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内部関係者からの脅威、サプライチェーン、IoT:現代のサイバー攻撃を解剖

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03
May 2021
03
May 2021
The threat landscape is not what it was. Sprawling IoT ecosystems and globalized supply chains offer many opportunities for threat actors. Darktrace detects these vectors on a daily basis, sometimes in the very same attack.

それは金曜日、午後5時10分前のことでした。技術者がいつも通り電子ドアのチェックを行います。彼女は問題なくオフィスに入室します。彼女は信頼のおける外部ベンダーの技術者で、従業員も毎週彼女の姿を見ています。彼女はラップトップを開き、ドアアクセス制御ユニットに接続します。これはスマートロックを操作するための小型のIoTデバイスです。数分後、トロイの木馬が社内のネットワークにダウンロードされ、クリプトマイニングが開始し、機密データが抜き取られた証拠もありました。どこで問題が起こったのでしょうか?

ビジネス内の脅威:新たな夜明け

企業がデジタル変革のさまざまな要求に対応していくなかで、アタックサーフェスはかつてなく広がっています。IoTエコシステム内の脆弱性から、サプライチェーン内のブラインドスポット、そしてビジネスへのアクセスを悪用する内部関係者に至るまで、サイバー犯罪者達にとっての入口は無数に存在します。Darktraceはこうした脅威を日々目撃しています。本ブログで解説する上記の事例のように、同じ攻撃内に複数の要素が含まれていることもあります。

内部関係者による脅威は、彼らのシステムに対する知識とアクセスのレベルを、検知を回避し攻撃を開始する上での決定的アドバンテージとして使用します。しかし、内部関係者による脅威は必ずしも悪意があるとは限りません。あらゆる従業員または請負業者は潜在的な脅威です。フィッシングのリンクをクリックしたり、誤ってデータを送信してしまったりすることで、広範囲の侵害につながることがよくあります。

同時に、多数のIoTデバイスが固有のIPアドレスを持ってコーポレートネットワークやインターネットに接続している、職場内の接続環境は喫緊のセキュリティ課題です。たとえば、アクセス制御システムは、オフィスに誰がいつ入室するかを追跡し物理的なセキュリティのレイヤーを追加するものです。しかし、この制御システム自体がデジタルセキュリティを危険にさらすことになるのです。システムには多数のセンサー、ロック、アラームシステム、キーパッドなどが付属し、これらが機密性が高いユーザー情報を持ち社内のインフラにアクセスします。

さらに、かなりの割合のIoTデバイスが、セキュリティを考慮せずに作られています。ベンダーは市場投入までの期間を優先し、多くの場合セキュリティ対策を組み込むために費やすリソースを持っていません。IoTを製造するスタートアップ企業の数を考えてみてください。 60%以上のホームオートメーション製品企業は従業員が10名未満です。

内部関係者からの脅威をCyber AIが検知

2021年1月、中規模の北米の企業がサプライチェーン攻撃に遭いました。それはサードパーティベンダーがスマートドアの制御ユニットに接続したときに発生しました。

図1:攻撃は現地時間16:50に開始され、3.5時間継続しました。

メーカーの技術者が定期的なメンテナンスのために来社しました。彼らはドアアクセス制御ユニットに直接接続する権限を持っていました。しかし、彼らが使用していたラップトップ(外部から持ち込まれたもの)がマルウェアに感染していたことを知らなかったのです。

ラップトップが制御ユニットに接続されるとすぐに、マルウェアは開いているポートを検知し、脆弱性を発見して水平移動を開始しました。数分のうちに、このIoTデバイスは未知の外部IPアドレスに対するきわめて不審な接続を開始しました。接続はHTTPを使って行われ、疑わしいユーザーエージェントとURIを含んでいました。

Darktraceはその時、この制御ユニットがupsupx2.exeや36BB9658.moeを含むトロイの木馬やその他のペイロードをダウンロードしようとしていることを検知しました。他の接続はbase64でエンコードされた、デバイス名と組織の外部IPアドレスを含む文字列を送信するのに使用されました。

その少し後に、Monero (XMR) CPUマイナーを使った 暗号通貨マイニング活動が検知されました。このデバイスはSMBエクスプロイトを使って445番ポートで外部接続を行い、同時に古いSMBv1プロトコルを使っている脆弱な内部デバイスを探しました。

