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BlackMatterによるスマッシュ・アンド・グラブ戦術とRESPONDの必要性






ほんの数年前、一般的な報道では、「スマッシュ・アンド・グラブ攻撃」の時代は終わり、より巧妙で「ロー・アンド・スロー」な手口を使う新種のハッカーが台頭してきたと発表されました [1]。このような攻撃は間違いなく出現していますが、スマート・アンド・グラブはすぐに見過ごされるようになり、おそらく心配な結果を招いています。昨年、Googleは、Cookieを盗むマルウェアを使用したフィッシングキャンペーンを繰り返し行い、最近では、2022年のウクライナ紛争において、同様の技術を使用したハッカーが確認されたという報告があります [2 & 3]。彼らのインスピレーションはどこから来ているのでしょうか。2021年夏に初めて登場したBlackMatterのような大規模なAPTグループにとって、スマッシュ・アンド・グラブは決して流行り廃りのあるものではありません。
このブログでは、2021年にDarktrace を試用していたある組織を襲った BlackMatter ランサムウェア攻撃について解剖しています。このインシデントは、セキュリティチームが優先度の高いアラートに反応しない場合に何が起こるかを明らかにするものです。
ランサムウェアの攻撃全体がわずか48時間の間に実行される可能性がある場合、脅威が拡大する前に検知に反応して被害を防ぐためにセキュリティチームに頼ることは高いリスクがあります。その導入にはためらいがありますが [4]、このブログでも、Darktrace RESPOND のような自律遮断ソリューションの必要性を示しています。
ネーム・ゲーム:BlackMatter、REvil、DarkSide
表面上は短命の犯罪組織であるにもかかわらず [5]、新しいBlackMatterグループのTTP(戦術、技術、手順)と引退したREvilやDarkSideの組織のTTPの間には、現在多くの類似性が描かれています [6]。
DarkSideとREvilは、引退する以前は、おそらくサイバー犯罪集団の中で最も著名なブランドとして、昨年最も破壊的なランサムウェア攻撃のうちの2つを担当していました。DarkSideは、Colonial Pipelineの攻撃から2週間足らずで、その活動を停止することを発表しました [7]。一方、FBIは、7月4日のKaseya攻撃で壊滅的な被害を受け、9月に復帰に失敗した後、2022年1月にREvilをシャットダウンしました [8]。現在では、どちらか、あるいは双方のメンバーがBlackMatterを結成することになったのではないかと疑われています。
このようなリブランディング戦略は、現在、これらのグループが採用することが多くなっている「スマッシュ・アンド・グラブ」攻撃と類似しています。数日後、数週間後、数か月後に戻ってきたときには、自分自身や自分たちの攻撃を認識できないほど小さな変化を遂げています。このように、DarkSideはBlackMatterとなり、その攻撃は、過去に遭遇した脅威について訓練されたセキュリティシステムをすり抜けることができるのです。
攻撃の詳細
2021年9月、Darktrace は米国のマーケティング会社を監視していましたが、BlackMatter の活動の特徴を示す二重の強奪ランサムウェア攻撃の犠牲となりました。この攻撃は、ドメイン認証された1台のデバイスが同社のネットワークに参加したことから始まりました。これは、事前に感染していた会社のデバイスが、しばらくオフラインの状態から再接続されたものと思われます。
参加からわずか15分後、デバイスは1,000以上の異なる内部IPに対してSMBとICMPのスキャン活動を開始しました。また、Epmapperへのリクエストも急増し、RPCベースのラテラルムーブメントの意図があることが示唆されました。1つのクレデンシャルが特に目立っていましたが、管理者クレデンシャルを含む複数のクレデンシャルが使用されていました。この偵察は予想外の性質を持っていたため、すぐにDETECT/Network モデルブリーチの連鎖を引き起こし、DarktraceのSOC は Proactive Threat Notification サービスを通じて警告を発しました。SOCのアナリストは活動のトリアージを開始しましたが、同社は受け取ったアラートのいずれにも対応できず、検知された脅威は同社のデジタル環境に根を下ろしたままとなりました。
その直後、Cobalt Strike [9] に関連するエンドポイントに向けて、一連のC2ビーコンが発生しました。これには、svcctl、SecAddr、およびさらなるRPC接続に対するさまざまな異常なWMIバインド要求が伴っていました。これらにより、最初に感染したデバイスは、他の11台のデバイスに素早く感染することができました。翌日もスキャンを続けた結果、すぐに貴重なデータが確認されました。数回の転送を経て、230GBの内部データがSSHポート22を介して4つのファイルサーバーから流出しました。このデータは、SMB WritesとMoves/Renamesによって暗号化され、ランダムに生成される拡張子 .qHefKSmfd によって、組織で使用できないようにされました。最後に qHefKSmfd.README.txt と題した身代金要求のメモが投下されました。
この身代金要求書には、BlackMatterのアスキーロゴが添付されていました。

