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クラウドの安全性はクラウドを理解することから始まる

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01
Nov 2023
01
Nov 2023
多くのクラウドセキュリティベンダーは「レスポンス」を提供すると称していますが、その本当の意味は何でしょうか。クラウド関連のサイバー脅威に対する意味のある「対応」とはどのようなもので、どのように実現されるのでしょうか。このブログでは、そのすべてを明らかにします。

クラウドの広範な利用がビジネスを変革し続ける一方で、サイバーセキュリティソリューションもそれに追いつこうと競争しています。今日のマルチクラウド環境は、複雑さと可視性のギャップをもたらし、攻撃者に門戸を開いています。クラウドは動的な性質を持っているため、これらの盲点は常に変化しています。また、クラウドの拡張性を考えると、ちょっとした設定ミスなどの単純なミスが、不釣り合いなほど大規模なセキュリティインシデントにつながる可能性もあります。

企業はもはや、バラバラのツールや静的でポイント・イン・タイムのリスクビューに頼る余裕はありません。クラウドは本質的に複雑であり、セキュリティツールはその複雑さを単純化することを目的とするのではなく、そのスケールと複雑さを利用することで、そのメリットを活かすべきです。

クラウドが高度にカスタマイズ可能で、クラウドごとに異なる世界では、クラウドセキュリティに対する画一的なアプローチでは、個々の環境のニュアンスに対応できません。このブログでは、独自の組織を機械学習・理解するAIを活用することで、セキュリティチームがクラウドにおけるセキュリティ確保に必要な可視性、理解、リアルタイムの検知と対応をどのように実現できるかを探ります。

セキュリティは行動にかかっている

一般的に、クラウドのセキュリティは2つの陣営のどちらかに分類される傾向があります:

  • ほとんどのクラウドセキュリティポスチャ管理(CSPM)ベンダーが採用しているエージェントレスのアプローチは、運用の中断を最小限に抑え、迅速かつ容易なインストールを約束する
  • エージェントベースのアプローチは、より細かい粒度を提供するが、セットアップに時間がかかり、コストがかかる可能性がある

どちらのアプローチにも固有の欠点があります。エージェントレスのソリューションは通常、悪意のあるインサイダーやゼロデイエクスプロイトなど、新たな脅威を検知するために必要なリアルタイムの認識をセキュリティチームに提供しません。一方、エージェントベースのソリューションでは、到達範囲と拡張性に限界があり、通常、セキュリティチームがすでにリスクがあることを知っているクラウドの領域に導入されるため、新たな洞察が得られず、死角がそのまま残ってしまいます。

そのため、今日のクラウドセキュリティはジレンマに陥っているようです。そして、どちらの方法にも共通するもう1つの問題は、これらの製品では、何か問題が発生したときにアナリストに警告を発することはできても、本格的な対応を行う能力がないということです。自動対処を謳う新しいソリューションでさえ、通常はアラートの送信やチケットの開設のプロセスを自動化することを指していることが多いのです。

迅速な対処は見果てぬ夢

組織にとってクラウドが非常に便利で魅力的なのは、スピード、敏捷性、可用性、スケールといった同じ属性が、攻撃者にとっても対称的に魅力的だからです。クラウド上でサイバー攻撃が急速に展開される場合、単にチケットを発行し、相手側の誰かが対応してくれるのを待つだけでは不十分です(むしろ、あまりに多くのチケットに対応することは、トリアージや調査をかえって停滞させ、対応を早めるどころか遅らせることになりかねません)。有用なレスポンスの最終的なテストは、セキュリティチームがそのレスポンス機能を使いたがるかどうかに帰着します。セキュリティチームが中断を恐れて、一向にオンにならないレスポンス機能は、まったく的外れなのです。

効果的な対処には、いつ、どのように対応すべきかを理解することと、対応を実行するためのクラウドネイティブなメカニズムが必要です。これは3つのステップに分けることができます:

ステップ1:可視性を超える:リアルタイム理解

今日の静的なクラウドセキュリティソリューションは、統合やインストールの前に環境のスナップショットを提供します。静的な洞察は、導入前のコントロールの検証と設定に役立ちますが、クラウド移行に関連する真のリスクは後から現れるのです。

