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Eメールセキュリティの統合により、各サイロの総和を超える体制を構築

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17
Apr 2023
17
Apr 2023
サイバー攻撃の94%は受信トレイから侵入してきますが、その行き先はほとんどEメールではありません。攻撃の行き先は、クラウドアプリやインフラ、エンドポイント、ネットワークなど、他の領域に及ぶことが多いのです。そのため、セキュリティチームは、Eメールセキュリティの強固な基盤を確立する必要がありますが、それらのソリューションがより広範なセキュリティ体制にどのように適合するかも考慮する必要があります。

Darktrace/Email™は、それ自体で、攻撃が従業員の受信トレイに到達する前に阻止し、セキュリティチームと従業員自身の双方を考慮します。しかし、その価値はメールセキュリティにとどまらず、Darktrace 製品や外部ツールなど、より広範なセキュリティエコシステムと統合する能力によって向上しています。 

Darktraceは、御社と御社の組織全体に対する理解を、御社がデータを持っている領域であればどこでも適用することができます。サイバーセキュリティに対するこの統一的なアプローチは、Cyber AI Loop™の基礎を築くもので、Darktrace の全製品がAI出力を相互にフィードし、自律的かつ継続的にセキュリティ体制全体を強化します。また、AIはデータを取り込み、共有することで、組織が導入している他のセキュリティソリューションも充実させます。このような統合の度合いにより、セキュリティスタックは、その部分の総和を超えるものになるのです。 

Darktrace Cyber AI Loop graphic
図1:Darktrace のすべての製品とカバーエリアが互いにフィードバックするCyber AI Loop

Eメールの枠を超えた統合で検知・対処能力を強化する 

Eメールのセキュリティをデジタル資産の他の領域と統合することで、必要なリソースを削減しながら、防御を強化することができます。より多くのデータにより、セキュリティチームはセキュリティスタックと攻撃がどのようにシステムを通過していくかをより深く理解することができます。

従来のセキュリティソリューションでは、さまざまなツールからの入力を手動で集約するか、ネイティブな統合機能を持たないSIEMを使用してデータを照合することでこれを実現していました。これに対し、Darktrace'の統合は、製品間でリアルタイムにインテリジェントな通信を行い、セキュリティチームに情報を提供します。 

例えば、ネットワークアクティビティのコンテキストは、より全体的なEメールセキュリティを提供することができます。ユーザーが訪問するウェブサイトとEメールを送る相手には強い相関関係があります。つまり、ウェブトラフィックのような情報はEメールの脅威に関する洞察を提供し、その逆もまた然りです。 

ある組織が、見知らぬ新しい送信者からEメールを受け取り、それが偶然にも誰も訪れたことのないドメインから送信されていた場合、その追加されたコンテキストは、実行するアクションの攻撃レベルに影響を与える可能性があります。エンドポイントセキュリティとの統合により、このような情報に基づく意思決定がリモート環境でも可能になります。これらの例は、Darktrace/Network™とDarktrace/Endpoint™をEメールカバレッジと組み合わせることで、特許も取得済みの独自の能力を発揮します。 

Diagram depicting the flow of email activity generated by Darktrace Email Security tool.
図2: Darktrace/Emailは、Darktrace/NetworkおよびDarktrace/Endpointと連携して、WebトラフィックからEメールのインサイトを生成し、その逆も可能 

Eメールのアクティビティは、さらに直接的な方法でクラウド/SaaSアプリケーションのアカウントアクティビティと結びついています。アカウント乗っ取りの場合、Microsoft 365への不審なログインに続いて、新しい受信トレイのルールが作成されるなど、非常に珍しいEメールアクティビティが発生すると、さらに不審に思われます。多くのEメールセキュリティソリューションは受信トレイだけに焦点を当てていますが、これらの領域を単一のスコープで見ることは、インシデントの完全なタイムラインを理解したいセキュリティチームにとって重要です。 

このため、Darktrace は、各ユーザーとその行動に関する 360 度のビューを作成します。この包括的なビューは、ネイティブのセキュリティ監視ツールを超えるもので、セキュリティチームは、データ流出、人的ミス、Eメールの誤送信、不適切なリンク共有、異常なログ活動などの事例を即座に特定することができます。 

ある実例では、Darktrace/EmailとDarktrace/Apps™のおかげで、セキュリティチームはEメールとSaaSの両方の視点から攻撃を見て、全体像を素早く理解することができました。 