Darktrace DETECT と Cyber AI Analystがライブアラートを提供し続けましたが、脅威アクターは見事に任務を達成しました。
組織が脅威への対応を組織化できない理由は数多くあります(リソース不足、時間外の攻撃、単に動きが速すぎるグループなど)。DarktraceのRESPOND 機能が有効でなければ、脅威アクターはこの攻撃を何の障害もなく進めることができました。

RESPONDが導入されていた場合、攻撃はどのように展開されたか
Darktraceによる顧客独自のデジタル環境に対する「自己」の進化した知識で武装したRESPONDは、最初のネットワークスキャンから数秒以内に起動し、非常に異常であると認識されたことでしょう。ここで取られる標準的な行動は、通常通りビジネスを継続させながら異常をピンポイントで止めるために、侵害されたデバイスの標準的な「生活パターン」を一定期間にわたって強制的に実行することです。
RESPOND は、攻撃の展開に応じて常に脅威を再評価しています。RESPOND モデルでは、ポート 443 を介した C2 サーバーへの外部接続、外部への流出の試み、そして重要な点として暗号化に関連するポート 445 を介した SMB 書き込みアクティビティをブロックするよう警告が出されたことでしょう。
DETECT とRESPOND は互いに影響し合うので、Darktrace は BlackMatter が戦術を転換する際にその行動を評価し続けたことでしょう。これらの行動は、週末に稼働していない可能性のあるセキュリティチームのために重要な時間を取り戻し、解決するよりも多くの問題を引き起こす過度に攻撃的な対応をすることなく、攻撃者をその場に留まらせることができます。
最終的に、このインシデントは自律的に解決されませんでしたが、身代金事件を受けて、Darktrace は、RESPOND を有効にし、すべてのクライアントとサーバーデバイスのランサムウェア指標に対してアクティブモードに設定することを提案しました。これにより、このようなインシデントは二度と発生しないことが確認されました。
なぜRESPONDが効果的なのか
レスポンスソリューションは、真の脅威が存在する場合にのみ起動するような正確さ、ユーザー側が支配権を握れるような設定、そして通常の業務を妨げることなく悪意のある活動のみを抑制するための正しいアクションを知るためのインテリジェンスを備えていなければならないのです。
これは、ある組織にとっての「通常」が何であるかを確立している場合にのみ可能です。そして、これこそが、DarktraceのRESPOND 製品ファミリーが、ターゲットを絞って適切な行動を取ることを保証する方法なのです。ネットワーク、クラウド、SaaSにおける微妙な、あるいは大きな逸脱を強調するDETECT アラートを活用することで、RESPOND は潜在的な脅威に対して慎重な対応を行うことができます。これには、次のようなアクションが含まれます:
- デバイスの「生活パターン」を一定期間強制
- 「グループ生活パターン」の強制(過去に同種のデバイスが行っていないことをデバイスが行うことを阻止)
- 特定の宛先への特定の種類の接続をブロック
- クラウドアカウントからログアウト
- エンドポイントデバイスの「スマート検疫」- 組織のVPNとアンチウイルスソリューションへのアクセスを維持
結論
CISA は、BlackMatter に関する報告書 [10] の中で、異常な活動を調査する能力を備えたネットワーク監視ツールに投資することを組織に推奨しています。あらかじめ決められたルールやシグネチャではなく、通常とは異なる挙動を検知することは、新たな脅威に対抗する上で重要なステップとなります。しかし、この事例が示すように、検知するだけでは十分とは限りません。いつ、どこから脅威が侵入してきても、即座に的確な対処を行い、脅威を封じ込めるRESPOND をオンにすることが、スマッシュアンドグラブ攻撃に対抗し、組織のデジタル資産を保護する最善の方法です。BlackMatter の背後にいる脅威アクターが、新しい名前と戦略で戻ってくるか、すでに戻っていることは間違いありませんが、RESPOND を導入した組織は、それに対する準備ができているはずです。
付録
Darktrace モデル検知
PTN というプレフィックスが付いたものは、Darktraceの24/7のSOCチームに直接アラートされました。
- Device / ICMP Address Scan
- Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity
- (PTN) Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity
- Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
- Device / Possible RPC Lateral Movement
- Device / Active Directory Reconnaissance
- Unusual Activity / Possible RPC Recon Activity
- Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance
- Compliance / Default Credential Usage
- Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution
- Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
- Device / New or Uncommon SMB Named Pipe
- Device / SMB Session Bruteforce
- Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity
- (PTN) Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches
- Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
- Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon
- Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint
- Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches
- Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Breaches
- Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
- Anomalous Connection / Anomalous SSL without SNI to New External
- Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
- Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint
- Compliance / SMB Drive Write
- Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session
- Anomalous Connection / High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control
- Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session
- Device / Suspicious File Writes to Multiple Hidden SMB Shares
- Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
- Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination
- Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
- Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
- Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload
- (PTN) Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
- Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
- (PTN) Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity
IoC一覧