時間後、このデバイスはサードパーティリモートアクセスツールであるTeamViewerに関連したエンドポイントに接続しました。数分後、デバイスは15 MB以上のデータを100%未知の外部IPに対して送信している様子が見られました。

図2:1つのデバイスのインシデント(青)前後の期間の接続のタイムライン。この侵入に関連した接続はデバイスの通常の生活パターンからの著しい逸脱であり、複数の不審なイベントおよび度重なるモデル違反(オレンジ)につながりました。

サプライチェーン内のセキュリティ脅威

Cyber AIは制御ユニットが侵害されると即座に内部関係者からの脅威について顧客に知らせました。この攻撃は組織内の他のセキュリティスタックをすり抜けることに成功していました。これは信頼される外部のラップトップから直接もたらされたこと、そしてIoTデバイス自体がこのサードパーティベンダーによって管理されていたため、顧客がそれに対してほとんど可視性を持っていなかったという単純な理由によるものです。

従来型のセキュリティツールはこのようなサプライチェーン攻撃には効果がありません。SolarWindsハックからVendor Email Compromise (VEC)に至るまで、2021年はシグネチャベースのセキュリティに最後のとどめを刺し、昨日の攻撃に依存して明日の脅威を予測することはできない、ということを証明しました。

現代の組織に関わる国際的サプライチェーン、そして各種パートナーやサプライヤーの数の多さは、外部ベンダーをネットワークにアクセスさせつつ、侵入を許さないシステムをどうやって維持することができるかという深刻なセキュリティ上のジレンマを生みます。

最初の答えは、ゼロトラストアクセスです。これは企業ネットワークの内部、外部を問わずあらゆるデバイスを悪意あるものとして扱い、あらゆる段階で検証を要求するものです。2つ目の答えは可視性と対処です。セキュリティ製品はクラウドおよびIoTインフラを明確に照らし出し、エンタープライズ内にかすかな異常が発生次第、自律的に反応しなくてはなりません。

IoTに対する調査

DarktraceのCyber AI Analystが、最初の悪意ある実行形式ファイルのダウンロードを含め、攻撃のあらゆる段階を報告しました。

図3:Cyber AI Analystがデバイスの異常な動作を検知した例。C2接続や不審なファイルのダウンロードが行われている。

Cyber AI AnalystはC2接続を調査し、このアクティビティに対するハイレベルなサマリーを提供しました。このIoTデバイスは、ランダムに生成された英数字の名前を持つ不審なMOEファイルにアクセスしていました。

図4:デバイスのC2接続に関するCyber AI Analystのサマリー

AIはアクティビティのあらゆる段階を検知しただけでなく、Proactive Threat Notificationにより顧客に通知を行いました。これは攻撃が開始されてわずか数分後、高いスコアでのモデル違反が発生した16時59分のことでした。

部外者の危険

第三者によるデバイス設定の変更やネットワークの調整は意図せぬ結果を招くことがあります。5Gやインダストリー4.0の登場により著しく接続が進んだ我々の世界は、サイバー犯罪者にとって格好の遊び場となっています。

上記の事例では、IoTはセキュアではなく設定にもミスがありました。IoTエコシステムの性急な構築、入り組んだサプライチェーン、そしてコーポレートインフラに接続する人とデバイスの幅広さにより、今日の組織は事前に定義されたルールに依存する単純なセキュリティツールで内部関係者からの脅威や他の高度なサイバー攻撃を阻止できると期待することはできません。

この組織はドアアクセス制御ユニットの管理状態について可視性を持っていませんでした。それにも関わらず、そして攻撃のタイプやこのIoTデバイスに存在していた脆弱性について事前の知識を持っていなかったにも関わらず、Darktraceは動作の異常を即座に検知しました。Cyber AIを使用していなければ、感染はこの顧客の環境に何週間、何か月も存在しつづけ、権限をエスカレーションし、密かにクリプトマイニングを行い、機密性が高い企業データを抜き出していたかもしれないのです。

上記の脅威検知に対する知見を提供してくれたDarktraceアナリストGrace Carballo 氏に感謝します。

2021脅威レポートで内部関係者からの脅威について詳しく知る

Darktraceによるモデル検知:

  • Anomalous File/Anomalous Octet Stream
  • Anomalous Connection/New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Unusual Activity/Unusual External Connectivity
  • Device/Increased External Connectivity
  • Anomalous Server Activity/Outgoing from Server
  • Device/New User Agent and New IP
  • Compliance/Cryptocurrency Mining Activity
  • Compliance/External Windows Connectivity
  • Anomalous File/Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations
  • Anomalous File/EXE from Rare External Location
  • Device/Large Number of Model Breaches
  • Anomalous File/Internet Facing System File Download
  • Device/Initial Breach Chain Compromise
  • Device/SMB Session Bruteforce
  • Device/Network Scan- Low Anomaly Score
  • Device/Large Number of Connections to New Endpoint
  • Anomalous Server Activity/Outgoing from Server
  • Compromise/Beacon to Young Endpoint
  • Anomalous Server Activity/Rare External from Server
  • Device/Multiple C2 Model Breaches
  • Compliance/Remote Management Tool on Server
  • Anomalous Connection/Data Sent to New External Device


INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
AUTHOR
ABOUT ThE AUTHOR
Brianna Leddy
Director of Analysis

Based in San Francisco, Brianna is Director of Analysis at Darktrace. She joined the analyst team in 2016 and has since advised a wide range of enterprise customers on advanced threat hunting and leveraging Self-Learning AI for detection and response. Brianna works closely with the Darktrace SOC team to proactively alert customers to emerging threats and investigate unusual behavior in enterprise environments. Brianna holds a Bachelor’s degree in Chemical Engineering from Carnegie Mellon University.

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Inside the SOC

A Thorn in Attackers’ Sides: How Darktrace Uncovered a CACTUS Ransomware Infection

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24
Apr 2024

What is CACTUS Ransomware?

In May 2023, Kroll Cyber Threat Intelligence Analysts identified CACTUS as a new ransomware strain that had been actively targeting large commercial organizations since March 2023 [1]. CACTUS ransomware gets its name from the filename of the ransom note, “cAcTuS.readme.txt”. Encrypted files are appended with the extension “.cts”, followed by a number which varies between attacks, e.g. “.cts1” and “.cts2”.

As the cyber threat landscape adapts to ever-present fast-paced technological change, ransomware affiliates are employing progressively sophisticated techniques to enter networks, evade detection and achieve their nefarious goals.

How does CACTUS Ransomware work?

In the case of CACTUS, threat actors have been seen gaining initial network access by exploiting Virtual Private Network (VPN) services. Once inside the network, they may conduct internal scanning using tools like SoftPerfect Network Scanner, and PowerShell commands to enumerate endpoints, identify user accounts, and ping remote endpoints. Persistence is maintained by the deployment of various remote access methods, including legitimate remote access tools like Splashtop, AnyDesk, and SuperOps RMM in order to evade detection, along with malicious tools like Cobalt Strike and Chisel. Such tools, as well as custom scripts like TotalExec, have been used to disable security software to distribute the ransomware binary. CACTUS ransomware is unique in that it adopts a double-extortion tactic, stealing data from target networks and then encrypting it on compromised systems [2].

At the end of November 2023, cybersecurity firm Arctic Wolf reported instances of CACTUS attacks exploiting vulnerabilities on the Windows version of the business analytics platform Qlik, specifically CVE-2023-41266, CVE-2023-41265, and CVE-2023-48365, to gain initial access to target networks [3]. The vulnerability tracked as CVE-2023-41266 can be exploited to generate anonymous sessions and perform HTTP requests to unauthorized endpoints, whilst CVE-2023-41265 does not require authentication and can be leveraged to elevate privileges and execute HTTP requests on the backend server that hosts the application [2].

Darktrace’s Coverage of CACTUS Ransomware

In November 2023, Darktrace observed malicious actors leveraging the aforementioned method of exploiting Qlik to gain access to the network of a customer in the US, more than a week before the vulnerability was reported by external researchers.

Here, Qlik vulnerabilities were successfully exploited, and a malicious executable (.exe) was detonated on the network, which was followed by network scanning and failed Kerberos login attempts. The attack culminated in the encryption of numerous files with extensions such as “.cts1”, and SMB writes of the ransom note “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to multiple internal devices, all of which was promptly identified by Darktrace DETECT™.

