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壊れた信頼:Darktraceが検知した信頼されたネットワーク関係の悪用

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17
Jan 2024
17
Jan 2024
このブログでは、Darktrace DETECTとDarktraceのSOCチームが、パートナーの1社との信頼関係を悪用され、ネットワークが侵害された顧客をどのように支援したかについて詳しく解説します。

組織と第三者との間の信頼関係は、サイバー脅威アクターが機密ネットワークにアクセスするための標的として、ますます一般的になってきています。このような信頼関係は、通常、組織が外部または隣接するエンティティに付与し、ビジネス目的で内部リソースへのアクセスを許可するものです。

Several high-profile compromises have occurred due to the leveraging of privileged network access by such third parties. One prominent example is the 2016 DNC network attack, in which the trust between the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC) was exploited. Supply chain attacks, which also leverage the implicit trust between IT vendors and customers, are also on the rise with some estimates projecting that by 2025, almost half of all organizations will be impact by supply chain compromises.2 These trends may also be attributed to the prevalence of remote work as well as the growth in IT-managed service providers.3

このようなネットワーク関係と脅威技術の性質を考慮すると、シグネチャベースの検知はこのような信頼悪用の特定と緩和において非常に不利であり、ネットワーク管理者は、ネットワークへのアクセスを必要とするIPをブロックするためにファイアウォールを使用することは容易ではありません。しかし、Darktrace DETECT™とその自己学習型AIは、このような侵害の特定と軽減に成功しています。2023年9月、Darktraceは医療機関のネットワーク上でこのような信頼関係の悪用に関わるインシデントを観測しました。

攻撃の概要

2023年9月上旬、あるDarktraceの顧客が、Ask the Expert™(ATE)サービスを通じてDarktraceセキュリティオペレーションセンター(SOC)に連絡し、ネットワーク上で検知された不審な活動に関する支援を要請しました。Darktraceは、顧客のセキュリティチームに、ネットワーク上に現れた未知のデバイスを警告し、偵察、ラテラルムーブメント、データ流出の試みなど、一連の予期せぬ活動を実行するように進めていました。

この顧客にとっては不運だったことは、Darktrace RESPOND™は、この侵害が発生した時点では自律遮断モードが有効になっていなかったため、RESPONDによって提案された予防措置は、事後的に顧客のセキュリティチームが手動で適用する必要がありました。それにもかかわらず、Darktrace による疑わしい活動の迅速な特定と SOC の調査により、侵入を初期段階で阻止し、より破壊的な侵害に発展するのを防ぐのに役立ちました。

初期アクセス

Darktraceは当初、顧客の内部ネットワーク内に、以前のパートナー組織のネットワークからのリモートアクセスを示唆するネットワークアドレス変換(NAT)IPアドレスで現れた新しいデバイスを観察しました。顧客によって実施されたさらなる調査により、パートナー組織内の貧弱なクレデンシャルポリシーが、仮想デスクトップインターフェース(VDI)マシンにアクセスするために攻撃者によって悪用された可能性が高いことが判明しました。

信頼できるアソシエイトのVDIアプライアンスを使用して、脅威アクターはNATリモートアクセスインフラを利用して顧客の環境にアクセスすることができました。顧客のネットワーク内のデバイスは、以前はパートナーネットワークからのリモートアクセスに利用されていました。それ以来、このネットワークへのアクセスはすべての関係者から排除されたと思われていましたが、リモートアクセス機能は稼動したままであることが明らかになりました。顧客は環境内にファイアウォールも設置していましたが、攻撃時の設定ミスにより、リモート環境へのインバウンドポートアクセスが許可され、2023年8月29日に不審なデバイスがネットワークに接続されました。