参考文献リスト
[2] https://cybernews.com/cyber-war/how-do-smash-and-grab-cyberattacks-help-ukraine-in-waging-war/
[5] https://techcrunch.com/2021/11/03/blackmatter-ransomware-shut-down/
[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/business/darkside-pipeline-hack.html
[8] https://techcrunch.com/2022/01/14/fsb-revil-ransomware/
[9] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/georgiaonsale.com/community
[10] https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-291a
寄稿者:Andras Balogh(SOCアナリスト)、 Gabriel Few-Wiegratz(hreat Intelligenceコンテンツ制作リーダー)
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PurpleFox in a Henhouse: How Darktrace Hunted Down a Persistent and Dynamic Rootkit



Versatile Malware: PurpleFox
As organizations and security teams across the world move to bolster their digital defenses against cyber threats, threats actors, in turn, are forced to adopt more sophisticated tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to circumvent them. Rather than being static and predictable, malware strains are becoming increasingly versatile and therefore elusive to traditional security tools.
One such example is PurpleFox. First observed in 2018, PurpleFox is a combined fileless rootkit and backdoor trojan known to target Windows machines. PurpleFox is known for consistently adapting its functionalities over time, utilizing different infection vectors including known vulnerabilities (CVEs), fake Telegram installers, and phishing. It is also leveraged by other campaigns to deliver ransomware tools, spyware, and cryptocurrency mining malware. It is also widely known for using Microsoft Software Installer (MSI) files masquerading as other file types.
The Evolution of PurpleFox
The Original Strain
First reported in March 2018, PurpleFox was identified to be a trojan that drops itself onto Windows machines using an MSI installation package that alters registry values to replace a legitimate Windows system file [1]. The initial stage of infection relied on the third-party toolkit RIG Exploit Kit (EK). RIG EK is hosted on compromised or malicious websites and is dropped onto the unsuspecting system when they visit browse that site. The built-in Windows installer (MSIEXEC) is leveraged to run the installation package retrieved from the website. This, in turn, drops two files into the Windows directory – namely a malicious dynamic-link library (DLL) that acts as a loader, and the payload of the malware. After infection, PurpleFox is often used to retrieve and deploy other types of malware.
Subsequent Variants
Since its initial discovery, PurpleFox has also been observed leveraging PowerShell to enable fileless infection and additional privilege escalation vulnerabilities to increase the likelihood of successful infection [2]. The PowerShell script had also been reported to be masquerading as a .jpg image file. PowerSploit modules are utilized to gain elevated privileges if the current user lacks administrator privileges. Once obtained, the script proceeds to retrieve and execute a malicious MSI package, also masquerading as an image file. As of 2020, PurpleFox no longer relied on the RIG EK for its delivery phase, instead spreading via the exploitation of the SMB protocol [3]. The malware would leverage the compromised systems as hosts for the PurpleFox payloads to facilitate its spread to other systems. This mode of infection can occur without any user action, akin to a worm.
The current iteration of PurpleFox reportedly uses brute-forcing of vulnerable services, such as SMB, to facilitate its spread over the network and escalate privileges. By scanning internet-facing Windows computers, PurpleFox exploits weak passwords for Windows user accounts through SMB, including administrative credentials to facilitate further privilege escalation.
Darktrace detection of PurpleFox
In July 2023, Darktrace observed an example of a PurpleFox infection on the network of a customer in the healthcare sector. This observation was a slightly different method of downloading the PurpleFox payload. An affected device was observed initiating a series of service control requests using DCE-RPC, instructing the device to make connections to a host of servers to download a malicious .PNG file, later confirmed to be the PurpleFox rootkit. The device was then observed carrying out worm-like activity to other external internet-facing servers, as well as scanning related subnets.
Darktrace DETECT™ was able to successfully identify and track this compromise across the cyber kill chain and ensure the customer was able to take swift remedial action to prevent the attack from escalating further.
While the customer in question did have Darktrace RESPOND™, it was configured in human confirmation mode, meaning any mitigative actions had to be manually applied by the customer’s security team. If RESPOND had been enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of the attack, it would have been able to take swift action against the compromise to contain it at the earliest instance.
攻撃の概要