Darktrace は、この統合されたセキュリティスタックから大きな価値を得ています。「この製品群のおかげで、エコシステム全体を100%可視化できるようになり、素晴らしいことです。そのためには、多くの製品を使用する必要がありますが、Darktrace の製品では、そのすべてが1つにまとまっています」と、ある大手信用組合の企業セキュリティおよび不正管理担当バイスプレジデントはコメントしています。 

サイバー業界では、サイロ化したソリューションが大きな痛手となっています。ほとんどの企業では、セキュリティスタックに複数のツールを多重的に導入しています。これらのツール間のコミュニケーションがほとんどない場合、セキュリティチームは増大する作業負荷に対処しなければならず、価値を見失うことになります。毎日すべてのソリューションを監視するだけでなく、複数の異なるダッシュボードを操作し、言語や用語を翻訳し、データを手動で相関させる方法を学ばなければなりません。このようなプロセスは、特に複雑化し、攻撃のペースが速くなる脅威ランドスケープにおいて、チームにとってセキュリティの維持をより困難なものにしています。 

Darktrace/Email は、セキュリティチームが既に使用している他のツールとの間で情報を送受信することで、それらがDarktraceの製品スタックの一部であるかどうかにかかわらず、ワークフローを最適化し、セキュリティチームがより大規模で戦略的なプロジェクトにリソースを再配分できるようにします。  

Eメールセキュリティとサイバーリスクマネジメントツールを横断するコラボレーション

Eメール保護とサイバーリスクマネジメントツールを同期させることで、さらにリスクを低減し、セキュリティを強固にすることができます。

クライアントのブランドに関連するドメイン名からEメールを受信した場合、攻撃対象範囲に含めるべきか、悪意のあるドメインの応答をトリガーすべきか、アタックサーフェス管理ツールが自動的に分析することができます。 

一方、アタックサーフェス管理ツールが、疑わしいドメイン、なりすましサイト、タイポスクワッターなどの悪意のある資産を特定した場合、Eメールセキュリティの意思決定に役立てることができます。ツール間の統合により、これらの悪意のある資産は自動的にインバウンドメールの感度を高めた監視ドメインとなります。 

このような統合的なリスク低減は、社内でも起こり得ます。セキュリティチームが社内の視点からサイバーリスクを見ると、社内のデジタル資産の中から攻撃経路や価値の高い標的を特定することができます。この理解を活用することで、Darktrace はどの従業員が潜在的な攻撃経路の重要な構成要素であるかを判断することができます。そして、実際のコミュニケーションパターンやカレンダーのデータなどを使ってフィッシングシミュレーションを行い、その結果をAIが検証することができます。これらのテストによって得られた知見は、Darktrace/Emailにフィードバックされ、感度を高めるなどして環境を強化することができます。 

これは、Darktrace/EmailDarktrace PREVENT™ を組み合わせることの利点を示しています。 Cyber AI Loopの一部として、Eメールセキュリティとサイバーリスクマネジメントの間のこれらの接続は、セキュリティチームが理解し、行動することが容易になっています。あるお客様は、この統合によってセキュリティチームのワークフローが改善されたと述べています。  

ある建設会社の最高情報責任者(CIO)は、「Darktrace を使えば使うほど、より良い相関関係を構築することができます。だからこそ、私たちは現在Darktrace を使っているのです。私たちはDarktrace の全体的なフットプリントを持ち、より多くのモジュールが私たちのために稼働し、別々に、あるいは孤立して相関を行う必要がないため、私たちに大きな利益をもたらしています」と述べています。 

外部セキュリティソリューションとの親和性をサポート

Darktrace/Emailはまた外部ツールとも連携しています。Microsoft 365やGoogle WorkspaceなどのEメールプロバイダとの成熟した統合に加え、Darktrace/Emailはオープンアーキテクチャを採用しているため、非常に柔軟性があります。API駆動でsyslogとの互換性があるため、あらゆるセキュリティツールと統合し、SIEMやSOARにフィードすることが可能です。 

この無限の統合能力により、Darktrace はより多くのデータにアクセスすることで、より正確に脅威を検知対処することができます。また、すべての関連情報を1枚の画面に収めることで、セキュリティチームの意味付けまでの時間を短縮することができます。 

Darktrace/Emailは、Darktrace モバイルアプリの一部でもあり、セキュリティチームは、外出先でもいつでも通知、レポート、改善アクションを確認することができます。このようにDarktrace は、より大きなセキュリティ態勢に適合するだけでなく、従業員の日々のワークフローにも適合しています。 