適切な対処を推進するためには、セキュリティソリューションが、組織のクラウド環境について一般的な感覚ではなく、リアルタイムで全体的なビューを提供する必要があります。

クラウドに関連するリスクを理解するには、単に可視化するだけでは不十分です。環境全体の様々な行動パターンを理解し、アプリケーションやワークロードのアーキテクチャのニュアンスを知る必要があります。誰が何にアクセスできるのか?通常、どの仮想マシンが互いに接続しているのか?このコンテナは期待通りに動作しているか?この新しいLambda関数は期待通りか?などです。

Darktrace/Cloudは、自己学習型AIを使用して、クラウドネットワーク、アーキテクチャ、管理の各レイヤーでお客様独自の組織を学習し、理解します。膨大な量のデータからパターンを認識するAIの能力は、セキュリティチームにクラウド環境で今何が起きているのかについての真の洞察を与えるユニークな立場にあります。

AIの導入や具体的な使用方法は(個々の組織の環境に基づいて)それぞれ異なりますが、導入ライフサイクル全体を通じてセキュリティチームとDevOpsチームを連携させるクラウドフットプリントのアーキテクチャビューが常に含まれます。  

あるベータ版の顧客は、Darktrace/Cloudを導入した際の感想として、次のように述べています:

暗い部屋で電気のスイッチを入れるような感覚です。

ステップ2:検知はコンテキストを適用する必要がある

どのユーザーがどのリソースに接続しているのか、誰が特定のワークロードにアクセスできるのか、グループ、重複、権限など、クラウドにおける「正常」を正確に理解することで、ソリューションは、普通でないことを発見するよう自らに教え込むことで、対処に向けて前進します。

クラウドセキュリティ体制の静的なスナップショットでは、パッチが適用されていない脆弱性や問題のある誤設定が表示されますが、洞察はそこで終わってしまいます。静的なビューとポイントインタイムの可視性に基づくクラウドセキュリティソリューションでは、最終目標であるリアルタイムの脅威を発見する能力を提供するために、点と点をつなぐことはできません。

Darktrace/Cloudは、脆弱性や設定ミスに対する有意義な洞察を提供するだけでなく、そのリアルタイムの理解により、新たな脅威の検知も可能にします。また、Darktrace/Network や Darktrace/Email のような他の Darktrace モジュールと組み合わせることで、これらの調査結果をビジネスコンテキストで充実させ、新たな脅威を数秒で検知してシャットダウンします。それは、クラウドのフットプリントと、それがオンプレミスのインフラ、エンドポイント、アプリケーションとどのように相互作用するかを理解するためのビジネス全体のコンテキストです。

ステップ3:対処は真に自律的でなければならない

Darktrace/Cloudは、貴社独自のクラウドフットプリントを貴社ビジネスの文脈で理解することで、今すぐ対処が必要な異常事態が発生したことを独自に検知します。

お客様の環境を理解するためにAIを使用することで、真に自律的で正確なクラウドネイティブの対処が可能になります。プラットフォームは、通常の業務を中断することなく、脅威となる行動のみを停止させるため、ピンポイントかつ的を絞った行動を取ることができます。

プラットフォームはクラウドアーキテクチャを完全に理解しているため、どのようなクラウドネイティブのメカニズムが実際の対処を開始するために自由に使えるかも把握しています。自動化されたリアルタイムのレスポンスには、EC2インスタンスのデタッチや、リスクの高い資産を封じ込めるためのセキュリティグループの適用など、クラウドネイティブなアクションが含まれます。

実際に体験する

Darktrace は、Darktrace/Cloudの30日間無償トライアルを提供しています。このトライアルは、簡単なインストールとマルチクラウド環境に関するこれまでにない理解を組み合わせたものです。ご興味のある方はこちらをクリックしてご登録ください。

INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
AUTHOR
ABOUT ThE AUTHOR
Nabil Zoldjalali
VP, Technology Innovation

Based in Toronto, Nabil develops innovative ways to continuously realize the Darktrace technology vision, working closely with Darktrace’s Research & Development team. He advises strategic Fortune 500 customers across North America on advanced threat detection, Self-Learning AI, and Autonomous Response. Nabil is a frequent speaker at leading industry conferences across North America, including Microsoft Ignite, Black Hat, and the World AI Forum. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical and Electronic Engineering from McGill University and is an advisory board member of the EC Council.