内部偵察

このデバイスがネットワークに接続した直後、Darktraceはこのデバイスが一連の内部偵察活動を実行しているのを観測しました。このアクティビティは、内部ICMPアドレス接続で開始され、SMB、RDP、HTTP、RPC、SSLなどの重要なサービスに関連するさまざまなポートへの内部TCP接続試行が続きました。また、このデバイスが特権クレデンシャルを使用しようとしていることも検知されましたが、このクレデンシャルは後に一般的な多目的管理アカウントに関連するものであることが特定されました。脅威アクターは、さらに6つのユーザー認証情報を使用しようとしながら、DNSの逆引きを含む内部偵察を進めました。

広範な内部接続に加え、DarktraceはRDPとSMBプロトコルに焦点を当てた持続的な接続試行を観測しました。Darktraceはまた、攻撃者の偵察のこの段階で、追加のSMB列挙を検知しました。この偵察活動は、利用可能な共有タイプと集約に利用可能な情報を特定するために、ホストによって以前は見られなかった多種多様なSMB共有へのアクセスを主に試みました。そのため、侵入ホストは、extramedwb というクレデンシャルを使用して、さまざまな内部ホストのサーバーサービス(srvsvc)エンドポイントにSMB書き込みを大量に行いました。このエンドポイントへの SMB 書き込みは、伝統的にバインディングの試みを示しています。

8月31日から、Darktraceは前述のNAT IPアドレスに関連する新しいホストを特定しました。この新しいホストは、VDIインフラストラクチャを利用してネットワーク上で偵察とラテラルムーブメントを行う主要なホストとして引き継がれたようです。以前のホストと同様に、このホストも8月31日に偵察活動を継続していることが確認されており、SMBの列挙、SMBアクセスの失敗、RDP接続の試行、DNSの逆引きが行われていました。 攻撃者は、偵察の実行のために、"auditor" や "administrator" などの一般的でおそらくデフォルトの管理者認証情報を含む複数の認証情報を利用していました。

図1:Advanced Search(詳細検索)クエリにより、侵害が発生した時点から1週間の間に観測された2番目のリモートアクセスホストからの異常なアクティビティがハイライトされた

Following these initial detections by Darktrace DETECT, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst™ launched an autonomous investigation into the scanning and privileged internal connectivity and linked these seemingly separate events together into one wider internal reconnaissance incident.

Figure 2: Timeline of an AI Analyst investigation carried out between August 29 and August 31, 2023, during which it detected an increased volume of scanning and unusual privileged internal connectivity.

ラテラルムーブメント

リモートアクセスインフラストラクチャを悪用して観測された新しいホストによって実行された偵察活動の後、Darktraceは、特にRPCコマンドとSMBファイル書き込みを介して、顧客のネットワーク内で横方向に移動しようとする試みの増加を検知しました。

具体的には、この脅威アクターは、複数の宛先デバイスに対してRPCバインドを試みていることが確認されており、このRPCバインドは、宛先デバイス上でコマンドの呼び出しやサービスの作成に使用される可能性があります。このアクティビティは、ネットワーク内の複数の宛先デバイスでntsvcsという名前のパイプへのバインドに何度も失敗していることで浮き彫りになりました。しかし、多数の接続試行があったことから、Darktraceは成功したRPC接続も多数検知しました。

Darktrace はまた、違反デバイスから一般的でないサービス制御(SVCCTL)の ExecMethod、Create、および Start サービス操作の急増を検知しました。

図 3:感染したデバイスが、宛先デバイスでサポートされていないエンドポイントへの RPC バインドに失敗したことを示すモデル違反の詳細

さらに、SMB/NTLM プロトコルを使用したラテラルムーブメントが行われました。また、感染したデバイスは、一連の匿名 NTLM ログイン(クライアントプリンシパルを指定せずに NTLM 認証を試行する)を内部ホストに対して実施していました。このような行為は、ネットワーク上で悪意のある、あるいは不正な行為が行われていることを強く示唆するものです。このホストはまた、キルチェーンのこの段階で、古い SMB バージョン 1 (SMBv1) プロトコルを使用していました。SMBv1の使用は、このバージョンのプロトコルに関連する悪用可能な脆弱性が多いため、ほとんどのネットワークでコンプライアンス上の問題になることが多いです。