最後に、Darktrace/Emailは、データエクスポートをサポートしています。これにより、Eメール環境内で収集したデータを翻訳して共有することができ、セキュリティチームは、Darktrace/Emailで生成された重要な手掛かりを組織内の誰にでも伝えることができるようになります。Microsoft Excelやその他のデータ分析ツールに直接エクスポートすることができます。これは、IT、コンプライアンス、財務などの他部門と連携するセキュリティチームにとって、特に有用です。 

統合はDarktrace パートナーシップの価値を高める

Darktrace/Emailはそれ自体で強力なツールですが、その価値の大きな源泉は、Darktrace の他のツール、人、およびプロセスとの互換性にあります。 

複数のDarktrace 製品を導入することで、強固なセキュリティエコシステムが構築され、サイロを破壊してワークフローを改善しながら検知を強化するため、セキュリティチームはより高度で戦略的な業務に取り組むことができるようになります。外部ツールとの統合により、Darktrace は自身の価値を高めるだけでなく、チームがすでに持っている他のセキュリティソリューションの投資対効果を最大化することができます。  

INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
AUTHOR
ABOUT ThE AUTHOR
Dan Fein
VP, Product

Based in New York, Dan joined Darktrace’s technical team in 2015, helping customers quickly achieve a complete and granular understanding of Darktrace’s product suite. Dan has a particular focus on Darktrace/Email, ensuring that it is effectively deployed in complex digital environments, and works closely with the development, marketing, sales, and technical teams. Dan holds a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science from New York University.

Carlos Gray
Product Manager

Carlos Gonzalez Gray is a Product Marketing Manager at Darktrace. Based in the Madrid Office, Carlos engages with the global product team to ensure each product supports the company’s overall strategy and goals throughout their entire lifecycle. Previous to his position in the product team, Carlos worked as a Cyber Technology Specialist where he specialized in the OT sector protecting critical infrastructure.  His background as a consultant in Spain to IBEX 35 companies led him to become well versed in matters of compliance, auditing and data privacy as well. Carlos holds an Honors BA in Political Science and a Masters in Cybersecurity from IE University.

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A Thorn in Attackers’ Sides: How Darktrace Uncovered a CACTUS Ransomware Infection

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24
Apr 2024

What is CACTUS Ransomware?

In May 2023, Kroll Cyber Threat Intelligence Analysts identified CACTUS as a new ransomware strain that had been actively targeting large commercial organizations since March 2023 [1]. CACTUS ransomware gets its name from the filename of the ransom note, “cAcTuS.readme.txt”. Encrypted files are appended with the extension “.cts”, followed by a number which varies between attacks, e.g. “.cts1” and “.cts2”.

As the cyber threat landscape adapts to ever-present fast-paced technological change, ransomware affiliates are employing progressively sophisticated techniques to enter networks, evade detection and achieve their nefarious goals.

How does CACTUS Ransomware work?

In the case of CACTUS, threat actors have been seen gaining initial network access by exploiting Virtual Private Network (VPN) services. Once inside the network, they may conduct internal scanning using tools like SoftPerfect Network Scanner, and PowerShell commands to enumerate endpoints, identify user accounts, and ping remote endpoints. Persistence is maintained by the deployment of various remote access methods, including legitimate remote access tools like Splashtop, AnyDesk, and SuperOps RMM in order to evade detection, along with malicious tools like Cobalt Strike and Chisel. Such tools, as well as custom scripts like TotalExec, have been used to disable security software to distribute the ransomware binary. CACTUS ransomware is unique in that it adopts a double-extortion tactic, stealing data from target networks and then encrypting it on compromised systems [2].

At the end of November 2023, cybersecurity firm Arctic Wolf reported instances of CACTUS attacks exploiting vulnerabilities on the Windows version of the business analytics platform Qlik, specifically CVE-2023-41266, CVE-2023-41265, and CVE-2023-48365, to gain initial access to target networks [3]. The vulnerability tracked as CVE-2023-41266 can be exploited to generate anonymous sessions and perform HTTP requests to unauthorized endpoints, whilst CVE-2023-41265 does not require authentication and can be leveraged to elevate privileges and execute HTTP requests on the backend server that hosts the application [2].

Darktrace’s Coverage of CACTUS Ransomware

In November 2023, Darktrace observed malicious actors leveraging the aforementioned method of exploiting Qlik to gain access to the network of a customer in the US, more than a week before the vulnerability was reported by external researchers.

