Blog
Inside the SOC
Outlaw Returns: Uncovering Returning Features and New Tactics
What is Outlaw Cryptocurrency Mining Operation?
The cybersecurity community has been aware of the threat of Outlaw cryptocurrency mining operation, and its affiliated activities since as early as 2018. Despite its prominence, Outlaw remains largely elusive to researchers and analysts due to its ability to adapt its tactics, procedures, and payloads.
Outlaw gained notoriety in 2018 as security researchers began observing the creation of affiliated botnets.[1][2] Researchers gave Outlaw its name based on the English translation of the “Haiduc” tool observed during their initial activity on compromised devices.[3],[4] By 2019, much of the initial Outlaw activity focused on the targeting of Internet of Things (IoT) devices and other internet facing servers, reportedly focusing operations in China and on Chinese devices.[5],[6] From the outset, mining operations featured as a core element of botnets created by the group.[7] This initial focus may have been a sign of caution by threat actors or a preliminary means of testing procedures and operation efficacy. Regardless, Outlaw actors inevitably expanded scope, targeting larger organizations and a wider range of internet facing devices across geographic scope.
Following a short period of inactivity, security researchers began to observe new Outlaw activity, showcasing additional capabilities such as the ability to kill existing crypto-mining processes on devices, thereby reclaiming devices already compromised by crypto-jacking. [8],[9]
Latest News on Outlaw
Although the more recently observed incidents of Outlaw did demonstrate some new tactics, many of its procedures remained the same, including its unique bundling of payloads that combine crypto-mining and botnet capabilities. [10] In conjunction, the continued use of mining-specific payloads and growth of affiliated botnets has bolstered the belief that Outlaw actors historically prioritizes financial gain, in lieu of overt political objectives.
Given the tendency for malicious actors to share tools and capabilities, true attribution of threat or threat group is extremely difficult in the wild. As such, a genuine survey of activity from the group across a customer base has not always been possible. Therefore, we will present an updated look into more recent activity associated with Outlaw detected across the Darktrace customer base.
Darktrace vs Outlaw
Since late 2022, Darktrace has observed a rise in probable cyber incidents involving indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with Outlaw. Given its continued prevalence and relative dearth of information, it is essential to take a renewed look at the latest campaign activity associated with threats like Outlaw to avoid making erroneous assumptions and to ensure the threat posed is correctly characterized.
While being aware of previous IoCs and tactics known to be employed in previous campaigns will go some way to protecting against future Outlaw attacks, it is paramount for organizations to arm themselves with an autonomous intelligent decision maker that can identify malicious activity, based on recognizing deviations from expected patterns of behavior, and take preventative action to effectively defend against such a versatile threat.
Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection means it is uniquely positioned to detect novel campaign activity by recognizing subtle deviations in affected devices’ behavior that would have gone unnoticed by traditional security tools relying on rules, signatures and known IoCs.
Outlaw Attack Overview & Darktrace Coverage
From late 2022 through early 2023, Darktrace identified multiple cyber events involving IP addresses, domains, and payloads associated with Outlaw on customer networks. In this recent re-emergence of campaign activity, Darktrace identified numerous attack vectors and IoCs that had previously been associated with Outlaw, however it also observed significant deviations from previous campaigns.
Returning Features
As outlined in a previous blog, past iterations of Outlaw compromises include four identified, distinct phases:
1. Targeting of internet facing devices via SSH brute-forcing
2. Initiation of crypto-mining operations
3. Download of shell script and/or botnet malware payloads
4. Outgoing external SSH scanning to propagate the botnet
Nearly all affected devices analyzed by Darktrace were tagged as internet facing, as identified in previous campaigns, supporting the notion that Outlaw continues to focus on easily exposed devices. In addition to this, Darktrace observed three other core returning features from previous Outlaw campaigns in affected devices between late 2022 and early 2023:
1. Gzip and/or Script Download
2. Beaconing Activity (Command and Control)
3. Crypto-mining
Gzip and/or Script Download
Darktrace observed numerous devices downloading the Dota malware, a strain that is previously known to have been associated with the Outlaw botnet, as either a gzip file or a shell script from rare external hosts.