最後に、Darktraceは、SMB書き込みによる TRMtZSqo.exe などの一般的でない実行ファイルの内部転送を確認しました。違反デバイスは、このファイルを宛先サーバーの隠し管理共有(ADMIN$)に書き込むことが観察されました。Darktraceは、このアクティビティがデバイスにとって非常に異例であり、脅威アクターが、さらなる永続化、データ集約、および/またはコマンド&コントロール(C2)操作のために、悪意のあるペイロードを宛先サーバーに転送していることを表している可能性があることを認識しました。この時、デバイスから実行可能ファイルのさらなる SMB 書き込みと、それに続くこれらのバイナリの削除が観測されました。例えば、追加の実行可能ファイル JAqfhBEB.exe が侵害デバイスによって削除されているのが確認されました。この削除は、SVCCTL の作成および開始操作の急増と相まって、ネットワーク内で永続化バイナリとデータハーベスティングバイナリが転送、実行、削除されたことを示唆しています。

図4: AI Analyst が、侵入時にリモートアクセスデバイスから書き込まれた異常な実行ファイルのSMBファイル書き込みをハイライトした詳細

結論

最終的に、Darktraceは信頼関係を悪用して顧客のネットワークに不正アクセスした脅威アクターによる不審な活動を特定し、警告することに成功しました。

スキャン、RPCコマンド、SMBセッションの特定は、この侵入を封じ込め、軽減するための対応において、顧客を直接支援しました。Darktrace SOC が実施した調査により、顧客は攻撃を迅速にトリアージして修復し、潜在的な損害を軽減し、侵害がさらに拡大するのを防ぐことができました。もしDarktrace RESPONDが攻撃時に自律遮断モードが有効になっていれば、スキャン、共有列挙、ファイル書き込み活動を抑制するための迅速な行動を取ることができ、それによって攻撃者のネットワーク偵察と横移動の試みを阻止することができたでしょう。

組織間の信頼関係を悪用することで、脅威アクターは多くの場合、特定のエンドポイントからの接続を許可し、信頼するように再設定された従来のシグネチャベースのセキュリティ手法を回避することができます。特定のルールや許可されたIPアドレス、ポート、デバイスの設定に依存するのではなく、脅威検知に対するDarktrace DETECTのアノマリベースのアプローチは、問題のあるデバイスやドメインまたは関係が信頼されているかどうかに関係なく、最も早い段階で疑わしいネットワークアクティビティを特定できることを意味しました。

寄稿者:Adam Potter(Cyber Security Analyst)、Taylor Breland(Analyst Team Lead, San Francisco)

Darktrace DETECT モデルブリーチの適用範囲:

  • Device / ICMP Address Scan
  • Device / Network Scan
  • Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity
  • Device / RDP Scan
  • Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance
  • Device / Reverse DNS Sweep
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Activity On High Risk Device
  • Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity
  • Device / Anonymous NTLM Logins
  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual SMB Version 1 Connectivity
  • Device / Repeated Unknown RPC Service Bind Errors
  • Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
  • Compliance / SMB Drive Write
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual Internal EXE File Transfer
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

AI Analyst のインシデント:

  • Scanning of Multiple Devices
  • Extensive Unusual RDPConnections
  • SMB Write of Suspicious File
  • Suspicious DCE-RPC Activity

MITRE ATT&CK マッピング

  • Tactic: Initial Access
  • Technique: T1199 - Trusted Relationship
  • Tactic: Discovery
  • Technique:
  • T1018 - Remote System Discovery
  • T1046 - Network Service Discovery
  • T1135 - Network Share Discovery
  • T1083 - File and Directory Discovery
  • Tactic: Lateral Movement
  • Technique:
  • T1570 - Lateral Tool Transfer
  • T1021 - Remote Services
  • T1021.002 - SMB/Windows Admin Shares
  • T1021.003 - Distributed Component Object Model
  • T1550 - Use Alternate Authentication Material

参考文献

1https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199/

2https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/insights-supply-chain-attacks/

3https://newsroom.cisco.com/c/r/newsroom/en/us/a/y2023/m09/companies-reliance-on-it-managed-services-increases-in-2023-sector-valued-at-us-472-billion-globally.html#:~:text=IT%20channel%20partners%20selling%20managed,US%24419%20billion%20in%202022.

INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Adam Potter
Cyber Analyst
Taylor Breland
Analyst Team Lead, San Francisco
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Inside the SOC

A Thorn in Attackers’ Sides: How Darktrace Uncovered a CACTUS Ransomware Infection

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24
Apr 2024

What is CACTUS Ransomware?

In May 2023, Kroll Cyber Threat Intelligence Analysts identified CACTUS as a new ransomware strain that had been actively targeting large commercial organizations since March 2023 [1]. CACTUS ransomware gets its name from the filename of the ransom note, “cAcTuS.readme.txt”. Encrypted files are appended with the extension “.cts”, followed by a number which varies between attacks, e.g. “.cts1” and “.cts2”.

As the cyber threat landscape adapts to ever-present fast-paced technological change, ransomware affiliates are employing progressively sophisticated techniques to enter networks, evade detection and achieve their nefarious goals.

How does CACTUS Ransomware work?

In the case of CACTUS, threat actors have been seen gaining initial network access by exploiting Virtual Private Network (VPN) services. Once inside the network, they may conduct internal scanning using tools like SoftPerfect Network Scanner, and PowerShell commands to enumerate endpoints, identify user accounts, and ping remote endpoints. Persistence is maintained by the deployment of various remote access methods, including legitimate remote access tools like Splashtop, AnyDesk, and SuperOps RMM in order to evade detection, along with malicious tools like Cobalt Strike and Chisel. Such tools, as well as custom scripts like TotalExec, have been used to disable security software to distribute the ransomware binary. CACTUS ransomware is unique in that it adopts a double-extortion tactic, stealing data from target networks and then encrypting it on compromised systems [2].

At the end of November 2023, cybersecurity firm Arctic Wolf reported instances of CACTUS attacks exploiting vulnerabilities on the Windows version of the business analytics platform Qlik, specifically CVE-2023-41266, CVE-2023-41265, and CVE-2023-48365, to gain initial access to target networks [3]. The vulnerability tracked as CVE-2023-41266 can be exploited to generate anonymous sessions and perform HTTP requests to unauthorized endpoints, whilst CVE-2023-41265 does not require authentication and can be leveraged to elevate privileges and execute HTTP requests on the backend server that hosts the application [2].

Darktrace’s Coverage of CACTUS Ransomware

In November 2023, Darktrace observed malicious actors leveraging the aforementioned method of exploiting Qlik to gain access to the network of a customer in the US, more than a week before the vulnerability was reported by external researchers.

Here, Qlik vulnerabilities were successfully exploited, and a malicious executable (.exe) was detonated on the network, which was followed by network scanning and failed Kerberos login attempts. The attack culminated in the encryption of numerous files with extensions such as “.cts1”, and SMB writes of the ransom note “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to multiple internal devices, all of which was promptly identified by Darktrace DETECT™.

While traditional rules and signature-based detection tools may struggle to identify the malicious use of a legitimate business platform like Qlik, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was able to confidently identify anomalous use of the tool in a CACTUS ransomware attack by examining the rarity of the offending device’s surrounding activity and comparing it to the learned behavior of the device and its peers.

Unfortunately for the customer in this case, Darktrace RESPOND™ was not enabled in autonomous response mode during their encounter with CACTUS ransomware meaning that attackers were able to successfully escalate their attack to the point of ransomware detonation and file encryption. Had RESPOND been configured to autonomously act on any unusual activity, Darktrace could have prevented the attack from progressing, stopping the download of any harmful files, or the encryption of legitimate ones.

Cactus Ransomware Attack Overview

Holiday periods have increasingly become one of the favoured times for malicious actors to launch their attacks, as they can take advantage of the festive downtime of organizations and their security teams, and the typically more relaxed mindset of employees during this period [4].