Initial Scanning over SMB
On July 14, 2023, Darktrace detected the affected device scanning other internal devices on the customer’s network via port 445. The numerous connections were consistent with the aforementioned worm-like activity that has been reported from PurpleFox behavior as it appears to be targeting SMB services looking for open or vulnerable channels to exploit.
This initial scanning activity was detected by Darktrace DETECT, specifically through the model breach ‘Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity’. Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst™ then launched an autonomous investigation into these internal connections and tied them into one larger-scale network reconnaissance incident, rather than a series of isolated connections.

As Darktrace RESPOND was configured in human confirmation mode, it was unable to autonomously block these internal connections. However, it did suggest blocking connections on port 445, which could have been manually applied by the customer’s security team.

特権昇格
The device successfully logged in via NTLM with the credential, ‘administrator’. Darktrace recognized that the endpoint was external to the customer’s environment, indicating that the affected device was now being used to propagate the malware to other networks. Considering the lack of observed brute-force activity up to this point, the credentials for ‘administrator’ had likely been compromised prior to Darktrace’s deployment on the network, or outside of Darktrace’s purview via a phishing attack.
Exploitation
Darktrace then detected a series of service control requests over DCE-RPC using the credential ‘admin’ to make SVCCTL Create Service W Requests. A script was then observed where the controlled device is instructed to launch mshta.exe, a Windows-native binary designed to execute Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) files. This enables the execution of arbitrary script code, VBScript in this case.


There are a few MSIEXEC flags to note:
- /i : installs or configures a product
- /Q : sets the user interface level. In this case, it is set to ‘No UI’, which is used for “quiet” execution, so no user interaction is required
Evidently, this was an attempt to evade detection by endpoint users as it is surreptitiously installed onto the system. This corresponds to the download of the rootkit that has previously been associated with PurpleFox. At this stage, the infected device continues to be leveraged as an attack device and scans SMB services over external endpoints. The device also appeared to attempt brute-forcing over NTLM using the same ‘administrator’ credential to these endpoints. This activity was identified by Darktrace DETECT which, if enabled in autonomous response mode would have instantly blocked similar outbound connections, thus preventing the spread of PurpleFox.

Installation
On August 9, Darktrace observed the device making initial attempts to download a malicious .PNG file. This was a notable change in tactics from previously reported PurpleFox campaigns which had been observed utilizing .MOE files for their payloads [3]. The .MOE payloads are binary files that are more easily detected and blocked by traditional signatured-based security measures as they are not associated with known software. The ubiquity of .PNG files, especially on the web, make identifying and blacklisting the files significantly more difficult.
The first connection was made with the URI ‘/test.png’. It was noted that the HTTP method here was HEAD, a method similar to GET requests except the server must not return a message-body in the response.
The metainformation contained in the HTTP headers in response to a HEAD request should be identical to the information sent in response to a GET request. This method is often used to test hypertext links for validity and recent modification. This is likely a way of checking if the server hosting the payload is still active. Avoiding connections that could possibly be detected by antivirus solutions can help keep this activity under-the-radar.


The server responds with a status code of 200 before the download begins. The HEAD request could be part of the attacker’s verification that the server is still running, and that the payload is available for download. The ‘/test.png’ HEAD request was sent twice, likely for double confirmation to begin the file transfer.

