Blog

該当する項目はありません。

Darktrace/OTにおける最新のイノベーションでCVEスコア以上のリスク管理を行う

Default blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog image
09
Apr 2024
09
Apr 2024
業界をリードするDarktrace/OTのイノベーションは、CVEスコアを超えて重要インフラの脆弱性管理を再定義し、従来のコントロールでは制限されないあらゆるリスクに取り組む新機軸をもたらします。

産業用環境におけるサイバーリスクの特定

ICSやSCADA環境において侵害されたOTデバイスは、重大な物理的リスクをもたらし、人命を危険にさらすことさえあります。しかし、多数の複雑なOTデバイスのCVEを特定するのは労力と時間がかかり、貴重なリソースを消耗します。

脆弱性が特定された後でも、パッチの実装には独自の課題があります。限られたメンテナンス期間と、中断のない運用が求められていることにより、ITチームとOTチームはしばしば、セキュリティよりも可用性を優先するようになり、脆弱性は平均で5年以上も解決されないままになっています。(1)

Darktraceの新機軸

Darktrace は、OT環境の安全確保に10年以上の経験を擁するサイバーセキュリティ業界のリーダーであり、脅威の検知と対処を強化するために自己学習型AIを使用して、根本的に異なるアプローチを採用しています。

拡大する脅威ランドスケープに対処するため、Darktraceは、産業用環境におけるサイバーリスク管理のための文脈に即したプロアクティブなアプローチを可能にする新機能を発表します。

当社は本日、OTサイバーセキュリティソリューション(Darktrace/OT)に、リスク管理への包括的なアプローチを可能にするプロアクティブなレイヤーを追加するイノベーションを発表します。この業界をリードするDarktrace/OTのイノベーションは、CVEスコアを超えて重要インフラの脆弱性管理を再定義し、従来のコントロールでは制限されないあらゆるリスクに取り組みます。  

Darktrace/OTは、以下のような包括的なリスク管理機能を備えた唯一のOTセキュリティソリューションです:

  • 御社独自の文脈に基づくリスク分析
  • OTリスクの最も現実的な評価と優先順位付け
  • パッチ適用の有無にかかわらず、OTインフラストラクチャ全体のリスクを効果的に軽減
  • 高度標的型攻撃(APT攻撃)グループに対する防御を評価できる唯一のOTセキュリティソリューション

重要インフラのために構築された最も包括的な予防、検知、遮断ソリューション

Darktraceの自己学習型AIテクノロジーは、運用技術(OT)に対してリアルタイムで予防、検知、遮断、復旧を実施する最先端のイノベーションであり、あらゆるネットワーク、デバイス、ユーザーの「生活パターン」の学習を継続することで、従来のサイバー防御のアプローチからの根本的な転換を可能にします。  

AIテクノロジーは、過去の攻撃に関する知識に頼るのではなく、その環境における固有の「通常」を学習し、行動の微妙な変化を検知することで、これまで知られていなかった脅威を発見します。このような予期せぬ異常を特定することで、セキュリティチームは新たな攻撃を調査し、盲点を発見し、すべての物理的およびデジタル資産を即時に可視化し、セキュリティイベントの検知、遮断、トリアージにかかる時間を短縮することができます。  

  • Purdueモデルのすべてのレベルにわたって、OTおよびITデバイスの可視性を高める。
  • 脅威の検知と遮断能力をスケールさせる業界唯一のOTセキュリティで、トリアージから復旧までの時間を92%短縮。  
  • オーダーメイドのリスク管理を提供する唯一のOTに特化したセキュリティソリューション。

Darktrace/OTがどのように産業界のユニークなユースケースにアプローチしているかについては、Darktrace/OTのWebページをご覧ください。

Darktrace/OTの新たなイノベーションが、産業用環境のリスクマネジメントにどのような新たな、文脈に即したアプローチをもたらしているか、詳しくは以下をお読みください。

Darktrace/OTソリューション全体の詳細については、こちらのソリューション概要をお読みください

Darktrace/OTと新たなリスク管理

リスクの特定

Darktrace/OT の可視性を活用することで、Purdueモデル全体の個々のシステムとそれらの関係を特定し、Darktrace/OT はリスクの高い CVE を特定し、正規サービスの悪用など、既知のエクスプロイトを必要とするテクニックを超えた潜在的な攻撃経路を提示します。各々の攻撃経路は、最初のアクセスから価値の高い目的までの難易度と影響を数学的に評価します。  