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Inside the SOC

Stemming the Citrix Bleed Vulnerability with Darktrace’s ActiveAI Platform

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28
May 2024

What is Citrix Bleed?

Since August 2023, cyber threat actors have been actively exploiting one of the most significant critical vulnerabilities disclosed in recent years: Citrix Bleed. Citrix Bleed, also known as CVE-2023-4966, remained undiscovered and even unpatched for several months, resulting in a wide range of security incidents across business and government sectors [1].

How does Citrix Bleed vulnerability work?

The vulnerability, which impacts the Citrix Netscaler Gateway and Netscaler ADC products, allows for outside parties to hijack legitimate user sessions, thereby bypassing password and multifactor authentication (MFA) requirements.

When used as a means of initial network access, the vulnerability has resulted in the exfiltration of sensitive data, as in the case of Xfinity, and even the deployment of ransomware variants including Lockbit [2]. Although Citrix has released a patch to address the vulnerability, slow patching procedures and the widespread use of these products has resulted in the continuing exploitation of Citrix Bleed into 2024 [3].

How Does Darktrace Handle Citrix Bleed?

Darktrace has demonstrated its proficiency in handling the exploitation of Citrix Bleed since it was disclosed back in 2023; its anomaly-based approach allows it to efficiently identify and inhibit post-exploitation activity as soon as it surfaces.  Rather than relying upon traditional rules and signatures, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI enables it to understand the subtle deviations in a device’s behavior that would indicate an emerging compromise, thus allowing it to detect anomalous activity related to the exploitation of Citrix Bleed.

In late 2023, Darktrace identified an instance of Citrix Bleed exploitation on a customer network. As this customer had subscribed to the Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service, the suspicious network activity surrounding the compromise was escalated to Darktrace’s Security Operation Center (SOC) for triage and investigation by Darktrace Analysts, who then alerted the customer’s security team to the incident.

Darktrace’s Coverage

Initial Access and Beaconing of Citrix Bleed

Darktrace’s initial detection of indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with the exploitation of Citrix Bleed actually came a few days prior to the SOC alert, with unusual external connectivity observed from a critical server. The suspicious connection in question, a SSH connection to the rare external IP 168.100.9[.]137, lasted several hours and utilized the Windows PuTTY client. Darktrace also identified an additional suspicious IP, namely 45.134.26[.]2, attempting to contact the server. Both rare endpoints had been linked with the exploitation of the Citrix Bleed vulnerability by multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) vendors [4] [5].

Darktrace model alert highlighting an affected device making an unusual SSH connection to 168.100.9[.]137 via port 22.
Figure 1: Darktrace model alert highlighting an affected device making an unusual SSH connection to 168.100.9[.]137 via port 22.

As Darktrace is designed to identify network-level anomalies, rather than monitor edge infrastructure, the initial exploitation via the typical HTTP buffer overflow associated with this vulnerability fell outside the scope of Darktrace’s visibility. However, the aforementioned suspicious connectivity likely constituted initial access and beaconing activity following the successful exploitation of Citrix Bleed.

Command and Control (C2) and Payload Download

Around the same time, Darktrace also detected other devices on the customer’s network conducting external connectivity to various endpoints associated with remote management and IT services, including Action1, ScreenConnect and Fixme IT. Additionally, Darktrace observed devices downloading suspicious executable files, including “tniwinagent.exe”, which is associated with the tool Total Network Inventory. While this tool is typically used for auditing and inventory management purposes, it could also be leveraged by attackers for the purpose of lateral movement.

防衛回避

In the days surrounding this compromise, Darktrace observed multiple devices engaging in potential defense evasion tactics using the ScreenConnect and Fixme IT services. Although ScreenConnect is a legitimate remote management tool, it has also been used by threat actors to carry out C2 communication [6]. ScreenConnect itself was the subject of a separate critical vulnerability which Darktrace investigated in early 2024. Meanwhile, CISA observed that domains associated with Fixme It (“fixme[.]it”) have been used by threat actors attempting to exploit the Citrix Bleed vulnerability [7].