Subsequent analysis using a Packet Capture (PCAP) tool revealed that this connection used the Windows Installer user agent that has previously been associated with PurpleFox. The device then began to download a payload that was masquerading as a Microsoft Word document. The device was thus able to download the payload twice, from two separate endpoints.
By masquerading as a Microsoft Word file, the threat actor was likely attempting to evade the detection of the endpoint user and traditional security tools by passing off as an innocuous text document. Likewise, using a Windows Installer user agent would enable threat actors to bypass antivirus measures and disguise the malicious installation as legitimate download activity.
Darktrace DETECT identified that these were masqueraded file downloads by correctly identifying the mismatch between the file extension and the true file type. Subsequently, AI Analyst was able to correctly identify the file type and deduced that this download was indicative of the device having been compromised.
In this case, the device attempted to download the payload from several different endpoints, many of which had low antivirus detection rates or open-source intelligence (OSINT) flags, highlighting the need to move beyond traditional signature-base detections.



If Darktrace RESPOND was enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of the attack it would have acted by blocking connections to these suspicious endpoints, thus preventing the download of malicious files. However, as RESPOND was in human confirmation mode, RESPOND actions required manual application by the customer’s security team which unfortunately did not happen, as such the device was able to download the payloads.
結論
The PurpleFox malware is a particularly dynamic strain known to continually evolve over time, utilizing a blend of old and new approaches to achieve its goals which is likely to muddy expectations on its behavior. By frequently employing new methods of attack, malicious actors are able to bypass traditional security tools that rely on signature-based detections and static lists of indictors of compromise (IoCs), necessitating a more sophisticated approach to threat detection.
Darktrace DETECT’s Self-Learning AI enables it to confront adaptable and elusive threats like PurpleFox. By learning and understanding customer networks, it is able to discern normal network behavior and patterns of life, distinguishing expected activity from potential deviations. This anomaly-based approach to threat detection allows Darktrace to detect cyber threats as soon as they emerge.
By combining DETECT with the autonomous response capabilities of RESPOND, Darktrace customers are able to effectively safeguard their digital environments and ensure that emerging threats can be identified and shut down at the earliest stage of the kill chain, regardless of the tactics employed by would-be attackers.
Credit to Piramol Krishnan, Cyber Analyst, Qing Hong Kwa, Senior Cyber Analyst & Deputy Team Lead, Singapore
付録
Darktraceによるモデル検知
- Device / Increased External Connectivity
- Device / Large Number of Connections to New Endpoints
- Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Admin)
- Compliance / External Windows Communications
- Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control
- Compromise / Unusual SVCCTL Activity
- Compromise / Rare Domain Pointing to Internal IP
- Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer
RESPOND Models
- Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block
- Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block
- Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
- Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block
- Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block
- Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block
IoC一覧
IoC - Type - Description
/C558B828.Png - URI - URI for Purple Fox Rootkit [4]
5b1de649f2bc4eb08f1d83f7ea052de5b8fe141f - File Hash - SHA1 hash of C558B828.Png file (Malware payload)
190.4.210[.]242 - IP - Purple Fox C2 Servers
218.4.170[.]236 - IP - IP for download of .PNG file (Malware payload)
180.169.1[.]220 - IP - IP for download of .PNG file (Malware payload)
103.94.108[.]114:10837 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
221.199.171[.]174:16543 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
61.222.155[.]49:14098 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
178.128.103[.]246:17880 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
222.134.99[.]132:12539 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
164.90.152[.]252:18075 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
198.199.80[.]121:11490 - IP - IP from Service Control MSIEXEC script to download PNG file (Malware payload)
MITRE ATT&CK マッピング
Tactic - Technique
Reconnaissance - Active Scanning T1595, Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks T1595.001, Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning T1595.002
Resource Development - Obtain Capabilities: Malware T1588.001
Initial Access, Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation - Valid Accounts: Default Accounts T1078.001
Initial Access - Drive-by Compromise T1189
Defense Evasion - Masquerading T1036
Credential Access - Brute Force T1110
Discovery - Network Service Discovery T1046
Command and Control - Proxy: External Proxy T1090.002
参考文献
- https://blog.360totalsecurity.com/en/purple-fox-trojan-burst-out-globally-and-infected-more-than-30000-users/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/purple-fox-fileless-malware-with-rookit-component-delivered-by-rig-exploit-kit-now-abuses-powershell.html
- https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/purple-fox-rootkit-now-propagates-as-a-worm
- https://www.foregenix.com/blog/an-overview-on-purple-fox
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_sg/research/21/j/purplefox-adds-new-backdoor-that-uses-websockets.html
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$70 Million in Cyber Security Funding for Electric Cooperatives & Utilities