これによって、攻撃者と既知の脆弱性の双方の観点から、現実的かつ潜在的なリスクを包括的にカバーすることができます。ここに見られるようなOT攻撃経路は、OT環境の通信とIT環境の通信の間の洞察さえも活用し、脅威アクターがIT-OTの融合を利用する方法を明らかにします。このように知覚できないリスクを明らかにすることで、リモートアクセスや内部脅威のような従来のリスク分析におけるギャップを埋めることができるのです。

図1:Darktrace/OTは組織における最もクリティカルな攻撃経路を可視化
図1:Darktrace/OTは組織における最もクリティカルな攻撃経路を可視化
図2:Darktrace/OTが特定した固有の攻撃経路

リスクの優先順位付け

Darktrace/OT は、確立された攻撃経路を使用し、お客様固有の組織に対する難易度と被害に基づいて、修復と緩和の優先順位を決定します。

私たちは、次のような質問に答えることで、純粋な理論的ダメージを超えて、御社の組織に適用される優先順位を確認します:

  • 攻撃者がその脆弱性に到達するために必要なステップを考慮すると、特定の脆弱性を悪用するのはどの程度難しいのか?
  • また、この特定のネットワーク内で悪用された場合、その影響はどの程度大きいか?

リスクの優先順位付けのためのこの拡張されたアプローチは、これまでよりもはるかに包括的に組織固有のリスクを評価します。CVSSやエクスプロイトの可能性に関するメトリックを使用して、既知の脆弱性のみを個別のスコアでランク付けする従来のアプローチでは、IT-OTリスクにギャップが残ることが多く、正当なサービスの悪用が見えなくなってしまいます。

図3:Darktrace/OT は、組織のネットワークの文脈的理解を活用して、リスクスコアにプラスの影響を与える修復の優先順位を決定

Darktrace は、MITRE ATT&CK の全技法にわたり、特定された各リスクに関連する緩和策と、それが全体的なリスク体制に与える関連する影響を提供します。

Darktrace の特徴は、これらの緩和策をより広範なビジネスの中で文脈化できることです。脆弱性に直接パッチを当てることができない場合、Darktrace は重要な資産につながる攻撃経路を硬化させる代替措置を特定します。周囲の攻撃経路を強化することで、攻撃の難易度を高め、侵害の可能性と影響を低減するのです。

つまり、パッチが適用されていない脆弱性や脆弱なデバイスが保護されないまま放置されることはありません。さらに、これらの硬化テクニックは、そのネットワークセグメント内のすべてのデバイスに対して機能するため、1つの変更を適用するだけで、多くのデバイスを保護できるという利点もあります。

図4:パッチが利用できない場合、Darktraceは脆弱性のアクセシビリティと全体的なリスクスコアを下げる緩和策を優先する

APT脅威マッピングにより取締役会レベルのリスク情報を提供

Darktrace/OTは、APTグループによって頻繁に使用されるMITREのテクニックを、AIによって評価された重要な攻撃経路にマッピングする唯一のセキュリティソリューションとして、理論と実践の橋渡しをします。このユニークなソリューションは、セクターとロケーションに関するインテリジェンス、可能性のある運用プラットフォーム、一般的なテクニック、悪用されるCVE、お客様の環境で影響を受ける可能性のあるデバイスの数など、比類のない洞察を提供し、全体的なリスク評価とプロアクティブな防御策をサポートします。

最終的には、指標に基づく証拠と業界標準の脅威マッピングの双方を使用して、取締役会レベルのリスクを伝えるための強力なダッシュボードとなります。

結論

Darktrace/OTは、Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platformの一部であり、10年以上にわたるAI研究に基づいて構築されたネイティブでホリスティックなAI駆動型プラットフォームです。このプラットフォームは、セキュリティチームがより生産的なモードに移行し、既知の攻撃と未知の攻撃を発見し、Darktrace の様々な製品でSOCを変革し、効率化を推進するのを支援します。インシデントのライフサイクル全体にわたってこれを行うことで、リスクを低減し、アクティブなインシデントに費やす時間を短縮し、投資収益率を向上させます。

Darktrace/Email 製品の今後の変更点など、Darktraceが強化し続けるプラットフォームについては、発表日以降にブログで詳細をご覧ください。

サイバーとAIの交差点について学ぶには、「AIサイバーセキュリティの現状2024」 レポートをダウンロードし、驚くような世界的な調査結果や、セキュリティリーダーからの洞察、今日の最重要課題に対処するための推奨事項をご覧ください。  

