endpoint users as it is surreptitiously installed onto the system. This corresponds to the download of the rootkit that has previously been associated with PurpleFox. At this stage, the infected device continues to be leveraged as an attack device and scans SMB services over external endpoints. The device also appeared to attempt brute-forcing over NTLM using the same ‘administrator’ credential to these endpoints. This activity was identified by Darktrace DETECT which, if enabled in autonomous response mode would have instantly blocked similar outbound connections, thus preventing the spread of PurpleFox.

Installation
On August 9, Darktrace observed the device making initial attempts to download a malicious .PNG file. This was a notable change in tactics from previously reported PurpleFox campaigns which had been observed utilizing .MOE files for their payloads [3]. The .MOE payloads are binary files that are more easily detected and blocked by traditional signatured-based security measures as they are not associated with known software. The ubiquity of .PNG files, especially on the web, make identifying and blacklisting the files significantly more difficult.
The first connection was made with the URI ‘/test.png’. It was noted that the HTTP method here was HEAD, a method similar to GET requests except the server must not return a message-body in the response.
The metainformation contained in the HTTP headers in response to a HEAD request should be identical to the information sent in response to a GET request. This method is often used to test hypertext links for validity and recent modification. This is likely a way of checking if the server hosting the payload is still active. Avoiding connections that could possibly be detected by antivirus solutions can help keep this activity under-the-radar.


The server responds with a status code of 200 before the download begins. The HEAD request could be part of the attacker’s verification that the server is still running, and that the payload is available for download. The ‘/test.png’ HEAD request was sent twice, likely for double confirmation to begin the file transfer.

Subsequent analysis using a Packet Capture (PCAP) tool revealed that this connection used the Windows Installer user agent that has previously been associated with PurpleFox. The device then began to download a payload that was masquerading as a Microsoft Word document. The device was thus able to download the payload twice, from two separate endpoints.
By masquerading as a Microsoft Word file, the threat actor was likely attempting to evade the detection of the endpoint user and traditional security tools by passing off as an innocuous text document. Likewise, using a Windows Installer user agent would enable threat actors to bypass antivirus measures and disguise the malicious installation as legitimate download activity.
Darktrace DETECT identified that these were masqueraded file downloads by correctly identifying the mismatch between the file extension and the true file type. Subsequently, AI Analyst was able to correctly identify the file type and deduced that this download was indicative of the device having been compromised.
In this case, the device attempted to download the payload from several different endpoints, many of which had low antivirus detection rates or open-source intelligence (OSINT) flags, highlighting the need to move beyond traditional signature-base detections.



If Darktrace RESPOND was enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of the attack it would have acted by blocking connections to these suspicious endpoints, thus preventing the download of malicious files. However, as RESPOND was in human confirmation mode, RESPOND actions required manual application by the customer’s security team which unfortunately did not happen, as such the device was able to download the payloads.
結論
The PurpleFox malware is a particularly dynamic strain known to continually evolve over time, utilizing a blend of old and new approaches to achieve its goals which is likely to muddy expectations on its behavior. By frequently employing new methods of attack, malicious actors are able to bypass traditional security tools that rely on signature-based detections and static lists of indictors of compromise (IoCs), necessitating a more sophisticated approach to threat detection.
Darktrace DETECT’s Self-Learning AI enables it to confront adaptable and elusive threats like PurpleFox. By learning and understanding customer networks, it is able to discern normal network behavior and patterns of life, distinguishing expected activity from potential deviations. This anomaly-based approach to threat detection allows Darktrace to detect cyber threats as soon as they emerge.
By combining DETECT with the autonomous response capabilities of RESPOND, Darktrace customers are able to effectively safeguard their digital environments and ensure that emerging threats can be identified and shut down at the earliest stage of the kill chain, regardless of the tactics employed by would-be attackers.
Credit to Piramol Krishnan, Cyber Analyst, Qing Hong Kwa, Senior Cyber Analyst & Deputy Team Lead, Singapore
付録
Darktraceによるモデル検知
- Device / Increased External Connectivity
- Device / Large Number of Connections to New Endpoints
- Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Admin)
- Compliance / External Windows Communications
- Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
- Compromise / Unusual SVCCTL Activity
- Compromise / Rare Domain Pointing to Internal IP
- Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer
RESPOND Models
- Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block
- Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block
- Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
- Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block
- Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block
- Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block
IoC一覧
IoC - Type - Description
/C558B828.Png - URI - URI for Purple Fox Rootkit [4]
5b1de649f2bc4eb08f1d83f7ea052de5b8fe141f - File Hash - SHA1 hash of C558B828.Png file (Malware payload)
190.4.210[.]242 - IP - Purple Fox C2 Servers
218.4.170[.]236 - IP - IP for download of .PNG file (Malware payload)
180.169.1[.]220 - IP - IP for download of .PNG file (Malware payload)
103.94.108[.]114:10837 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
221.199.171[.]174:16543 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
61.222.155[.]49:14098 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
178.128.103[.]246:17880 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
222.134.99[.]132:12539 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
164.90.152[.]252:18075 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
198.199.80[.]121:11490 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
MITRE ATT&CK マッピング
Tactic - Technique
Reconnaissance - Active Scanning T1595, Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks T1595.001, Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning T1595.002
Resource Development - Obtain Capabilities: Malware T1588.001
Initial Access, Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation - Valid Accounts: Default Accounts T1078.001
Initial Access - Drive-by Compromise T1189
Defense Evasion - Masquerading T1036
Credential Access - Brute Force T1110
Discovery - Network Service Discovery T1046
Command and Control - Proxy: External Proxy T1090.002
参考文献
- https://blog.360totalsecurity.com/en/purple-fox-trojan-burst-out-globally-and-infected-more-than-30000-users/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/purple-fox-fileless-malware-with-rookit-component-delivered-by-rig-exploit-kit-now-abuses-powershell.html
- https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/purple-fox-rootkit-now-propagates-as-a-worm
- https://www.foregenix.com/blog/an-overview-on-purple-fox
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_sg/research/21/j/purplefox-adds-new-backdoor-that-uses-websockets.html
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OT
$70 Million in Cyber Security Funding for Electric Cooperatives & Utilities