In some examples, IP addresses that provided the payload were flagged by open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources as having engaged in widespread SSH brute-forcing activities. While the timing of the payload transfer to the device was not consistent, download of gzip files featured prominently during directly observed or potentially affiliated activity. Moreover, Darktrace detected multiple devices performing HTTP requests for shell scripts (.sh) according to detected connection URIs. Darktrace DETECT was able to identify these anomalous connections due to the rarity of the endpoint, payloads, and connectivity for the devices.
Beaconing Activity – Command and Control (C2) Endpoint
Across all Outlaw activity identified by Darktrace, devices engaged in some form of beaconing behavior, rather than one-off connections to IPs associated with Outlaw. While the use of application protocol was not uniform, repeated connectivity to rare external IP addresses related to Outlaw occurred across many analyzed incidents. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI understood that this beaconing activity represented devices deviating from their expected patterns of life and was able to bring it to the immediate attention of customer security teams.
Crypto-mining
In almost every incident of Outlaw identified across the fleet, Darktrace detected some form of cryptocurrency mining activity. Devices affected by Outlaw were consistently observed making anomalous connections to external endpoints associated with crypto-mining operations. Furthermore, the Minergate protocol appeared consistently across hosts; even when devices did not make direct crypto-mining commands, such hosts attempted connections to external entities that were known to support crypto-mining operations.
Is Outlaw Using New Tactics?
While in the past, Outlaw activity was identified through a systematic kill chain, recent investigations conducted by Darktrace show significant deviations from this.
For instance, affected devices do not necessarily follow the previously outlined kill chain directly as they did previously. Instead, Darktrace observed affected devices exhibiting these phases in differing orders, repeating steps, or missing out attack phases entirely.
It is essential to study such variation in the kill chain to learn more about the threat of Outlaw and how threat actors are continuing to use it is varying ways. These discrepancies in kill chain elements are likely impacted by visibility into the networks and devices of Darktrace customers, with some relevant activity falling outside of Darktrace’s purview. This is particularly true for internet-exposed devices and hosts that repeatedly performed the same anomalous activity (such as making Minergate requests). Moreover, some devices involved in Outlaw activity may have already been compromised prior to Darktrace’s visibility into the network. As such, these conclusions must be evaluated with a degree of uncertainty.
SSH Activity
Although external SSH connectivity was apparent in some of the incidents detected by Darktrace, it was not directly related to brute-forcing activity. Affected devices did receive anomalous incoming SSH connections, however, wide ranging SSH failed connectivity following the initiation of mining operations by compromised devices was not readily apparent across analyzed compromises. Connections over port 22 were more frequently associated with beaconing and/or C2 activity to endpoints associated with Outlaw, than with potential brute-forcing. As such, Darktrace could not, with high confidence correlate such SSH activity to brute-forcing. This could suggest that threat actors are now portioning or rotation of botnet devices for different operations, for example dividing between botnet expansion and mining operations.
Command line tools
In cases of Outlaw investigated by Darktrace, there was also a degree of variability involving the tools used to retrieve payloads. On the networks of customers affected by Outlaw, Darktrace DETECT identified the use of user agents and command line tools that it considered to be out of character for the network and its devices.
When retrieving the Dota malware payload or shell script data, compromised devices frequently relied on numerous versions of wget and curl user agents. Although the use of such tools as a tactic cannot be definitively linked to the crypto-mining campaign, the employment of varying and/or outdated native command line tools attests to the procedural flexibility of Outlaw campaigns, and its potential for continued evolution.
Outlaw in 2023
Given Outlaw’s widespread notoriety and its continued activities, it is likely to remain a prominent threat to organizations and security teams across the threat landscape in 2023 and beyond.
As Darktrace has observed within its customer base from late 2022 through early 2023, activity linked with the Outlaw cryptocurrency mining campaign continues to transpire, offering security teams and research a renewed look at how it has evolved and adapted over the years. While many of its features and tactics appear to have remained consistent, Darktrace has identified numerous signs of Outlaw deviating from its previously known activities.
While relying on previously established IoCs and known tactics from previous campaigns will go some way to protecting an organization’s network from Outlaw compromises, there is a greater need than ever to go further than this. Rather than depending on a list of known-bads or traditional signatures and rules, Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection and unparallel autonomous response capabilities mean it is uniquely positioned to DETECT and RESPOND to Outlaw activity, regardless of how it evolves in the future.