Reconnaissance and Lateral Movement

A few days after the detection of the initial beaconing communication, Darktrace identified several devices on the customer’s network carrying out reconnaissance and lateral movement activity. This included SMB writes of “PSEXESVC.exe”, network scanning, DCE-RPC binds of numerous internal devices to IPC$ shares and the transfer of compromise-related tools. It was at this point that Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI deemed the activity to be likely indicative of an ongoing compromise and several Enhanced Monitoring models alerted, triggering the aforementioned PTNs and investigation by Darktrace’s SOC.

Darktrace observed a server on the network initiating a wide range of connections to more than 600 internal IPs across several critical ports, suggesting port scanning, as well as conducting unexpected DCE-RPC service control (svcctl) activity on multiple internal devices, amongst them domain controllers. Additionally, several binds to server service (srvsvc) and security account manager (samr) endpoints via IPC$ shares on destination devices were detected, indicating further reconnaissance activity. The querying of these endpoints was also observed through RPC commands to enumerate services running on the device, as well as Security Account Manager (SAM) accounts.  

Darktrace also identified devices performing SMB writes of the WinRAR data compression tool, in what likely represented preparation for the compression of data prior to data exfiltration. Further SMB file writes were observed around this time including PSEXESVC.exe, which was ultimately used by attackers to conduct remote code execution, and one device was observed making widespread failed NTLM authentication attempts on the network, indicating NTLM brute-forcing. Darktrace observed several devices using administrative credentials to carry out the above activity.

In addition to the transfer of tools and executables via SMB, Darktrace also identified numerous devices deleting files through SMB around this time. In one example, an MSI file associated with the patch management and remediation service, Action1, was deleted by an attacker. This legitimate security tool, if leveraged by attackers, could be used to uncover additional vulnerabilities on target networks.

A server on the customer’s network was also observed writing the file “m.exe” to multiple internal devices. OSINT investigation into the executable indicated that it could be a malicious tool used to prevent antivirus programs from launching or running on a network [8].

Impact and Data Exfiltration

Following the initial steps of the breach chain, Darktrace observed numerous devices on the customer’s network engaging in data exfiltration and impact events, resulting in additional PTN alerts and a SOC investigation into data egress. Specifically, two servers on the network proceeded to read and download large volumes of data via SMB from multiple internal devices over the course of a few hours. These hosts sent large outbound volumes of data to MEGA file storage sites using TLS/SSL over port 443. Darktrace also identified the use of additional file storage services during this exfiltration event, including 4sync, file[.]io, and easyupload[.]io. In total the threat actor exfiltrated over 8.5 GB of data from the customer’s network.

Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting the details of a data exfiltration attempt.
Figure 2: Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting the details of a data exfiltration attempt.

Finally, Darktrace detected a user account within the customer’s Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) environment conducting several suspicious Office365 and AzureAD actions from a rare IP for the network, including uncommon file reads, creations and the deletion of a large number of files.

Unfortunately for the customer in this case, Darktrace RESPOND™ was not enabled on the network and the post-exploitation activity was able to progress until the customer was made aware of the attack by Darktrace’s SOC team. Had RESPOND been active and configured in autonomous response mode at the time of the attack, it would have been able to promptly contain the post-exploitation activity by blocking external connections, shutting down any C2 activity and preventing the download of suspicious files, blocking incoming traffic, and enforcing a learned ‘pattern of life’ on offending devices.

結論

Given the widespread use of Netscaler Gateway and Netscaler ADC, Citrix Bleed remains an impactful and potentially disruptive vulnerability that will likely continue to affect organizations who fail to address affected assets. In this instance, Darktrace demonstrated its ability to track and inhibit malicious activity stemming from Citrix Bleed exploitation, enabling the customer to identify affected devices and enact their own remediation.

Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection allows it to identify such post-exploitation activity resulting from the exploitation of a vulnerability, regardless of whether it is a known CVE or a zero-day threat. Unlike traditional security tools that rely on existing threat intelligence and rules and signatures, Darktrace’s ability to identify the subtle deviations in a compromised device’s behavior gives it a unique advantage when it comes to identifying emerging threats.