What is the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal?
The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law passed by congress in 2021 aimed to upgrade power and infrastructure to deliver clean, reliable energy across the US to achieve zero-emissions. To date, the largest investment in clean energy, the deal will fund new programs to support the development and deployment of clean energy technology.
Why is it relevant to electric municipalities?
Section 40124 of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law allocates $250 million over a 5-year period to create the Rural and Municipal Utility Cybersecurity (RMUC) Program to help electric cooperative, municipal, and small investor-owned utilities protect against, detect, respond to, and recover from cybersecurity threats.1 This act illuminates the value behind a full life-cycle approach to cyber security. Thus, finding a cyber security solution that can provide all aspects of security in one integrated platform would enhance the overall security posture and ease many of the challenges that arise with adopting multiple point solutions.
On November 16, 2023 the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) released the Advanced Cybersecurity Technology (ACT) for electric utilities offering a $70 million funding opportunity that aims to enhance the cybersecurity posture of electric cooperative, municipal, and small investor-owned utilities.
Funding Details
10 projects will be funded with application submissions due November 29, 2023, 5:00 pm ET with $200,000 each in cash prizes in the following areas:
- Direct support for eligible utilities to make investments in cybersecurity technologies, tools, training, and improvements in utility processes and procedures;
- Funding to strengthen the peer-to-peer and not-for-profit cybersecurity technical assistance ecosystem currently serving eligible electric utilities; and
- Increasing access to cybersecurity technical assistance and training for eligible utilities with limited cybersecurity resources. 2
To submit for this award visit: https://www.herox.com/ACT1Prize
How can electric municipalities utilize the funding?
While the adoption of hybrid working patterns increase cloud and SaaS usage, the number of industrial IoT devices also continues to rise. The result is decrease in visibility for security teams and new entry points for attackers. Particularly for energy and utility organizations.
Electric cooperatives seeking to enhance their cyber security posture can aim to invest in cyber security tools that provide the following:
Compliance support: Consider finding an OT security solution that maps out how its solutions and features help your organization comply with relevant compliance mandates such as NIST, ISA, FERC, TSA, HIPAA, CIS Controls, and more.
Anomaly based detection: Siloed security solutions also fail to detect attacks that span
the entire organization. Anomaly-based detection enhances an organization’s cyber security posture by proactively defending against potential attacks and maintaining a comprehensive view of their attack surface.
Integration capabilities: Implementation of several point solutions that complete individual tasks runs the risk of increasing workloads for operators and creates additional challenges with compliance, budgeting, and technical support. Look for cyber security tools that integrate with your existing technologies.
Passive and active asset tracking: Active Identification offers accurate enumeration, real time updates, vulnerability assessment, asset validation while Passive Identification eliminates the risk of operational disruption, minimizes risk, does not generate additional network traffic. It would be ideal to find a security solution that can do both.
Can secure both IT and OT in unison: Given that most OT cyber-attacks actually start in IT networks before pivoting into OT, a mature security posture for critical infrastructure would include a single solution for both IT and OT. Separate solutions for IT and OT present challenges when defending network boundaries and detecting incidents when an attacker pivots from IT to OT. These independent solutions also significantly increase operator workload and materially diminish risk mitigation efforts.
Darktrace/OT for Electric Cooperatives and Utilities
For smaller teams with just one or two dedicated employees, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst and Investigation features allow end users to spend less time in the platform as it compiles critical incidents into comprehensive actionable event reports. AI Analyst brings all the information into a centralized view with incident reporting in natural language summaries and can be generated for compliance reports specific to regulatory requirements.
For larger teams, Darktrace alerts can be forwarded to 3rd party platforms such as a SIEM, where security team decision making is augmented. Additionally, executive reports and autonomous response reduce the alert fatigue generally associated with legacy tools. Most importantly, Darktrace’s unique understanding of normal allows security teams to detect zero-days and signatureless attacks regardless of the size of the organization and how alerts are consumed.
Key Benefits of Darktrace/OT
- Anomaly-based detection and real-time response
- Secures IT, OT, and IoT in unison
- Active and Passive Asset Identification
- Automated security reporting
- Attack surface management and vulnerability assessment
- Covers all levels of the Purdue Model
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