参考文献

1. https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/313646831/Catch_Me_if_You_Can.pdf

INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
AUTHOR
ABOUT ThE AUTHOR
Mitchell Bezzina
VP, Product and Solutions Marketing
Book a 1-1 meeting with one of our experts
この記事を共有
USE CASES
該当する項目はありません。
PRODUCT SPOTLIGHT
該当する項目はありません。
COre coverage

More in this series

該当する項目はありません。

Blog

Inside the SOC

Stemming the Citrix Bleed Vulnerability with Darktrace’s ActiveAI Platform

Default blog imageDefault blog image
28
May 2024

What is Citrix Bleed?

Since August 2023, cyber threat actors have been actively exploiting one of the most significant critical vulnerabilities disclosed in recent years: Citrix Bleed. Citrix Bleed, also known as CVE-2023-4966, remained undiscovered and even unpatched for several months, resulting in a wide range of security incidents across business and government sectors [1].

How does Citrix Bleed vulnerability work?

The vulnerability, which impacts the Citrix Netscaler Gateway and Netscaler ADC products, allows for outside parties to hijack legitimate user sessions, thereby bypassing password and multifactor authentication (MFA) requirements.

When used as a means of initial network access, the vulnerability has resulted in the exfiltration of sensitive data, as in the case of Xfinity, and even the deployment of ransomware variants including Lockbit [2]. Although Citrix has released a patch to address the vulnerability, slow patching procedures and the widespread use of these products has resulted in the continuing exploitation of Citrix Bleed into 2024 [3].

How Does Darktrace Handle Citrix Bleed?

Darktrace has demonstrated its proficiency in handling the exploitation of Citrix Bleed since it was disclosed back in 2023; its anomaly-based approach allows it to efficiently identify and inhibit post-exploitation activity as soon as it surfaces.  Rather than relying upon traditional rules and signatures, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI enables it to understand the subtle deviations in a device’s behavior that would indicate an emerging compromise, thus allowing it to detect anomalous activity related to the exploitation of Citrix Bleed.

In late 2023, Darktrace identified an instance of Citrix Bleed exploitation on a customer network. As this customer had subscribed to the Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service, the suspicious network activity surrounding the compromise was escalated to Darktrace’s Security Operation Center (SOC) for triage and investigation by Darktrace Analysts, who then alerted the customer’s security team to the incident.

Darktrace’s Coverage

Initial Access and Beaconing of Citrix Bleed

Darktrace’s initial detection of indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with the exploitation of Citrix Bleed actually came a few days prior to the SOC alert, with unusual external connectivity observed from a critical server. The suspicious connection in question, a SSH connection to the rare external IP 168.100.9[.]137, lasted several hours and utilized the Windows PuTTY client. Darktrace also identified an additional suspicious IP, namely 45.134.26[.]2, attempting to contact the server. Both rare endpoints had been linked with the exploitation of the Citrix Bleed vulnerability by multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) vendors [4] [5].

Darktrace model alert highlighting an affected device making an unusual SSH connection to 168.100.9[.]137 via port 22.
Figure 1: Darktrace model alert highlighting an affected device making an unusual SSH connection to 168.100.9[.]137 via port 22.

As Darktrace is designed to identify network-level anomalies, rather than monitor edge infrastructure, the initial exploitation via the typical HTTP buffer overflow associated with this vulnerability fell outside the scope of Darktrace’s visibility. However, the aforementioned suspicious connectivity likely constituted initial access and beaconing activity following the successful exploitation of Citrix Bleed.

Command and Control (C2) and Payload Download

Around the same time, Darktrace also detected other devices on the customer’s network conducting external connectivity to various endpoints associated with remote management and IT services, including Action1, ScreenConnect and Fixme IT. Additionally, Darktrace observed devices downloading suspicious executable files, including “tniwinagent.exe”, which is associated with the tool Total Network Inventory. While this tool is typically used for auditing and inventory management purposes, it could also be leveraged by attackers for the purpose of lateral movement.