Credit to Vivek Rajan, Cyber Analyst, Adam Potter, Cyber Analyst

付録

Darktrace モデルカバレッジ

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Device / ICMP Address Scan

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

Device / Network Scan

Device / SMB Lateral Movement

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

Anomalous File / Internal::Unusual Internal EXE File Transfer

Compliance / SMB Drive Write

Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution

Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Incoming

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

Device / Unauthorised Device

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe

Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Admin)

Device / New User Agent

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Device / Increased External Connectivity

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoints

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

Compliance / Possible Unencrypted Password File On Server

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio and Rare External

Device / Reverse DNS Sweep]

Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity

Anomalous File / Internal::Executable Uploaded to DC

Compliance / SMB Version 1 Usage

Darktrace AI Analyst Incidents

Scanning of Multiple Devices

Suspicious Remote Service Control Activity

SMB Writes of Suspicious Files to Multiple Devices

Possible SSL Command and Control to Multiple Devices

Extensive Suspicious DCE-RPC Activity

Suspicious DCE-RPC Activity

Internal Downloads and External Uploads

Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual External Data Transfer to Multiple Related Endpoints

MITRE ATT&CK マッピング

Technique – Tactic – ID – Sub technique of

Network Scanning – Reconnaissance - T1595 - T1595.002

Valid Accounts – Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access – T1078 – N/A

Remote Access Software – Command and Control – T1219 – N/A

Lateral Tool Transfer – Lateral Movement – T1570 – N/A

Data Transfers – Exfiltration – T1567 – T1567.002

Compressed Data – Exfiltration – T1030 – N/A

NTLM Brute Force – Brute Force – T1110 - T1110.001

AntiVirus Deflection – T1553 - NA

Ingress Tool Transfer   - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1105 - NA

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

204.155.149[.]37 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

199.80.53[.]177 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

168.100.9[.]137 – IP – Malicious Endpoint

45.134.26[.]2 – IP – Malicious Endpoint

13.35.147[.]18 – IP – Likely Malicious Endpoint

13.248.193[.]251 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

76.223.1[.]166 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

179.60.147[.]10 – IP – Likely Malicious Endpoint

185.220.101[.]25 – IP – Likely Malicious Endpoint

141.255.167[.]250 – IP – Malicious Endpoint

106.71.177[.]68 – IP – Possible Malicious Endpoint

cat2.hbwrapper[.]com – Hostname – Likely Malicious Endpoint

aj1090[.]online – Hostname – Likely Malicious Endpoint

dc535[.]4sync[.]com – Hostname – Likely Malicious Endpoint

204.155.149[.]140 – IP - Likely Malicious Endpoint

204.155.149[.]132 – IP - Likely Malicious Endpoint

204.155.145[.]52 – IP - Likely Malicious Endpoint

204.155.145[.]49 – IP - Likely Malicious Endpoint

参考文献

  1. https://www.axios.com/2024/01/02/citrix-bleed-security-hacks-impact
  2. https://www.csoonline.com/article/1267774/hackers-steal-data-from-millions-of-xfinity-customers-via-citrix-bleed-vulnerability.html
  3. https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/citrixbleed-security-critical-vulnerability/702505/
  4. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/168.100.9.137
  5. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.134.26.2
  6. https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/b/threat-actor-groups-including-black-basta-are-exploiting-recent-.html
  7. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-325a
  8. https://www.file.net/process/m.exe.html
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Vivek Rajan
Cyber Analyst

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How to Protect your Organization Against Microsoft Teams Phishing Attacks

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21
May 2024

The problem: Microsoft Teams phishing attacks are on the rise

Around 83% of Fortune 500 companies rely on Microsoft Office products and services1, with Microsoft Teams and Microsoft SharePoint in particular emerging as critical platforms to the business operations of the everyday workplace. Researchers across the threat landscape have begun to observe these legitimate services being leveraged more and more by malicious actors as an initial access method.

As Teams becomes a more prominent feature of the workplace many employees rely on it for daily internal and external communication, even surpassing email usage in some organizations. As Microsoft2 states, "Teams changes your relationship with email. When your whole group is working in Teams, it means you'll all get fewer emails. And you'll spend less time in your inbox, because you'll use Teams for more of your conversations."