While traditional rules and signature-based detection tools may struggle to identify the malicious use of a legitimate business platform like Qlik, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was able to confidently identify anomalous use of the tool in a CACTUS ransomware attack by examining the rarity of the offending device’s surrounding activity and comparing it to the learned behavior of the device and its peers.

Unfortunately for the customer in this case, Darktrace RESPOND™ was not enabled in autonomous response mode during their encounter with CACTUS ransomware meaning that attackers were able to successfully escalate their attack to the point of ransomware detonation and file encryption. Had RESPOND been configured to autonomously act on any unusual activity, Darktrace could have prevented the attack from progressing, stopping the download of any harmful files, or the encryption of legitimate ones.

Cactus Ransomware Attack Overview

Holiday periods have increasingly become one of the favoured times for malicious actors to launch their attacks, as they can take advantage of the festive downtime of organizations and their security teams, and the typically more relaxed mindset of employees during this period [4].

Following this trend, in late November 2023, Darktrace began detecting anomalous connections on the network of a customer in the US, which presented multiple indicators of compromise (IoCs) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) associated with CACTUS ransomware. The threat actors in this case set their attack in motion by exploiting the Qlik vulnerabilities on one of the customer’s critical servers.

Darktrace observed the server device making beaconing connections to the endpoint “zohoservice[.]net” (IP address: 45.61.147.176) over the course of three days. This endpoint is known to host a malicious payload, namely a .zip file containing the command line connection tool PuttyLink [5].

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to autonomously identify over 1,000 beaconing connections taking place on the customer’s network and group them together, in this case joining the dots in an ongoing ransomware attack. AI Analyst recognized that these repeated connections to highly suspicious locations were indicative of malicious command-and-control (C2) activity.

Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.

The infected device was then observed downloading the file “putty.zip” over a HTTP connection using a PowerShell user agent. Despite being labelled as a .zip file, Darktrace’s detection capabilities were able to identify this as a masqueraded PuttyLink executable file. This activity resulted in multiple Darktrace DETECT models being triggered. These models are designed to look for suspicious file downloads from endpoints not usually visited by devices on the network, and files whose types are masqueraded, as well as the anomalous use of PowerShell. This behavior resembled previously observed activity with regards to the exploitation of Qlik Sense as an intrusion technique prior to the deployment of CACTUS ransomware [5].

The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.
Figure 2: The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.

Following the download of the masqueraded file, Darktrace observed the initial infected device engaging in unusual network scanning activity over the SMB, RDP and LDAP protocols. During this activity, the credential, “service_qlik” was observed, further indicating that Qlik was exploited by threat actors attempting to evade detection. Connections to other internal devices were made as part of this scanning activity as the attackers attempted to move laterally across the network.

Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.
Figure 3: Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.

The compromised server was then seen initiating multiple sessions over the RDP protocol to another device on the customer’s network, namely an internal DNS server. External researchers had previously observed this technique in CACTUS ransomware attacks where an RDP tunnel was established via Plink [5].

A few days later, on November 24, Darktrace identified over 20,000 failed Kerberos authentication attempts for the username “service_qlik” being made to the internal DNS server, clearly representing a brute-force login attack. There is currently a lack of open-source intelligence (OSINT) material definitively listing Kerberos login failures as part of a CACTUS ransomware attack that exploits the Qlik vulnerabilities. This highlights Darktrace’s ability to identify ongoing threats amongst unusual network activity without relying on existing threat intelligence, emphasizing its advantage over traditional security detection tools.

Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.
Figure 4: Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.

In the month following these failed Kerberos login attempts, between November 26 and December 22, Darktrace observed multiple internal devices encrypting files within the customer’s environment with the extensions “.cts1” and “.cts7”. Devices were also seen writing ransom notes with the file name “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to two additional internal devices, as well as files likely associated with Qlik, such as “QlikSense.pdf”. This activity detected by Darktrace confirmed the presence of a CACTUS ransomware infection that was spreading across the customer’s network.

The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.
Figure 5: The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.
CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.
Figure 6: CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.

Following this initial encryption activity, two affected devices were observed attempting to remove evidence of this activity by deleting the encrypted files.

Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.
Figure 7: Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.