Credit to: Adam Potter, Cyber Analyst, Nahisha Nobregas, SOC Analyst, and Ryan Traill, Threat Content Lead
Relevant DETECT Model Breaches:
Compliance / Incoming SSH
Device / New User Agent and New IP
Device / New User Agent
Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
Compromise / Crypto Currency Mining Activity
Anomalous File / Internet Facing System File Download
Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System
Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location
Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint
Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint
侵害インジケータ
Indicator - Type - Description
/dota3.tar.gz
File URI
Outlaw payload
/tddwrt7s.sh
File URI
Outlaw payload
73e5dbafa25946ed636e68d1733281e63332441d
SHA1 Hash
Outlaw payload
debian-package[.]center
Hostname
Outlaw C2 endpoint
161.35.236[.]24
IP address
Outlaw C2 endpoint
138.68.115[.]96
IP address
Outlaw C2 endpoint
67.205.134[.]224
IP address
Outlaw C2 endpoint
138.197.212[.]204
IP address
Outlaw C2 endpoint
45.9.148[.]59
IP address
Possible Outlaw C2 endpoint
45.9.148[.]117
IP address
Outlaw C2 endpoint
45.9.148[.]125
IP address
Outlaw C2 endpoint
45.9.148[.]129
IP address
Outlaw C2 endpoint
45.9.148[.]99
IP address
Outlaw C2 endpoint
45.9.148[.]234
IP address
Possible Outlaw C2 endpoint
45.9.148[.]236
IP address
Possible Outlaw C2 endpoint
159.203.102[.]122
IP address
Outlaw C2 endpoint
159.203.85[.]196
IP address
Outlaw C2 endpoint
159.223.235[.]198
IP address
Outlaw C2 endpoint
MITRE ATT&CK マッピング
Tactic -Technique
Initial Access -T1190 Exploit - Public Facing Application
Command and Control - T1071 - Application - Layer Protocol
T1071.001 - Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
Impact - T1496 Resource Hijacking
Like this and want more?
More in this series
Blog
Inside the SOC
PurpleFox in a Henhouse: How Darktrace Hunted Down a Persistent and Dynamic Rootkit
Versatile Malware: PurpleFox
As organizations and security teams across the world move to bolster their digital defenses against cyber threats, threats actors, in turn, are forced to adopt more sophisticated tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to circumvent them. Rather than being static and predictable, malware strains are becoming increasingly versatile and therefore elusive to traditional security tools.
One such example is PurpleFox. First observed in 2018, PurpleFox is a combined fileless rootkit and backdoor trojan known to target Windows machines. PurpleFox is known for consistently adapting its functionalities over time, utilizing different infection vectors including known vulnerabilities (CVEs), fake Telegram installers, and phishing. It is also leveraged by other campaigns to deliver ransomware tools, spyware, and cryptocurrency mining malware. It is also widely known for using Microsoft Software Installer (MSI) files masquerading as other file types.
The Evolution of PurpleFox
The Original Strain
First reported in March 2018, PurpleFox was identified to be a trojan that drops itself onto Windows machines using an MSI installation package that alters registry values to replace a legitimate Windows system file [1]. The initial stage of infection relied on the third-party toolkit RIG Exploit Kit (EK). RIG EK is hosted on compromised or malicious websites and is dropped onto the unsuspecting system when they visit browse that site. The built-in Windows installer (MSIEXEC) is leveraged to run the installation package retrieved from the website. This, in turn, drops two files into the Windows directory – namely a malicious dynamic-link library (DLL) that acts as a loader, and the payload of the malware. After infection, PurpleFox is often used to retrieve and deploy other types of malware.
Subsequent Variants
Since its initial discovery, PurpleFox has also been observed leveraging PowerShell to enable fileless infection and additional privilege escalation vulnerabilities to increase the likelihood of successful infection [2]. The PowerShell script had also been reported to be masquerading as a .jpg image file. PowerSploit modules are utilized to gain elevated privileges if the current user lacks administrator privileges. Once obtained, the script proceeds to retrieve and execute a malicious MSI package, also masquerading as an image file. As of 2020, PurpleFox no longer relied on the RIG EK for its delivery phase, instead spreading via the exploitation of the SMB protocol [3]. The malware would leverage the compromised systems as hosts for the PurpleFox payloads to facilitate its spread to other systems. This mode of infection can occur without any user action, akin to a worm.
The current iteration of PurpleFox reportedly uses brute-forcing of vulnerable services, such as SMB, to facilitate its spread over the network and escalate privileges. By scanning internet-facing Windows computers, PurpleFox exploits weak passwords for Windows user accounts through SMB, including administrative credentials to facilitate further privilege escalation.