防衛回避

In the days surrounding this compromise, Darktrace observed multiple devices engaging in potential defense evasion tactics using the ScreenConnect and Fixme IT services. Although ScreenConnect is a legitimate remote management tool, it has also been used by threat actors to carry out C2 communication [6]. ScreenConnect itself was the subject of a separate critical vulnerability which Darktrace investigated in early 2024. Meanwhile, CISA observed that domains associated with Fixme It (“fixme[.]it”) have been used by threat actors attempting to exploit the Citrix Bleed vulnerability [7].

Reconnaissance and Lateral Movement

A few days after the detection of the initial beaconing communication, Darktrace identified several devices on the customer’s network carrying out reconnaissance and lateral movement activity. This included SMB writes of “PSEXESVC.exe”, network scanning, DCE-RPC binds of numerous internal devices to IPC$ shares and the transfer of compromise-related tools. It was at this point that Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI deemed the activity to be likely indicative of an ongoing compromise and several Enhanced Monitoring models alerted, triggering the aforementioned PTNs and investigation by Darktrace’s SOC.

Darktrace observed a server on the network initiating a wide range of connections to more than 600 internal IPs across several critical ports, suggesting port scanning, as well as conducting unexpected DCE-RPC service control (svcctl) activity on multiple internal devices, amongst them domain controllers. Additionally, several binds to server service (srvsvc) and security account manager (samr) endpoints via IPC$ shares on destination devices were detected, indicating further reconnaissance activity. The querying of these endpoints was also observed through RPC commands to enumerate services running on the device, as well as Security Account Manager (SAM) accounts.  

Darktrace also identified devices performing SMB writes of the WinRAR data compression tool, in what likely represented preparation for the compression of data prior to data exfiltration. Further SMB file writes were observed around this time including PSEXESVC.exe, which was ultimately used by attackers to conduct remote code execution, and one device was observed making widespread failed NTLM authentication attempts on the network, indicating NTLM brute-forcing. Darktrace observed several devices using administrative credentials to carry out the above activity.

In addition to the transfer of tools and executables via SMB, Darktrace also identified numerous devices deleting files through SMB around this time. In one example, an MSI file associated with the patch management and remediation service, Action1, was deleted by an attacker. This legitimate security tool, if leveraged by attackers, could be used to uncover additional vulnerabilities on target networks.

A server on the customer’s network was also observed writing the file “m.exe” to multiple internal devices. OSINT investigation into the executable indicated that it could be a malicious tool used to prevent antivirus programs from launching or running on a network [8].

Impact and Data Exfiltration

Following the initial steps of the breach chain, Darktrace observed numerous devices on the customer’s network engaging in data exfiltration and impact events, resulting in additional PTN alerts and a SOC investigation into data egress. Specifically, two servers on the network proceeded to read and download large volumes of data via SMB from multiple internal devices over the course of a few hours. These hosts sent large outbound volumes of data to MEGA file storage sites using TLS/SSL over port 443. Darktrace also identified the use of additional file storage services during this exfiltration event, including 4sync, file[.]io, and easyupload[.]io. In total the threat actor exfiltrated over 8.5 GB of data from the customer’s network.

Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting the details of a data exfiltration attempt.
Figure 2: Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting the details of a data exfiltration attempt.

Finally, Darktrace detected a user account within the customer’s Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) environment conducting several suspicious Office365 and AzureAD actions from a rare IP for the network, including uncommon file reads, creations and the deletion of a large number of files.

Unfortunately for the customer in this case, Darktrace RESPOND™ was not enabled on the network and the post-exploitation activity was able to progress until the customer was made aware of the attack by Darktrace’s SOC team. Had RESPOND been active and configured in autonomous response mode at the time of the attack, it would have been able to promptly contain the post-exploitation activity by blocking external connections, shutting down any C2 activity and preventing the download of suspicious files, blocking incoming traffic, and enforcing a learned ‘pattern of life’ on offending devices.

結論

Given the widespread use of Netscaler Gateway and Netscaler ADC, Citrix Bleed remains an impactful and potentially disruptive vulnerability that will likely continue to affect organizations who fail to address affected assets. In this instance, Darktrace demonstrated its ability to track and inhibit malicious activity stemming from Citrix Bleed exploitation, enabling the customer to identify affected devices and enact their own remediation.

Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection allows it to identify such post-exploitation activity resulting from the exploitation of a vulnerability, regardless of whether it is a known CVE or a zero-day threat. Unlike traditional security tools that rely on existing threat intelligence and rules and signatures, Darktrace’s ability to identify the subtle deviations in a compromised device’s behavior gives it a unique advantage when it comes to identifying emerging threats.