Following this trend, in late November 2023, Darktrace began detecting anomalous connections on the network of a customer in the US, which presented multiple indicators of compromise (IoCs) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) associated with CACTUS ransomware. The threat actors in this case set their attack in motion by exploiting the Qlik vulnerabilities on one of the customer’s critical servers.

Darktrace observed the server device making beaconing connections to the endpoint “zohoservice[.]net” (IP address: 45.61.147.176) over the course of three days. This endpoint is known to host a malicious payload, namely a .zip file containing the command line connection tool PuttyLink [5].

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to autonomously identify over 1,000 beaconing connections taking place on the customer’s network and group them together, in this case joining the dots in an ongoing ransomware attack. AI Analyst recognized that these repeated connections to highly suspicious locations were indicative of malicious command-and-control (C2) activity.

Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.

The infected device was then observed downloading the file “putty.zip” over a HTTP connection using a PowerShell user agent. Despite being labelled as a .zip file, Darktrace’s detection capabilities were able to identify this as a masqueraded PuttyLink executable file. This activity resulted in multiple Darktrace DETECT models being triggered. These models are designed to look for suspicious file downloads from endpoints not usually visited by devices on the network, and files whose types are masqueraded, as well as the anomalous use of PowerShell. This behavior resembled previously observed activity with regards to the exploitation of Qlik Sense as an intrusion technique prior to the deployment of CACTUS ransomware [5].

The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.
Figure 2: The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.

Following the download of the masqueraded file, Darktrace observed the initial infected device engaging in unusual network scanning activity over the SMB, RDP and LDAP protocols. During this activity, the credential, “service_qlik” was observed, further indicating that Qlik was exploited by threat actors attempting to evade detection. Connections to other internal devices were made as part of this scanning activity as the attackers attempted to move laterally across the network.

Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.
Figure 3: Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.

The compromised server was then seen initiating multiple sessions over the RDP protocol to another device on the customer’s network, namely an internal DNS server. External researchers had previously observed this technique in CACTUS ransomware attacks where an RDP tunnel was established via Plink [5].

A few days later, on November 24, Darktrace identified over 20,000 failed Kerberos authentication attempts for the username “service_qlik” being made to the internal DNS server, clearly representing a brute-force login attack. There is currently a lack of open-source intelligence (OSINT) material definitively listing Kerberos login failures as part of a CACTUS ransomware attack that exploits the Qlik vulnerabilities. This highlights Darktrace’s ability to identify ongoing threats amongst unusual network activity without relying on existing threat intelligence, emphasizing its advantage over traditional security detection tools.

Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.
Figure 4: Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.

In the month following these failed Kerberos login attempts, between November 26 and December 22, Darktrace observed multiple internal devices encrypting files within the customer’s environment with the extensions “.cts1” and “.cts7”. Devices were also seen writing ransom notes with the file name “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to two additional internal devices, as well as files likely associated with Qlik, such as “QlikSense.pdf”. This activity detected by Darktrace confirmed the presence of a CACTUS ransomware infection that was spreading across the customer’s network.

The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.
Figure 5: The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.
CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.
Figure 6: CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.

Following this initial encryption activity, two affected devices were observed attempting to remove evidence of this activity by deleting the encrypted files.

Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.
Figure 7: Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.

結論

In the face of this CACTUS ransomware attack, Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection enabled it to quickly identify multiple stages of the cyber kill chain occurring in the customer’s environment. These stages ranged from ‘initial access’ by exploiting Qlik vulnerabilities, which Darktrace was able to detect before the method had been reported by external researchers, to ‘actions on objectives’ by encrypting files. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was also able to detect a previously unreported stage of the attack: multiple Kerberos brute force login attempts.

If Darktrace’s autonomous response capability, RESPOND, had been active and enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of this attack, it would have been able to take swift mitigative action to shut down such suspicious activity as soon as it was identified by DETECT, effectively containing the ransomware attack at the earliest possible stage.