Darktrace detection of PurpleFox
In July 2023, Darktrace observed an example of a PurpleFox infection on the network of a customer in the healthcare sector. This observation was a slightly different method of downloading the PurpleFox payload. An affected device was observed initiating a series of service control requests using DCE-RPC, instructing the device to make connections to a host of servers to download a malicious .PNG file, later confirmed to be the PurpleFox rootkit. The device was then observed carrying out worm-like activity to other external internet-facing servers, as well as scanning related subnets.
Darktrace DETECT™ was able to successfully identify and track this compromise across the cyber kill chain and ensure the customer was able to take swift remedial action to prevent the attack from escalating further.
While the customer in question did have Darktrace RESPOND™, it was configured in human confirmation mode, meaning any mitigative actions had to be manually applied by the customer’s security team. If RESPOND had been enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of the attack, it would have been able to take swift action against the compromise to contain it at the earliest instance.
攻撃の概要
Initial Scanning over SMB
On July 14, 2023, Darktrace detected the affected device scanning other internal devices on the customer’s network via port 445. The numerous connections were consistent with the aforementioned worm-like activity that has been reported from PurpleFox behavior as it appears to be targeting SMB services looking for open or vulnerable channels to exploit.
This initial scanning activity was detected by Darktrace DETECT, specifically through the model breach ‘Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity’. Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst™ then launched an autonomous investigation into these internal connections and tied them into one larger-scale network reconnaissance incident, rather than a series of isolated connections.
As Darktrace RESPOND was configured in human confirmation mode, it was unable to autonomously block these internal connections. However, it did suggest blocking connections on port 445, which could have been manually applied by the customer’s security team.
特権昇格
The device successfully logged in via NTLM with the credential, ‘administrator’. Darktrace recognized that the endpoint was external to the customer’s environment, indicating that the affected device was now being used to propagate the malware to other networks. Considering the lack of observed brute-force activity up to this point, the credentials for ‘administrator’ had likely been compromised prior to Darktrace’s deployment on the network, or outside of Darktrace’s purview via a phishing attack.
Exploitation
Darktrace then detected a series of service control requests over DCE-RPC using the credential ‘admin’ to make SVCCTL Create Service W Requests. A script was then observed where the controlled device is instructed to launch mshta.exe, a Windows-native binary designed to execute Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) files. This enables the execution of arbitrary script code, VBScript in this case.
There are a few MSIEXEC flags to note:
- /i : installs or configures a product
- /Q : sets the user interface level. In this case, it is set to ‘No UI’, which is used for “quiet” execution, so no user interaction is required
Evidently, this was an attempt to evade detection by endpoint users as it is surreptitiously installed onto the system. This corresponds to the download of the rootkit that has previously been associated with PurpleFox. At this stage, the infected device continues to be leveraged as an attack device and scans SMB services over external endpoints. The device also appeared to attempt brute-forcing over NTLM using the same ‘administrator’ credential to these endpoints. This activity was identified by Darktrace DETECT which, if enabled in autonomous response mode would have instantly blocked similar outbound connections, thus preventing the spread of PurpleFox.
Installation
On August 9, Darktrace observed the device making initial attempts to download a malicious .PNG file. This was a notable change in tactics from previously reported PurpleFox campaigns which had been observed utilizing .MOE files for their payloads [3]. The .MOE payloads are binary files that are more easily detected and blocked by traditional signatured-based security measures as they are not associated with known software. The ubiquity of .PNG files, especially on the web, make identifying and blacklisting the files significantly more difficult.
The first connection was made with the URI ‘/test.png’. It was noted that the HTTP method here was HEAD, a method similar to GET requests except the server must not return a message-body in the response.
The metainformation contained in the HTTP headers in response to a HEAD request should be identical to the information sent in response to a GET request. This method is often used to test hypertext links for validity and recent modification. This is likely a way of checking if the server hosting the payload is still active. Avoiding connections that could possibly be detected by antivirus solutions can help keep this activity under-the-radar.
The server responds with a status code of 200 before the download begins. The HEAD request could be part of the attacker’s verification that the server is still running, and that the payload is available for download. The ‘/test.png’ HEAD request was sent twice, likely for double confirmation to begin the file transfer.