結論

In the face of this CACTUS ransomware attack, Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection enabled it to quickly identify multiple stages of the cyber kill chain occurring in the customer’s environment. These stages ranged from ‘initial access’ by exploiting Qlik vulnerabilities, which Darktrace was able to detect before the method had been reported by external researchers, to ‘actions on objectives’ by encrypting files. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was also able to detect a previously unreported stage of the attack: multiple Kerberos brute force login attempts.

If Darktrace’s autonomous response capability, RESPOND, had been active and enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of this attack, it would have been able to take swift mitigative action to shut down such suspicious activity as soon as it was identified by DETECT, effectively containing the ransomware attack at the earliest possible stage.

Learning a network’s ‘normal’ to identify deviations from established patterns of behaviour enables Darktrace’s identify a potential compromise, even one that uses common and often legitimately used administrative tools. This allows Darktrace to stay one step ahead of the increasingly sophisticated TTPs used by ransomware actors.

Credit to Tiana Kelly, Cyber Analyst & Analyst Team Lead, Anna Gilbertson, Cyber Analyst

付録

参考文献

[1] https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/cactus-ransomware-prickly-new-variant-evades-detection

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cactus-ransomware-exploiting-qlik-sense-flaws-to-breach-networks/

[3] https://explore.avertium.com/resource/new-ransomware-strains-cactus-and-3am

[4] https://www.soitron.com/cyber-attackers-abuse-holidays/

[5] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/qlik-sense-exploited-in-cactus-ransomware-campaign/

Darktrace DETECT Models

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

Anomalous Connection / PowerShell to Rare External

Device / New PowerShell User Agent

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

User / Kerberos Password Brute Force

Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB

Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Delete Volume

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare  

Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination  

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server  

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)  

Compromise / Suspicious File and C2  

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert  

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches  

Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer

Anomalous File / Internet facing System File Download  

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise  

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)  

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)  

IoC一覧

IoC - Type - Description

zohoservice[.]net: 45.61.147[.]176 - Domain name: IP Address - Hosting payload over HTTP

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT; Windows NT 10.0; en-US) WindowsPowerShell/5.1.17763.2183 - User agent -PowerShell user agent

.cts1 - File extension - Malicious appendage

.cts7- File extension - Malicious appendage

cAcTuS.readme.txt - Filename -Ransom note

putty.zip – Filename - Initial payload: ZIP containing PuTTY Link

MITRE ATT&CK マッピング

Tactic - Technique  - SubTechnique

Web Protocols: COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071 -T1071.001

Powershell: EXECUTION - T1059 - T1059.001

Exploitation of Remote Services: LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210 – N/A

Vulnerability Scanning: RECONAISSANCE     - T1595 - T1595.002

Network Service Scanning: DISCOVERY - T1046 - N/A

Malware: RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1588 - T1588.001

Drive-by Compromise: INITIAL ACCESS - T1189 - N/A

Remote Desktop Protocol: LATERAL MOVEMENT – 1021 -T1021.001

Brute Force: CREDENTIAL ACCESS        T – 1110 - N/A

Data Encrypted for Impact: IMPACT - T1486 - N/A

Data Destruction: IMPACT - T1485 - N/A

File Deletion: DEFENSE EVASION - T1070 - T1070.004

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著者について
Tiana Kelly
Deputy Team Lead, London & Cyber Analyst

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The State of AI in Cybersecurity: How AI will impact the cyber threat landscape in 2024

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22
Apr 2024

About the AI Cybersecurity Report

We surveyed 1,800 CISOs, security leaders, administrators, and practitioners from industries around the globe. Our research was conducted to understand how the adoption of new AI-powered offensive and defensive cybersecurity technologies are being managed by organizations.

This blog is continuing the conversation from our last blog post “The State of AI in Cybersecurity: Unveiling Global Insights from 1,800 Security Practitioners” which was an overview of the entire report. This blog will focus on one aspect of the overarching report, the impact of AI on the cyber threat landscape.

To access the full report click here.

Are organizations feeling the impact of AI-powered cyber threats?

Nearly three-quarters (74%) state AI-powered threats are now a significant issue. Almost nine in ten (89%) agree that AI-powered threats will remain a major challenge into the foreseeable future, not just for the next one to two years.

However, only a slight majority (56%) thought AI-powered threats were a separate issue from traditional/non AI-powered threats. This could be the case because there are few, if any, reliable methods to determine whether an attack is AI-powered.