Learning a network’s ‘normal’ to identify deviations from established patterns of behaviour enables Darktrace’s identify a potential compromise, even one that uses common and often legitimately used administrative tools. This allows Darktrace to stay one step ahead of the increasingly sophisticated TTPs used by ransomware actors.

Credit to Tiana Kelly, Cyber Analyst & Analyst Team Lead, Anna Gilbertson, Cyber Analyst

付録

参考文献

[1] https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/cactus-ransomware-prickly-new-variant-evades-detection

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cactus-ransomware-exploiting-qlik-sense-flaws-to-breach-networks/

[3] https://explore.avertium.com/resource/new-ransomware-strains-cactus-and-3am

[4] https://www.soitron.com/cyber-attackers-abuse-holidays/

[5] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/qlik-sense-exploited-in-cactus-ransomware-campaign/

Darktrace DETECT Models

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

Anomalous Connection / PowerShell to Rare External

Device / New PowerShell User Agent

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

User / Kerberos Password Brute Force

Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB

Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Delete Volume

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare  

Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination  

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server  

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)  

Compromise / Suspicious File and C2  

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert  

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches  

Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer

Anomalous File / Internet facing System File Download  

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise  

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)  

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)  

IoC一覧

IoC - Type - Description

zohoservice[.]net: 45.61.147[.]176 - Domain name: IP Address - Hosting payload over HTTP

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT; Windows NT 10.0; en-US) WindowsPowerShell/5.1.17763.2183 - User agent -PowerShell user agent

.cts1 - File extension - Malicious appendage

.cts7- File extension - Malicious appendage

cAcTuS.readme.txt - Filename -Ransom note

putty.zip – Filename - Initial payload: ZIP containing PuTTY Link

MITRE ATT&CK マッピング

Tactic - Technique  - SubTechnique

Web Protocols: COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071 -T1071.001

Powershell: EXECUTION - T1059 - T1059.001

Exploitation of Remote Services: LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210 – N/A

Vulnerability Scanning: RECONAISSANCE     - T1595 - T1595.002

Network Service Scanning: DISCOVERY - T1046 - N/A

Malware: RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1588 - T1588.001

Drive-by Compromise: INITIAL ACCESS - T1189 - N/A

Remote Desktop Protocol: LATERAL MOVEMENT – 1021 -T1021.001

Brute Force: CREDENTIAL ACCESS        T – 1110 - N/A

Data Encrypted for Impact: IMPACT - T1486 - N/A

Data Destruction: IMPACT - T1485 - N/A

File Deletion: DEFENSE EVASION - T1070 - T1070.004

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Tiana Kelly
Deputy Team Lead, London & Cyber Analyst

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The State of AI in Cybersecurity: How AI will impact the cyber threat landscape in 2024

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22
Apr 2024

About the AI Cybersecurity Report

We surveyed 1,800 CISOs, security leaders, administrators, and practitioners from industries around the globe. Our research was conducted to understand how the adoption of new AI-powered offensive and defensive cybersecurity technologies are being managed by organizations.

This blog is continuing the conversation from our last blog post “The State of AI in Cybersecurity: Unveiling Global Insights from 1,800 Security Practitioners” which was an overview of the entire report. This blog will focus on one aspect of the overarching report, the impact of AI on the cyber threat landscape.

To access the full report click here.

Are organizations feeling the impact of AI-powered cyber threats?

Nearly three-quarters (74%) state AI-powered threats are now a significant issue. Almost nine in ten (89%) agree that AI-powered threats will remain a major challenge into the foreseeable future, not just for the next one to two years.

However, only a slight majority (56%) thought AI-powered threats were a separate issue from traditional/non AI-powered threats. This could be the case because there are few, if any, reliable methods to determine whether an attack is AI-powered.

Identifying exactly when and where AI is being applied may not ever be possible. However, it is possible for AI to affect every stage of the attack lifecycle. As such, defenders will likely need to focus on preparing for a world where threats are unique and are coming faster than ever before.

a hypothetical cyber attack augmented by AI at every stage

Are security stakeholders concerned about AI’s impact on cyber threats and risks?