Subsequent analysis using a Packet Capture (PCAP) tool revealed that this connection used the Windows Installer user agent that has previously been associated with PurpleFox. The device then began to download a payload that was masquerading as a Microsoft Word document. The device was thus able to download the payload twice, from two separate endpoints.
By masquerading as a Microsoft Word file, the threat actor was likely attempting to evade the detection of the endpoint user and traditional security tools by passing off as an innocuous text document. Likewise, using a Windows Installer user agent would enable threat actors to bypass antivirus measures and disguise the malicious installation as legitimate download activity.
Darktrace DETECT identified that these were masqueraded file downloads by correctly identifying the mismatch between the file extension and the true file type. Subsequently, AI Analyst was able to correctly identify the file type and deduced that this download was indicative of the device having been compromised.
In this case, the device attempted to download the payload from several different endpoints, many of which had low antivirus detection rates or open-source intelligence (OSINT) flags, highlighting the need to move beyond traditional signature-base detections.
If Darktrace RESPOND was enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of the attack it would have acted by blocking connections to these suspicious endpoints, thus preventing the download of malicious files. However, as RESPOND was in human confirmation mode, RESPOND actions required manual application by the customer’s security team which unfortunately did not happen, as such the device was able to download the payloads.
結論
The PurpleFox malware is a particularly dynamic strain known to continually evolve over time, utilizing a blend of old and new approaches to achieve its goals which is likely to muddy expectations on its behavior. By frequently employing new methods of attack, malicious actors are able to bypass traditional security tools that rely on signature-based detections and static lists of indictors of compromise (IoCs), necessitating a more sophisticated approach to threat detection.
Darktrace DETECT’s Self-Learning AI enables it to confront adaptable and elusive threats like PurpleFox. By learning and understanding customer networks, it is able to discern normal network behavior and patterns of life, distinguishing expected activity from potential deviations. This anomaly-based approach to threat detection allows Darktrace to detect cyber threats as soon as they emerge.
By combining DETECT with the autonomous response capabilities of RESPOND, Darktrace customers are able to effectively safeguard their digital environments and ensure that emerging threats can be identified and shut down at the earliest stage of the kill chain, regardless of the tactics employed by would-be attackers.
Credit to Piramol Krishnan, Cyber Analyst, Qing Hong Kwa, Senior Cyber Analyst & Deputy Team Lead, Singapore
付録
Darktraceによるモデル検知
- Device / Increased External Connectivity
- Device / Large Number of Connections to New Endpoints
- Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Admin)
- Compliance / External Windows Communications
- Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
- Compromise / Unusual SVCCTL Activity
- Compromise / Rare Domain Pointing to Internal IP
- Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer
RESPOND Models
- Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block
- Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block
- Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
- Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block
- Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block
- Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block
IoC一覧
IoC - Type - Description
/C558B828.Png - URI - URI for Purple Fox Rootkit [4]
5b1de649f2bc4eb08f1d83f7ea052de5b8fe141f - File Hash - SHA1 hash of C558B828.Png file (Malware payload)
190.4.210[.]242 - IP - Purple Fox C2 Servers
218.4.170[.]236 - IP - IP for download of .PNG file (Malware payload)
180.169.1[.]220 - IP - IP for download of .PNG file (Malware payload)
103.94.108[.]114:10837 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
221.199.171[.]174:16543 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
61.222.155[.]49:14098 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
178.128.103[.]246:17880 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
222.134.99[.]132:12539 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
164.90.152[.]252:18075 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
198.199.80[.]121:11490 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
MITRE ATT&CK マッピング
Tactic - Technique
Reconnaissance - Active Scanning T1595, Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks T1595.001, Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning T1595.002
Resource Development - Obtain Capabilities: Malware T1588.001
Initial Access, Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation - Valid Accounts: Default Accounts T1078.001
Initial Access - Drive-by Compromise T1189
Defense Evasion - Masquerading T1036
Credential Access - Brute Force T1110
Discovery - Network Service Discovery T1046
Command and Control - Proxy: External Proxy T1090.002
参考文献
- https://blog.360totalsecurity.com/en/purple-fox-trojan-burst-out-globally-and-infected-more-than-30000-users/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/purple-fox-fileless-malware-with-rookit-component-delivered-by-rig-exploit-kit-now-abuses-powershell.html
- https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/purple-fox-rootkit-now-propagates-as-a-worm
- https://www.foregenix.com/blog/an-overview-on-purple-fox
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_sg/research/21/j/purplefox-adds-new-backdoor-that-uses-websockets.html
Blog
OT
$70 Million in Cyber Security Funding for Electric Cooperatives & Utilities
What is the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal?