Here, Qlik vulnerabilities were successfully exploited, and a malicious executable (.exe) was detonated on the network, which was followed by network scanning and failed Kerberos login attempts. The attack culminated in the encryption of numerous files with extensions such as “.cts1”, and SMB writes of the ransom note “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to multiple internal devices, all of which was promptly identified by Darktrace DETECT™.

While traditional rules and signature-based detection tools may struggle to identify the malicious use of a legitimate business platform like Qlik, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was able to confidently identify anomalous use of the tool in a CACTUS ransomware attack by examining the rarity of the offending device’s surrounding activity and comparing it to the learned behavior of the device and its peers.

Unfortunately for the customer in this case, Darktrace RESPOND™ was not enabled in autonomous response mode during their encounter with CACTUS ransomware meaning that attackers were able to successfully escalate their attack to the point of ransomware detonation and file encryption. Had RESPOND been configured to autonomously act on any unusual activity, Darktrace could have prevented the attack from progressing, stopping the download of any harmful files, or the encryption of legitimate ones.

Cactus Ransomware Attack Overview

Holiday periods have increasingly become one of the favoured times for malicious actors to launch their attacks, as they can take advantage of the festive downtime of organizations and their security teams, and the typically more relaxed mindset of employees during this period [4].

Following this trend, in late November 2023, Darktrace began detecting anomalous connections on the network of a customer in the US, which presented multiple indicators of compromise (IoCs) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) associated with CACTUS ransomware. The threat actors in this case set their attack in motion by exploiting the Qlik vulnerabilities on one of the customer’s critical servers.

Darktrace observed the server device making beaconing connections to the endpoint “zohoservice[.]net” (IP address: 45.61.147.176) over the course of three days. This endpoint is known to host a malicious payload, namely a .zip file containing the command line connection tool PuttyLink [5].

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to autonomously identify over 1,000 beaconing connections taking place on the customer’s network and group them together, in this case joining the dots in an ongoing ransomware attack. AI Analyst recognized that these repeated connections to highly suspicious locations were indicative of malicious command-and-control (C2) activity.

Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.

The infected device was then observed downloading the file “putty.zip” over a HTTP connection using a PowerShell user agent. Despite being labelled as a .zip file, Darktrace’s detection capabilities were able to identify this as a masqueraded PuttyLink executable file. This activity resulted in multiple Darktrace DETECT models being triggered. These models are designed to look for suspicious file downloads from endpoints not usually visited by devices on the network, and files whose types are masqueraded, as well as the anomalous use of PowerShell. This behavior resembled previously observed activity with regards to the exploitation of Qlik Sense as an intrusion technique prior to the deployment of CACTUS ransomware [5].

The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.
Figure 2: The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.

Following the download of the masqueraded file, Darktrace observed the initial infected device engaging in unusual network scanning activity over the SMB, RDP and LDAP protocols. During this activity, the credential, “service_qlik” was observed, further indicating that Qlik was exploited by threat actors attempting to evade detection. Connections to other internal devices were made as part of this scanning activity as the attackers attempted to move laterally across the network.

Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.
Figure 3: Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.

The compromised server was then seen initiating multiple sessions over the RDP protocol to another device on the customer’s network, namely an internal DNS server. External researchers had previously observed this technique in CACTUS ransomware attacks where an RDP tunnel was established via Plink [5].

A few days later, on November 24, Darktrace identified over 20,000 failed Kerberos authentication attempts for the username “service_qlik” being made to the internal DNS server, clearly representing a brute-force login attack. There is currently a lack of open-source intelligence (OSINT) material definitively listing Kerberos login failures as part of a CACTUS ransomware attack that exploits the Qlik vulnerabilities. This highlights Darktrace’s ability to identify ongoing threats amongst unusual network activity without relying on existing threat intelligence, emphasizing its advantage over traditional security detection tools.

Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.
Figure 4: Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.

In the month following these failed Kerberos login attempts, between November 26 and December 22, Darktrace observed multiple internal devices encrypting files within the customer’s environment with the extensions “.cts1” and “.cts7”. Devices were also seen writing ransom notes with the file name “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to two additional internal devices, as well as files likely associated with Qlik, such as “QlikSense.pdf”. This activity detected by Darktrace confirmed the presence of a CACTUS ransomware infection that was spreading across the customer’s network.

The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.
Figure 5: The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.
CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.
Figure 6: CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.