Credit to Vivek Rajan, Cyber Analyst, Adam Potter, Cyber Analyst

付録

Darktrace モデルカバレッジ

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Device / ICMP Address Scan

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

Device / Network Scan

Device / SMB Lateral Movement

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

Anomalous File / Internal::Unusual Internal EXE File Transfer

Compliance / SMB Drive Write

Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution

Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Incoming

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

Device / Unauthorised Device

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe

Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Admin)

Device / New User Agent

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Device / Increased External Connectivity

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoints

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

Compliance / Possible Unencrypted Password File On Server

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio and Rare External

Device / Reverse DNS Sweep]

Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity

Anomalous File / Internal::Executable Uploaded to DC

Compliance / SMB Version 1 Usage

Darktrace AI Analyst Incidents

Scanning of Multiple Devices

Suspicious Remote Service Control Activity

SMB Writes of Suspicious Files to Multiple Devices

Possible SSL Command and Control to Multiple Devices

Extensive Suspicious DCE-RPC Activity

Suspicious DCE-RPC Activity

Internal Downloads and External Uploads

Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual External Data Transfer to Multiple Related Endpoints

MITRE ATT&CK マッピング

Technique – Tactic – ID – Sub technique of

Network Scanning – Reconnaissance - T1595 - T1595.002

Valid Accounts – Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access – T1078 – N/A

Remote Access Software – Command and Control – T1219 – N/A

Lateral Tool Transfer – Lateral Movement – T1570 – N/A

Data Transfers – Exfiltration – T1567 – T1567.002

Compressed Data – Exfiltration – T1030 – N/A

NTLM Brute Force – Brute Force – T1110 - T1110.001

AntiVirus Deflection – T1553 - NA

Ingress Tool Transfer   - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1105 - NA

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

204.155.149[.]37 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

199.80.53[.]177 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

168.100.9[.]137 – IP – Malicious Endpoint

45.134.26[.]2 – IP – Malicious Endpoint

13.35.147[.]18 – IP – Likely Malicious Endpoint

13.248.193[.]251 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

76.223.1[.]166 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

179.60.147[.]10 – IP – Likely Malicious Endpoint

185.220.101[.]25 – IP – Likely Malicious Endpoint

141.255.167[.]250 – IP – Malicious Endpoint

106.71.177[.]68 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

cat2.hbwrapper[.]com – Hostname – Likely Malicious Endpoint

aj1090[.]online – Hostname – Likely Malicious Endpoint

dc535[.]4sync[.]com – Hostname – Likely Malicious Endpoint

204.155.149[.]140 – IP - Likely Malicious Endpoint

204.155.149[.]132 – IP - Likely Malicious Endpoint

204.155.145[.]52 – IP - Likely Malicious Endpoint

204.155.145[.]49 – IP - Likely Malicious Endpoint

参考文献

  1. https://www.axios.com/2024/01/02/citrix-bleed-security-hacks-impact
  2. https://www.csoonline.com/article/1267774/hackers-steal-data-from-millions-of-xfinity-customers-via-citrix-bleed-vulnerability.html
  3. https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/citrixbleed-security-critical-vulnerability/702505/
  4. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/168.100.9.137
  5. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.134.26.2
  6. https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/b/threat-actor-groups-including-black-basta-are-exploiting-recent-.html
  7. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-325a
  8. https://www.file.net/process/m.exe.html
続きを読む
著者について
Vivek Rajan
Cyber Analyst

Blog

Eメール

How to Protect your Organization Against Microsoft Teams Phishing Attacks

Default blog imageDefault blog image
21
May 2024

The problem: Microsoft Teams phishing attacks are on the rise

Around 83% of Fortune 500 companies rely on Microsoft Office products and services1, with Microsoft Teams and Microsoft SharePoint in particular emerging as critical platforms to the business operations of the everyday workplace. Researchers across the threat landscape have begun to observe these legitimate services being leveraged more and more by malicious actors as an initial access method.

As Teams becomes a more prominent feature of the workplace many employees rely on it for daily internal and external communication, even surpassing email usage in some organizations. As Microsoft2 states, "Teams changes your relationship with email. When your whole group is working in Teams, it means you'll all get fewer emails. And you'll spend less time in your inbox, because you'll use Teams for more of your conversations."