The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law passed by congress in 2021 aimed to upgrade power and infrastructure to deliver clean, reliable energy across the US to achieve zero-emissions. To date, the largest investment in clean energy, the deal will fund new programs to support the development and deployment of clean energy technology.
Why is it relevant to electric municipalities?
Section 40124 of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law allocates $250 million over a 5-year period to create the Rural and Municipal Utility Cybersecurity (RMUC) Program to help electric cooperative, municipal, and small investor-owned utilities protect against, detect, respond to, and recover from cybersecurity threats.1 This act illuminates the value behind a full life-cycle approach to cyber security. Thus, finding a cyber security solution that can provide all aspects of security in one integrated platform would enhance the overall security posture and ease many of the challenges that arise with adopting multiple point solutions.
On November 16, 2023 the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) released the Advanced Cybersecurity Technology (ACT) for electric utilities offering a $70 million funding opportunity that aims to enhance the cybersecurity posture of electric cooperative, municipal, and small investor-owned utilities.
Funding Details
10 projects will be funded with application submissions due November 29, 2023, 5:00 pm ET with $200,000 each in cash prizes in the following areas:
- Direct support for eligible utilities to make investments in cybersecurity technologies, tools, training, and improvements in utility processes and procedures;
- Funding to strengthen the peer-to-peer and not-for-profit cybersecurity technical assistance ecosystem currently serving eligible electric utilities; and
- Increasing access to cybersecurity technical assistance and training for eligible utilities with limited cybersecurity resources. 2
To submit for this award visit: https://www.herox.com/ACT1Prize
How can electric municipalities utilize the funding?
While the adoption of hybrid working patterns increase cloud and SaaS usage, the number of industrial IoT devices also continues to rise. The result is decrease in visibility for security teams and new entry points for attackers. Particularly for energy and utility organizations.
Electric cooperatives seeking to enhance their cyber security posture can aim to invest in cyber security tools that provide the following:
Compliance support: Consider finding an OT security solution that maps out how its solutions and features help your organization comply with relevant compliance mandates such as NIST, ISA, FERC, TSA, HIPAA, CIS Controls, and more.
Anomaly based detection: Siloed security solutions also fail to detect attacks that span
the entire organization. Anomaly-based detection enhances an organization’s cyber security posture by proactively defending against potential attacks and maintaining a comprehensive view of their attack surface.
Integration capabilities: Implementation of several point solutions that complete individual tasks runs the risk of increasing workloads for operators and creates additional challenges with compliance, budgeting, and technical support. Look for cyber security tools that integrate with your existing technologies.
Passive and active asset tracking: Active Identification offers accurate enumeration, real time updates, vulnerability assessment, asset validation while Passive Identification eliminates the risk of operational disruption, minimizes risk, does not generate additional network traffic. It would be ideal to find a security solution that can do both.
Can secure both IT and OT in unison: Given that most OT cyber-attacks actually start in IT networks before pivoting into OT, a mature security posture for critical infrastructure would include a single solution for both IT and OT. Separate solutions for IT and OT present challenges when defending network boundaries and detecting incidents when an attacker pivots from IT to OT. These independent solutions also significantly increase operator workload and materially diminish risk mitigation efforts.
Darktrace/OT for Electric Cooperatives and Utilities
For smaller teams with just one or two dedicated employees, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst and Investigation features allow end users to spend less time in the platform as it compiles critical incidents into comprehensive actionable event reports. AI Analyst brings all the information into a centralized view with incident reporting in natural language summaries and can be generated for compliance reports specific to regulatory requirements.
For larger teams, Darktrace alerts can be forwarded to 3rd party platforms such as a SIEM, where security team decision making is augmented. Additionally, executive reports and autonomous response reduce the alert fatigue generally associated with legacy tools. Most importantly, Darktrace’s unique understanding of normal allows security teams to detect zero-days and signatureless attacks regardless of the size of the organization and how alerts are consumed.
Key Benefits of Darktrace/OT
- Anomaly-based detection and real-time response
- Secures IT, OT, and IoT in unison
- Active and Passive Asset Identification
- Automated security reporting
- Attack surface management and vulnerability assessment
- Covers all levels of the Purdue Model
.png)
参考文献