The results from our survey showed that security practitioners are concerned that AI will impact organizations in a variety of ways. There was equal concern associated across the board – from volume and sophistication of malware to internal risks like leakage of proprietary information from employees using generative AI tools.

What this tells us is that defenders need to prepare for a greater volume of sophisticated attacks and balance this with a focus on cyber hygiene to manage internal risks.

One example of a growing internal risks is shadow AI. It takes little effort for employees to adopt publicly-available text-based generative AI systems to increase their productivity. This opens the door to “shadow AI”, which is the use of popular AI tools without organizational approval or oversight. Resulting security risks such as inadvertent exposure of sensitive information or intellectual property are an ever-growing concern.

Are organizations taking strides to reduce risks associated with adoption of AI in their application and computing environment?

71.2% of survey participants say their organization has taken steps specifically to reduce the risk of using AI within its application and computing environment.

16.3% of survey participants claim their organization has not taken these steps.

These findings are good news. Even as enterprises compete to get as much value from AI as they can, as quickly as possible, they’re tempering their eager embrace of new tools with sensible caution.

Still, responses varied across roles. Security analysts, operators, administrators, and incident responders are less likely to have said their organizations had taken AI risk mitigation steps than respondents in other roles. In fact, 79% of executives said steps had been taken, and only 54% of respondents in hands-on roles agreed. It seems that leaders believe their organizations are taking the needed steps, but practitioners are seeing a gap.

Do security professionals feel confident in their preparedness for the next generation of threats?

A majority of respondents (six out of every ten) believe their organizations are inadequately prepared to face the next generation of AI-powered threats.

The survey findings reveal contrasting perceptions of organizational preparedness for cybersecurity threats across different regions and job roles. Security administrators, due to their hands-on experience, express the highest level of skepticism, with 72% feeling their organizations are inadequately prepared. Notably, respondents in mid-sized organizations feel the least prepared, while those in the largest companies feel the most prepared.

Regionally, participants in Asia-Pacific are most likely to believe their organizations are unprepared, while those in Latin America feel the most prepared. This aligns with the observation that Asia-Pacific has been the most impacted region by cybersecurity threats in recent years, according to the IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index.

The optimism among Latin American respondents could be attributed to lower threat volumes experienced in the region, but it's cautioned that this could change suddenly (1).

What are biggest barriers to defending against AI-powered threats?

The top-ranked inhibitors center on knowledge and personnel. However, issues are alluded to almost equally across the board including concerns around budget, tool integration, lack of attention to AI-powered threats, and poor cyber hygiene.

The cybersecurity industry is facing a significant shortage of skilled professionals, with a global deficit of approximately 4 million experts (2). As organizations struggle to manage their security tools and alerts, the challenge intensifies with the increasing adoption of AI by attackers. This shift has altered the demands on security teams, requiring practitioners to possess broad and deep knowledge across rapidly evolving solution stacks.

Educating end users about AI-driven defenses becomes paramount as organizations grapple with the shortage of professionals proficient in managing AI-powered security tools. Operationalizing machine learning models for effectiveness and accuracy emerges as a crucial skill set in high demand. However, our survey highlights a concerning lack of understanding among cybersecurity professionals regarding AI-driven threats and the use of AI-driven countermeasures indicating a gap in keeping pace with evolving attacker tactics.

The integration of security solutions remains a notable problem, hindering effective defense strategies. While budget constraints are not a primary inhibitor, organizations must prioritize addressing these challenges to bolster their cybersecurity posture. It's imperative for stakeholders to recognize the importance of investing in skilled professionals and integrated security solutions to mitigate emerging threats effectively.

To access the full report click here.

参考文献

1. IBM, X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2024, Available at: https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/L0GKXDWJ

2. ISC2, Cybersecurity Workforce Study 2023, Available at: https://media.isc2.org/-/media/Project/ISC2/Main/Media/ documents/research/ISC2_Cybersecurity_Workforce_Study_2023.pdf?rev=28b46de71ce24e6ab7705f6e3da8637e

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