What is the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal?
The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law passed by congress in 2021 aimed to upgrade power and infrastructure to deliver clean, reliable energy across the US to achieve zero-emissions. To date, the largest investment in clean energy, the deal will fund new programs to support the development and deployment of clean energy technology.
Why is it relevant to electric municipalities?
Section 40124 of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law allocates $250 million over a 5-year period to create the Rural and Municipal Utility Cybersecurity (RMUC) Program to help electric cooperative, municipal, and small investor-owned utilities protect against, detect, respond to, and recover from cybersecurity threats.1 This act illuminates the value behind a full life-cycle approach to cyber security. Thus, finding a cyber security solution that can provide all aspects of security in one integrated platform would enhance the overall security posture and ease many of the challenges that arise with adopting multiple point solutions.
On November 16, 2023 the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) released the Advanced Cybersecurity Technology (ACT) for electric utilities offering a $70 million funding opportunity that aims to enhance the cybersecurity posture of electric cooperative, municipal, and small investor-owned utilities.
Funding Details
10 projects will be funded with application submissions due November 29, 2023, 5:00 pm ET with $200,000 each in cash prizes in the following areas:
- Direct support for eligible utilities to make investments in cybersecurity technologies, tools, training, and improvements in utility processes and procedures;
- Funding to strengthen the peer-to-peer and not-for-profit cybersecurity technical assistance ecosystem currently serving eligible electric utilities; and
- Increasing access to cybersecurity technical assistance and training for eligible utilities with limited cybersecurity resources. 2
To submit for this award visit: https://www.herox.com/ACT1Prize
How can electric municipalities utilize the funding?
While the adoption of hybrid working patterns increase cloud and SaaS usage, the number of industrial IoT devices also continues to rise. The result is decrease in visibility for security teams and new entry points for attackers. Particularly for energy and utility organizations.
Electric cooperatives seeking to enhance their cyber security posture can aim to invest in cyber security tools that provide the following:
Compliance support: Consider finding an OT security solution that maps out how its solutions and features help your organization comply with relevant compliance mandates such as NIST, ISA, FERC, TSA, HIPAA, CIS Controls, and more.
Anomaly based detection: Siloed security solutions also fail to detect attacks that span
the entire organization. Anomaly-based detection enhances an organization’s cyber security posture by proactively defending against potential attacks and maintaining a comprehensive view of their attack surface.
Integration capabilities: Implementation of several point solutions that complete individual tasks runs the risk of increasing workloads for operators and creates additional challenges with compliance, budgeting, and technical support. Look for cyber security tools that integrate with your existing technologies.
Passive and active asset tracking: Active Identification offers accurate enumeration, real time updates, vulnerability assessment, asset validation while Passive Identification eliminates the risk of operational disruption, minimizes risk, does not generate additional network traffic. It would be ideal to find a security solution that can do both.
Can secure both IT and OT in unison: Given that most OT cyber-attacks actually start in IT networks before pivoting into OT, a mature security posture for critical infrastructure would include a single solution for both IT and OT. Separate solutions for IT and OT present challenges when defending network boundaries and detecting incidents when an attacker pivots from IT to OT. These independent solutions also significantly increase operator workload and materially diminish risk mitigation efforts.
Darktrace/OT for Electric Cooperatives and Utilities
For smaller teams with just one or two dedicated employees, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst and Investigation features allow end users to spend less time in the platform as it compiles critical incidents into comprehensive actionable event reports. AI Analyst brings all the information into a centralized view with incident reporting in natural language summaries and can be generated for compliance reports specific to regulatory requirements.
For larger teams, Darktrace alerts can be forwarded to 3rd party platforms such as a SIEM, where security team decision making is augmented. Additionally, executive reports and autonomous response reduce the alert fatigue generally associated with legacy tools. Most importantly, Darktrace’s unique understanding of normal allows security teams to detect zero-days and signatureless attacks regardless of the size of the organization and how alerts are consumed.
Key Benefits of Darktrace/OT
- Anomaly-based detection and real-time response
- Secures IT, OT, and IoT in unison
- Active and Passive Asset Identification
- Automated security reporting
- Attack surface management and vulnerability assessment
- Covers all levels of the Purdue Model
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