However, Teams can be exploited to send targeted phishing messages to individuals either internally or externally, while appearing legitimate and safe. Users might receive an external message request from a Teams account claiming to be an IT support service or otherwise affiliated with the organization. Once a user has accepted, the threat actor can launch a social engineering campaign or deliver a malicious payload. As a primarily internal tool there is naturally less training and security awareness around Teams – due to the nature of the channel it is assumed to be a trusted source, meaning that social engineering is already one step ahead.

Screenshot of a Microsoft Teams message request from a Midnight Blizzard-controlled account (courtesy of Microsoft)
Figure 1: Screenshot of a Microsoft Teams message request from a Midnight Blizzard-controlled account (courtesy of Microsoft)

Microsoft Teams Phishing Examples

Microsoft has identified several major phishing attacks using Teams within the past year.

In July 2023, Microsoft announced that the threat actor known as Midnight Blizzard – identified by the United States as a Russian state-sponsored group – had launched a series of phishing campaigns via Teams with the aim of stealing user credentials. These attacks used previously compromised Microsoft 365 accounts and set up new domain names that impersonated legitimate IT support organizations. The threat actors then used social engineering tactics to trick targeted users into sharing their credentials via Teams, enabling them to access sensitive data.  

At a similar time, threat actor Storm-0324 was observed sending phishing lures via Teams containing links to malicious SharePoint-hosted files. The group targeted organizations that allow Teams users to interact and share files externally. Storm-0324’s goal is to gain initial access to hand over to other threat actors to pursue more dangerous follow-on attacks like ransomware.

Darktrace がMicrosoft Teamsのフィッシングを阻止する方法について、さらに詳しく知りたい方は、ブログをお読みください: 餌に喰いつくな:Darktrace Microsoft Teamsのフィッシング攻撃を阻止する方法

The market: Existing Microsoft Teams security solutions are insufficient

Microsoft’s native Teams security focuses on payloads, namely links and attachments, as the principal malicious component of any phishing. These payloads are relatively straightforward to detect with their experience in anti-virus, sandboxing, and IOCs. However, this approach is unable to intervene before the stage at which payloads are delivered, before the user even gets the chance to accept or deny an external message request. At the same time, it risks missing more subtle threats that don’t include attachments or links – like early stage phishing, which is pure social engineering – or completely new payloads.

Equally, the market offering for Teams security is limited. Security solutions available on the market are always payload-focused, rather than taking into account the content and context in which a link or attachment is sent. Answering questions like:

  • Does it make sense for these two accounts to speak to each other?
  • Are there any linguistic indicators of inducement?

Furthermore, they do not correlate with email to track threats across multiple communication environments which could signal a wider campaign. Effectively, other market solutions aren’t adding extra value – they are protecting against the same types of threats that Microsoft is already covering by default.

The other aspect of Teams security that native and market solutions fail to address is the account itself. As well as focusing on Teams threats, it’s important to analyze messages to understand the normal mode of communication for a user, and spot when a user’s Teams activity might signal account takeover.

The solution: How Darktrace protects Microsoft Teams against sophisticated threats

With its biggest update to Darktrace/Email ever, Darktrace now offers support for Microsoft Teams. With that, we are bringing the same AI philosophy that protects your email and accounts to your messaging environment.  

Our Self-Learning AI looks at content and context for every communication, whether that’s sent in an email or Teams message. It looks at actual user behavior, including language patterns, relationship history of sender and recipient, tone and payloads, to understand if a message poses a threat. This approach allows Darktrace to detect threats such as social engineering and payloadless attacks using visibility and forensic capabilities that Microsoft security doesn’t currently offer, as well as early symptoms of account compromise.  

Unlike market solutions, Darktrace doesn’t offer a siloed approach to Teams security. Data and signals from Teams are shared across email to inform detection, and also with the wider Darktrace ActiveAI security platform. By correlating information from email and Teams with network and apps security, Darktrace is able to better identify suspicious Teams activity and vice versa.  

Interested in the other ways Darktrace/Email augments threat detection? Read our latest blog on how improving the quality of end-user reporting can decrease the burden on the SOC. To find our more about Darktrace's enduring partnership with Microsoft, click here.

参考文献

[1] Essential Microsoft Office Statistics in 2024

[2] Microsoft blog, Microsoft Teams and email, living in harmony, 2024

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著者について
Carlos Gray
Product Manager
Our ai. Your data.

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