However, Teams can be exploited to send targeted phishing messages to individuals either internally or externally, while appearing legitimate and safe. Users might receive an external message request from a Teams account claiming to be an IT support service or otherwise affiliated with the organization. Once a user has accepted, the threat actor can launch a social engineering campaign or deliver a malicious payload. As a primarily internal tool there is naturally less training and security awareness around Teams – due to the nature of the channel it is assumed to be a trusted source, meaning that social engineering is already one step ahead.

Screenshot of a Microsoft Teams message request from a Midnight Blizzard-controlled account (courtesy of Microsoft)
Figure 1: Screenshot of a Microsoft Teams message request from a Midnight Blizzard-controlled account (courtesy of Microsoft)

Microsoft Teams Phishing Examples

Microsoft has identified several major phishing attacks using Teams within the past year.

In July 2023, Microsoft announced that the threat actor known as Midnight Blizzard – identified by the United States as a Russian state-sponsored group – had launched a series of phishing campaigns via Teams with the aim of stealing user credentials. These attacks used previously compromised Microsoft 365 accounts and set up new domain names that impersonated legitimate IT support organizations. The threat actors then used social engineering tactics to trick targeted users into sharing their credentials via Teams, enabling them to access sensitive data.  

At a similar time, threat actor Storm-0324 was observed sending phishing lures via Teams containing links to malicious SharePoint-hosted files. The group targeted organizations that allow Teams users to interact and share files externally. Storm-0324’s goal is to gain initial access to hand over to other threat actors to pursue more dangerous follow-on attacks like ransomware.

Darktrace がMicrosoft Teamsのフィッシングを阻止する方法について、さらに詳しく知りたい方は、ブログをお読みください: 餌に喰いつくな:Darktrace Microsoft Teamsのフィッシング攻撃を阻止する方法

The market: Existing Microsoft Teams security solutions are insufficient

Microsoft’s native Teams security focuses on payloads, namely links and attachments, as the principal malicious component of any phishing. These payloads are relatively straightforward to detect with their experience in anti-virus, sandboxing, and IOCs. However, this approach is unable to intervene before the stage at which payloads are delivered, before the user even gets the chance to accept or deny an external message request. At the same time, it risks missing more subtle threats that don’t include attachments or links – like early stage phishing, which is pure social engineering – or completely new payloads.

Equally, the market offering for Teams security is limited. Security solutions available on the market are always payload-focused, rather than taking into account the content and context in which a link or attachment is sent. Answering questions like:

  • Does it make sense for these two accounts to speak to each other?
  • Are there any linguistic indicators of inducement?

Furthermore, they do not correlate with email to track threats across multiple communication environments which could signal a wider campaign. Effectively, other market solutions aren’t adding extra value – they are protecting against the same types of threats that Microsoft is already covering by default.

The other aspect of Teams security that native and market solutions fail to address is the account itself. As well as focusing on Teams threats, it’s important to analyze messages to understand the normal mode of communication for a user, and spot when a user’s Teams activity might signal account takeover.

The solution: How Darktrace protects Microsoft Teams against sophisticated threats

With its biggest update to Darktrace/Email ever, Darktrace now offers support for Microsoft Teams. With that, we are bringing the same AI philosophy that protects your email and accounts to your messaging environment.  

Our Self-Learning AI looks at content and context for every communication, whether that’s sent in an email or Teams message. It looks at actual user behavior, including language patterns, relationship history of sender and recipient, tone and payloads, to understand if a message poses a threat. This approach allows Darktrace to detect threats such as social engineering and payloadless attacks using visibility and forensic capabilities that Microsoft security doesn’t currently offer, as well as early symptoms of account compromise.  

Unlike market solutions, Darktrace doesn’t offer a siloed approach to Teams security. Data and signals from Teams are shared across email to inform detection, and also with the wider Darktrace ActiveAI security platform. By correlating information from email and Teams with network and apps security, Darktrace is able to better identify suspicious Teams activity and vice versa.  

Interested in the other ways Darktrace/Email augments threat detection? Read our latest blog on how improving the quality of end-user reporting can decrease the burden on the SOC. To find our more about Darktrace's enduring partnership with Microsoft, click here.

参考文献

[1] Essential Microsoft Office Statistics in 2024

[2] Microsoft blog, Microsoft Teams and email, living in harmony, 2024

続きを読む
著者について
Carlos Gray
Product Manager
Our ai. Your data.

Elevate your cyber defenses with Darktrace AI

無償トライアルを開始
Darktrace AI protecting a business from cyber threats.