Following this initial encryption activity, two affected devices were observed attempting to remove evidence of this activity by deleting the encrypted files.

Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.
Figure 7: Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.

結論

In the face of this CACTUS ransomware attack, Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection enabled it to quickly identify multiple stages of the cyber kill chain occurring in the customer’s environment. These stages ranged from ‘initial access’ by exploiting Qlik vulnerabilities, which Darktrace was able to detect before the method had been reported by external researchers, to ‘actions on objectives’ by encrypting files. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was also able to detect a previously unreported stage of the attack: multiple Kerberos brute force login attempts.

If Darktrace’s autonomous response capability, RESPOND, had been active and enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of this attack, it would have been able to take swift mitigative action to shut down such suspicious activity as soon as it was identified by DETECT, effectively containing the ransomware attack at the earliest possible stage.

Learning a network’s ‘normal’ to identify deviations from established patterns of behaviour enables Darktrace’s identify a potential compromise, even one that uses common and often legitimately used administrative tools. This allows Darktrace to stay one step ahead of the increasingly sophisticated TTPs used by ransomware actors.

Credit to Tiana Kelly, Cyber Analyst & Analyst Team Lead, Anna Gilbertson, Cyber Analyst

付録

参考文献

[1] https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/cactus-ransomware-prickly-new-variant-evades-detection

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cactus-ransomware-exploiting-qlik-sense-flaws-to-breach-networks/

[3] https://explore.avertium.com/resource/new-ransomware-strains-cactus-and-3am

[4] https://www.soitron.com/cyber-attackers-abuse-holidays/

[5] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/qlik-sense-exploited-in-cactus-ransomware-campaign/

Darktrace DETECT Models

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

Anomalous Connection / PowerShell to Rare External

Device / New PowerShell User Agent

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

User / Kerberos Password Brute Force

Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB

Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Delete Volume

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare  

Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination  

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server  

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)  

Compromise / Suspicious File and C2  

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert  

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches  

Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer

Anomalous File / Internet facing System File Download  

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise  

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)  

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)  

IoC一覧

IoC - Type - Description

zohoservice[.]net: 45.61.147[.]176 - Domain name: IP Address - Hosting payload over HTTP

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT; Windows NT 10.0; en-US) WindowsPowerShell/5.1.17763.2183 - User agent -PowerShell user agent

.cts1 - File extension - Malicious appendage

.cts7- File extension - Malicious appendage

cAcTuS.readme.txt - Filename -Ransom note

putty.zip – Filename - Initial payload: ZIP containing PuTTY Link

MITRE ATT&CK マッピング

Tactic - Technique  - SubTechnique

Web Protocols: COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071 -T1071.001

Powershell: EXECUTION - T1059 - T1059.001

Exploitation of Remote Services: LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210 – N/A

Vulnerability Scanning: RECONAISSANCE     - T1595 - T1595.002

Network Service Scanning: DISCOVERY - T1046 - N/A

Malware: RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1588 - T1588.001

Drive-by Compromise: INITIAL ACCESS - T1189 - N/A

Remote Desktop Protocol: LATERAL MOVEMENT – 1021 -T1021.001

Brute Force: CREDENTIAL ACCESS        T – 1110 - N/A

Data Encrypted for Impact: IMPACT - T1486 - N/A

Data Destruction: IMPACT - T1485 - N/A

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Tiana Kelly
Deputy Team Lead, London & Cyber Analyst

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The State of AI in Cybersecurity: How AI will impact the cyber threat landscape in 2024

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22
Apr 2024

About the AI Cybersecurity Report

We surveyed 1,800 CISOs, security leaders, administrators, and practitioners from industries around the globe. Our research was conducted to understand how the adoption of new AI-powered offensive and defensive cybersecurity technologies are being managed by organizations.

This blog is continuing the conversation from our last blog post “The State of AI in Cybersecurity: Unveiling Global Insights from 1,800 Security Practitioners” which was an overview of the entire report. This blog will focus on one aspect of the overarching report, the impact of AI on the cyber threat landscape.

To access the full report click here.

Are organizations feeling the impact of AI-powered cyber threats?

Nearly three-quarters (74%) state AI-powered threats are now a significant issue. Almost nine in ten (89%) agree that AI-powered threats will remain a major challenge into the foreseeable future, not just for the next one to two years.

However, only a slight majority (56%) thought AI-powered threats were a separate issue from traditional/non AI-powered threats. This could be the case because there are few, if any, reliable methods to determine whether an attack is AI-powered.