Identifying exactly when and where AI is being applied may not ever be possible. However, it is possible for AI to affect every stage of the attack lifecycle. As such, defenders will likely need to focus on preparing for a world where threats are unique and are coming faster than ever before.

a hypothetical cyber attack augmented by AI at every stage

Are security stakeholders concerned about AI’s impact on cyber threats and risks?

The results from our survey showed that security practitioners are concerned that AI will impact organizations in a variety of ways. There was equal concern associated across the board – from volume and sophistication of malware to internal risks like leakage of proprietary information from employees using generative AI tools.

What this tells us is that defenders need to prepare for a greater volume of sophisticated attacks and balance this with a focus on cyber hygiene to manage internal risks.

One example of a growing internal risks is shadow AI. It takes little effort for employees to adopt publicly-available text-based generative AI systems to increase their productivity. This opens the door to “shadow AI”, which is the use of popular AI tools without organizational approval or oversight. Resulting security risks such as inadvertent exposure of sensitive information or intellectual property are an ever-growing concern.

Are organizations taking strides to reduce risks associated with adoption of AI in their application and computing environment?

71.2% of survey participants say their organization has taken steps specifically to reduce the risk of using AI within its application and computing environment.

16.3% of survey participants claim their organization has not taken these steps.

These findings are good news. Even as enterprises compete to get as much value from AI as they can, as quickly as possible, they’re tempering their eager embrace of new tools with sensible caution.

Still, responses varied across roles. Security analysts, operators, administrators, and incident responders are less likely to have said their organizations had taken AI risk mitigation steps than respondents in other roles. In fact, 79% of executives said steps had been taken, and only 54% of respondents in hands-on roles agreed. It seems that leaders believe their organizations are taking the needed steps, but practitioners are seeing a gap.

Do security professionals feel confident in their preparedness for the next generation of threats?

A majority of respondents (six out of every ten) believe their organizations are inadequately prepared to face the next generation of AI-powered threats.

The survey findings reveal contrasting perceptions of organizational preparedness for cybersecurity threats across different regions and job roles. Security administrators, due to their hands-on experience, express the highest level of skepticism, with 72% feeling their organizations are inadequately prepared. Notably, respondents in mid-sized organizations feel the least prepared, while those in the largest companies feel the most prepared.

Regionally, participants in Asia-Pacific are most likely to believe their organizations are unprepared, while those in Latin America feel the most prepared. This aligns with the observation that Asia-Pacific has been the most impacted region by cybersecurity threats in recent years, according to the IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index.

The optimism among Latin American respondents could be attributed to lower threat volumes experienced in the region, but it's cautioned that this could change suddenly (1).

What are biggest barriers to defending against AI-powered threats?

The top-ranked inhibitors center on knowledge and personnel. However, issues are alluded to almost equally across the board including concerns around budget, tool integration, lack of attention to AI-powered threats, and poor cyber hygiene.

The cybersecurity industry is facing a significant shortage of skilled professionals, with a global deficit of approximately 4 million experts (2). As organizations struggle to manage their security tools and alerts, the challenge intensifies with the increasing adoption of AI by attackers. This shift has altered the demands on security teams, requiring practitioners to possess broad and deep knowledge across rapidly evolving solution stacks.

Educating end users about AI-driven defenses becomes paramount as organizations grapple with the shortage of professionals proficient in managing AI-powered security tools. Operationalizing machine learning models for effectiveness and accuracy emerges as a crucial skill set in high demand. However, our survey highlights a concerning lack of understanding among cybersecurity professionals regarding AI-driven threats and the use of AI-driven countermeasures indicating a gap in keeping pace with evolving attacker tactics.

The integration of security solutions remains a notable problem, hindering effective defense strategies. While budget constraints are not a primary inhibitor, organizations must prioritize addressing these challenges to bolster their cybersecurity posture. It's imperative for stakeholders to recognize the importance of investing in skilled professionals and integrated security solutions to mitigate emerging threats effectively.

To access the full report click here.

参考文献

1. IBM, X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2024, Available at: https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/L0GKXDWJ

2. ISC2, Cybersecurity Workforce Study 2023, Available at: https://media.isc2.org/-/media/Project/ISC2/Main/Media/ documents/research/ISC2_Cybersecurity_Workforce_Study_2023.pdf?rev=28b46de71ce24e6ab7705f6e3da8637e

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