Identifying exactly when and where AI is being applied may not ever be possible. However, it is possible for AI to affect every stage of the attack lifecycle. As such, defenders will likely need to focus on preparing for a world where threats are unique and are coming faster than ever before.

a hypothetical cyber attack augmented by AI at every stage

Are security stakeholders concerned about AI’s impact on cyber threats and risks?

The results from our survey showed that security practitioners are concerned that AI will impact organizations in a variety of ways. There was equal concern associated across the board – from volume and sophistication of malware to internal risks like leakage of proprietary information from employees using generative AI tools.

What this tells us is that defenders need to prepare for a greater volume of sophisticated attacks and balance this with a focus on cyber hygiene to manage internal risks.

One example of a growing internal risks is shadow AI. It takes little effort for employees to adopt publicly-available text-based generative AI systems to increase their productivity. This opens the door to “shadow AI”, which is the use of popular AI tools without organizational approval or oversight. Resulting security risks such as inadvertent exposure of sensitive information or intellectual property are an ever-growing concern.

Are organizations taking strides to reduce risks associated with adoption of AI in their application and computing environment?

71.2% of survey participants say their organization has taken steps specifically to reduce the risk of using AI within its application and computing environment.

16.3% of survey participants claim their organization has not taken these steps.

These findings are good news. Even as enterprises compete to get as much value from AI as they can, as quickly as possible, they’re tempering their eager embrace of new tools with sensible caution.

Still, responses varied across roles. Security analysts, operators, administrators, and incident responders are less likely to have said their organizations had taken AI risk mitigation steps than respondents in other roles. In fact, 79% of executives said steps had been taken, and only 54% of respondents in hands-on roles agreed. It seems that leaders believe their organizations are taking the needed steps, but practitioners are seeing a gap.

Do security professionals feel confident in their preparedness for the next generation of threats?

A majority of respondents (six out of every ten) believe their organizations are inadequately prepared to face the next generation of AI-powered threats.

The survey findings reveal contrasting perceptions of organizational preparedness for cybersecurity threats across different regions and job roles. Security administrators, due to their hands-on experience, express the highest level of skepticism, with 72% feeling their organizations are inadequately prepared. Notably, respondents in mid-sized organizations feel the least prepared, while those in the largest companies feel the most prepared.

Regionally, participants in Asia-Pacific are most likely to believe their organizations are unprepared, while those in Latin America feel the most prepared. This aligns with the observation that Asia-Pacific has been the most impacted region by cybersecurity threats in recent years, according to the IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index.

The optimism among Latin American respondents could be attributed to lower threat volumes experienced in the region, but it's cautioned that this could change suddenly (1).

What are biggest barriers to defending against AI-powered threats?

The top-ranked inhibitors center on knowledge and personnel. However, issues are alluded to almost equally across the board including concerns around budget, tool integration, lack of attention to AI-powered threats, and poor cyber hygiene.

The cybersecurity industry is facing a significant shortage of skilled professionals, with a global deficit of approximately 4 million experts (2). As organizations struggle to manage their security tools and alerts, the challenge intensifies with the increasing adoption of AI by attackers. This shift has altered the demands on security teams, requiring practitioners to possess broad and deep knowledge across rapidly evolving solution stacks.

Educating end users about AI-driven defenses becomes paramount as organizations grapple with the shortage of professionals proficient in managing AI-powered security tools. Operationalizing machine learning models for effectiveness and accuracy emerges as a crucial skill set in high demand. However, our survey highlights a concerning lack of understanding among cybersecurity professionals regarding AI-driven threats and the use of AI-driven countermeasures indicating a gap in keeping pace with evolving attacker tactics.

The integration of security solutions remains a notable problem, hindering effective defense strategies. While budget constraints are not a primary inhibitor, organizations must prioritize addressing these challenges to bolster their cybersecurity posture. It's imperative for stakeholders to recognize the importance of investing in skilled professionals and integrated security solutions to mitigate emerging threats effectively.

To access the full report click here.

参考文献

1. IBM, X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2024, Available at: https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/L0GKXDWJ

2. ISC2, Cybersecurity Workforce Study 2023, Available at: https://media.isc2.org/-/media/Project/ISC2/Main/Media/ documents/research/ISC2_Cybersecurity_Workforce_Study_2023.pdf?rev=28b46de71ce24e6ab7705f6e3da8637e

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